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This thesis adopts the methodology of systems theory to examine the limits of anti-discrimination 
law. The sociology of Niklas Luhmann, alongside extensions provided by Michel Foucault and Gilles 
Deleuze, is applied to construct a versatile re-description of anti-discrimination law. This is an 
innovative approach because it articulates the social basis for discrimination alongside a legal picture 
of anti-discrimination within the same theoretical framework. By considering each side of this 
discrimination/anti-discrimination equation the capacity of law to address discrimination is put into 
question. 
The difficulty of providing a philosophically sound explanation for discrimination involves a 
legitimate academic question, but it also indicates its limitation. This thesis argues that this difficultly 
reflects a genuine divergence between the social meaning of discrimination and the ability of moral 
philosophy to comprehend this phenomenon. Racism is analyzed as a confluence of moral, artistic, 
and mass mediated communications; it is communicated through inconsistency and complex 
repetition. This confluence is described by tracing societal differentiations and self-descriptions, as 
developed by Luhmann, with an emphasis on the history of manners as a precursor to modern 
racism.    
The legal picture of anti-discrimination presented here is divided into argumentation and decision. 
Firstly, the description of direct and indirect discrimination in terms of justice is questioned through 
an examination of argumentative limits, with legal liability being re-interpreted in the light of how 
concepts and interests inform argumentation. Secondly, the validity of a decision is analyzed as a 
separate problem for anti-discrimination law. The jurisprudence of the positivist Joseph Raz is 
criticized from the perspective of a Luhmannian theorization of law as symbolically valid decisions.  
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This thesis constructs an explanatory framework that redraws the limitations of anti-discrimination 
law by revealing [1] how racism is a protean social phenomenon, and [2] that separation of the legal 
understanding of anti-discrimination law into discrete streams exposes the concrete limitations 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
 
"Many things are much too delicate to be expressed in thought, let alone, to be put into words" 
(Luhmann, 2000a: 18, quoting Novalis) 
 
Overcoming discrimination has been one of the essential challenges of the late twentieth century. 
Through the enlightening discourses of social movements and the enforcement accorded by legal 
regulation material achievements have been made to address some of discrimination’s most virulent 
manifestations. Even though long-standing inequalities still persist one cannot doubt that significant 
successes have been accomplished. Discrimination is a problem for modern society. Its conceptual 
focus on the treatment of individuals has arisen alongside the differentiation of society which is at 
once dis-embedded from older conceptions of tradition and status, but is also struggling to find 
solutions to the problems of individualization enabled by this societal dynamic. The semantics of 
discrimination locks into this struggle and, as such, that which was once non-visible can no longer be 
unseen. And yet, even with attention to discrimination as a problem and with the creation of 
successful solutions, the extent to which its emanations and ideologies are still pervasive has 
surprised even the most knowledgeable of advocates. Contemporary political realities have exposed 
both the progress made, their limitations, and the difficulties that lie ahead. Just as it appears that 
the intellectual prophets of the 1990s were mistaken in their conclusion that liberal-democracy was 
an end of history, so too we may find that the achievements of the last six decades have been far 
more ephemeral than previously supposed.  
It now appears that expecting racism to be defeated by the election of the first Afro-American US 
President, or for sexism to fade away once more women are in positions of power, has been to 
presuppose a model of the world which does not approximate with reality. The rhetoric of inevitable 
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progression and attendant legal transformation has been too beguiling. Many recent events have 
thrown such expectations into relief, marking out discrimination as a complex and deep social 
phenomenon that involves more than the exhibition of outdated views and irrational bias; it can be 
shown to be a broader phenomenon than previously suspected encompassing the self-worth and 
self-respect of both the victim and the perpetrator. It is also a more elusive phenomenon than is 
classically supposed involving perception as well as structural bias, and lived experience alongside 
discrete actions.  
Legal regulation has been developed in many jurisdictions to protect persons against such 
phenomena by the prohibition of both direct and indirect forms of discrimination. In restricted 
circumstances, the law has also allowed affirmative action to promote actively equal opportunity to 
confront the influence of historical and structural discrimination. And yet, there is also something 
further in play, and already at work, that cannot be easily expressed in these terms.  This may be 
communicated with the sheer intensity of the gaze in which women find themselves, or the 
starkness with which race can become an issue in an interaction or a commentary. The words of 
Novalis cited above allude to this problem. Through their tightly-focused vision poets are often 
attuned to the fallibility of perception and language to form adequate representations. With the 
adoption of a critical mind-set we can see how statistics and public opinion can provide only a 
limited view on discrimination. There seem to be intensities that cannot be easily represented by 
word, fact, or figure. These intensities of discrimination are perhaps best approximated by various 
adjectives and participles - increasing, diminishing, exaggerating, demanding, compelling. They 
signify the manner in which distinctions actively operate, loosening and tightening connections 
between communications. These matters are salient components of discrimination. This thesis will 




Only if this problem can be theorized, can a way towards a plausible legal response also be 
constructed. Of course, as often occurs, we can certainly call for further legal regulation and more 
effective enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. A new generation of rights focused on more 
positive duties may be valuable (Hepple: 2011), and a greater codification of discrimination in 
accordance with a substantive notion of dignity (Fredman: 2011) may also promote the ideals of 
anti-discrimination law. And yet, the broader social basis on which discrimination operates remains 
barely formulated, and the limits of legal understanding barely conceived and assessed with a view 
to considering whether there are inherent limitations on how law can process discrimination claims.   
This thesis addresses several conjoined questions. What is the social basis of discrimination? How 
does the current philosophical and jurisprudential approach fail to adequately appreciate this social 
basis? What are the limits on how law can understand claims of discrimination and the discrete 
decisions made in such cases? The scholarship that responds to these issues presently offers an 
incomplete picture stemming from its basic methodological intuitions of consistency and coherence 
alongside an over-reliance on moral and political philosophy. Discrimination is certainly an issue 
which generates moral debates and it remains a presiding public policy concern, however this does 
not indicate that its generative foundations are delimited precisely in these terms, nor should we 
presume a constitutive affinity between anti-discrimination law and discrimination itself. Careful 
analysis of the legal categorizations of discrimination as they appear in statute and doctrine is a 
worthwhile area of study. Much may have been accomplished, but this does not mean that such a 
course can provide a complete representation of the phenomena, nor does it mean that alternative 
approaches cannot complement seemingly intractable dilemmas. We should not confuse the 
solution with the problem.   
It is important to maintain a level of critical reflexivity between the research methodology and the 
research object. I would argue that this lesson is especially compelling where the object under 
13 
 
inspection is complex in its nature, and where that object is sufficiently sensitive as to change in 
response to the research methodology adopted.1 It seems fair to surmise that the social basis of 
discrimination meets these criteria. Firstly, if it was not complex then it would not be differentiated 
into so many arguably contradictory concerns such as race, gender, sexuality, age, neither would it 
find itself manifested in ways which seem to extend from the scintilla's of personal interaction to the 
grand narratives of historical development. Secondly, it cannot be in doubt to even the most casual 
of observers that discrimination has responded and altered its disposition through contact with anti-
discrimination law and the equality movement. These two trends – contradiction and reflexivity – 
suggest that a more complementary approach would be productive, and Luhmann’s systems theory 
is well-placed to fulfill this challenge since it is a sociology epistemologically constructed upon 
paradox, reflexivity, and self-reference. 
Recent scholarship that couples sociological insight with legal analysis (e.g. Solanke: 2017) 
highlighting stigma as a core component of discrimination is closer to the line of analysis pursued 
here. This thesis proposes that the limitations of anti-discrimination law can be sufficiently outlined 
if a methodology is adopted that can do justice to the historical, social, and legal dimensions of 
discrimination – especially, when these dimensions seem to be radically divergent. The methodology 
of systems theory, as mainly developed by Niklas Luhmann, is utilized as a tool which can adequately 
outline the limitations of anti-discrimination law while situating the problem of discrimination within 
a social and historical context.  
                                                                
1
 Luhmann (1995:24) defines complexity as indicative of ‘immanent constraints in the elements’ connective 
capacity’. Therefore, it refers to a state of affairs in which each element cannot be related to every other 
element, and thus compels the observer to reduce complexity and produce a selective, fractured perspective 
on the state of affairs as a whole. This reduction is mirrored in the way in which various headings of 
discrimination diverge into specialized advocacy (feminist, anti-racist, disability, anti-homophobia). There are 
ample examples in which these headings are categorized as in competition. For example, Sandra Fredman 
(2008: 209) notes that an issue with collective action over equal pay is that it creates a competition of interests 
between trade unions and anti-sexism campaigners along with an over-shadowing of individual experience by 
collective goals. There have also been many misgivings about the subsumption of formerly specialized 
commissions under the umbrella of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (O’Cinneide: 2007). 
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This thesis will make the claim that the social basis for discrimination is located in a particular type of 
communication that focuses on the visible. To adequately understand such a framework recourse to 
a socio-historical method is required. In his genealogical excavations of power and knowledge, 
Michel Foucault (1970: 131) proposed that 'natural history is nothing more than the nomination of 
the visible'. The conditions which underpin the possibility of observation was a recurring motif 
through Foucault’s work – in the gazes of the medical profession and the architectural diagrams of 
power in the barracks and monastery through to Linnaeus’s taxonomy of the animal kingdom. The 
basis of discrimination too is best grasped by an interlacing of the conditions that delimit the 
possibilities of perception, observational perspectives, and the conditions for taxonomic 
descriptions. A conception of visibility in communication comes closest to providing a reconciliation 
of these difficult themes. Race is chosen as an archetype because of its long-held centrality to 
discrimination scholars and for reasons of economy. When the thesis moves in Chapters 7-10 to 
outlining the legal understanding of discrimination the emphasis on race is dropped in favor of a 
more general approach since the specificity of a protected characteristic does not feature as a 
constitutive element in the construction of either legal argumentation or decision.  
This broader notion of the visible can provide a platform for knitting together ways in which complex 
entities, such as labour and life, manage to bind together the strands of discrimination: the 
information and persuasiveness which the invocation of race provides at many different levels of 
sociality; the allocation of moral values and ethical reflections on these allocations whenever race is 
implicated; the way in which race manages to produce aesthetic compositions in which one can 
describe the world and even singular moments in new ways whilst maintaining a connection to how 
they were formerly comprehended. 
To this end a versatile methodology combining the insights of modern systems theory, of Gilles 
Deleuze, and of Michel Foucault will be utilized to explain how discrimination communicates as a 
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social problem, and how law understands this problem in its own extremely limited manner. As 
already noted above, Luhmann’s systemic architecture provides a great number of concepts which 
shed light on the social basis of discrimination, not least functional differentiation, societal self-
description, communicative media, and complexity. Its position as a ‘super-theory’ provides a more 
complete rendering of the problem than reliance on more specialized sociologies.2 And yet, this 
thesis found that Luhmann’s methodology should be supplemented in order to better understand 
the social basis of discrimination. Foucault’s diagrams of power illustrate how observational 
technologies (discipline, surveillance, governmentality) can be essential in understanding emergent 
social rationalities and organized complexity. Luhmann’s more top-down approach and reliance on 
system differentiation does not easily comprehend such elusive, contradictory, but amalgamated, 
phenomena.3  
Foucault’s genealogical method combines observation and complex repetition, described by Deleuze 
(1986: 49, 50ff) as ‘bands of visibility’, alongside his concern with the forgotten and downtrodden 
that provides a supplement to Luhmann’s systems architecture.4  Both were fascinated by the 
epistemic break of modernity; however Foucault provides a lens on social exclusion, a topic only 
discovered by Luhmann later in his career. Deleuze (1990, 1994) provides a further supplementation 
to Luhmann’s methodology through a more radical theory of time predicated on pure difference and 
complex repetition that goes beyond the Husserlian and Kantian predicates of Luhmann’s theory. 
Deleuze’s focus on pure difference provides a platform for understanding how race can intensify and 
irritate communications in functional systems and across such functional systems. As such Deleuze’s 
tripartite intagliation of temporal repetition is proposed as a means to circumvent Luhmann’s 
restrictions on systemic relations to structural coupling and interpenetration. The combination of 
                                                                
2
 For example Solanke (2017) who uses the insights of Erving Goffman on the interactive order and stigma to 
understand discrimination. 
3
 Poul Kjaer (2017) proposes that Luhmann continues in the tradition of German Idealism and smuggles in 
many of its conceptual insights, with limited acknowledgement, from Hegel, Fichte, and Kant. This would make 
Luhmann the idealist, to Foucault’s materialist. 
4
 Foucault (1979: 77) tried to bottle the little novellas of such people as ‘life-poems’ and ‘lightning-existences’. 
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Deleuze and Foucault is also needed to broaden Luhmann’s conception of the public as a medial sub-
stratum wherein the semantical antecedents of discrimination - which this thesis argues can be 
found in the socio-genetics of manner and esteem - are abstracted from textual mediums; indeed 
the modern semantics of racism abstract from a more complicated, temporal, public medium that is 
emergent in modern society. These methodologies combine to provide a description of 
discrimination from a socio-historical and philosophical angle which adds to those presently on offer 
in academic scholarship. 
This is not a detailed intellectual history of discrimination semantics. It is limited to a few key 
illustrations to show the connections between self-descriptions and semantics, artistic sensibility, 
communicative media, morality, and the dynamic of society and the world. Racism, and the 
semantics of discrimination for that matter, touches far too broad an array of topics - nationalism, 
anti-semitism, colonialism, psychology, political ideology - to be addressed fully in this thesis; 
moreover, there is a rich history in labour law in which anti-discrimination legislation and doctrinal 
development is analyzed and criticized in response to compelling social objectives and philosophical 
projects. This thesis aims to address the thesis questions outlined above such that some of the 
important limitations presupposed by academic scholarship and some important limits immanent to 
law and society are re-described from a systems informed perspective. This thesis hopes to show the 
benefits of a turn towards a more sociologically and critically informed examination of 
discrimination, and thus provide a perspective attuned to the intensities of discrimination.  
This thesis is not an exegetical exercise in how Luhmann, Foucault, or Deleuze did think or would 
have thought on discrimination.5 Racism and jurisprudence were only occasional concerns for these 
authors - although, Luhmann's prolificacy gives a false impression in this regard.6 Instead, their 
                                                                
5
 Stoler (1995), for example, undertakes such an analysis by delving into Foucault's posthumously published 
writings on governmentality, bio-power, and colonialism. 
6
 Nobles and Schiff (2017: 52-54) provide a recent confirmation of Luhmann's extensive writing on law and his 
expertise to do so.  
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systems of thought have provided a hospitable methodology that has been applied to generate 
illustrations of the social basis for racism, the legal arguments concerned with discrimination, and 
the decisions on discrimination. In terms of Chapters 7 to 10, however, Luhmann’s sociology of law is 
relied upon almost exclusively to explicate the immanent limitations on argumentation and decision.  
The thesis begins by outlining the limitations of discrimination law presupposed in the scholarship 
and identified in the legal categorizations of Anti-Discrimination law in the UK. Chapter 2 presents an 
overview of the approaches to discrimination law identifying the issues and perspectives of 
discrimination law scholarship. These include the moral philosophical explanations which seek to 
identify the ‘wrong’ which discrimination law is claimed to address. Topics and structures are 
identified as constituting common presumptions in the academic literature - core moral 
understandings of discrimination, the requirement for discrimination to be salient, and the 
identification of inconsistency as a symptom of discrimination. It is these limitations which provide a 
focus for a later re-description by the methodological insights outlined in Chapter 3 and explained 
further in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 3 will then proceed to provide an introduction to how systems theory can be aligned with 
socio-legal approaches to law with an emphasis on its empirical contribution. The key axioms of 
systems theory will be explained denoting points of particular relevance for discrimination law and 
this thesis: forms of societal differentiation, individuality, and human rights. 
In Chapter 4 Luhmann's theory of a functionally differentiated society is utilized to argue that 
discrimination can be connected to the development of major changes in the way that society 
describes itself. The form of societal differentiation prior to function was based on the stratifications 
of status. These were distributed by significant divisions within society between different social roles 
and institutions, such as the court and the country. The work of Norbert Elias in the Civilizing Process 
is utilized to show how developing theories of manner, courtesy, and civility provides a social 
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precursor to how discrimination operates in modern society. This analysis is presented as both an 
extension in the social aspect of discrimination in terms of respect, and as a prelude to 
discrimination in the modern world which must be understood as an emergent type of 
communication that crosses functional lines. 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide a description of discrimination in a functionally differentiated society. 
Racism is taken as an archetype of discrimination that combines contributions made from the mass 
media, moral communications, and art. An alternative mechanism to structural coupling is 
developed by recourse to the tripartite theory of repetition developed by Deleuze. From this 
position racism is categorized as a special type of communication that appears in the public 
capillaries between social systems. The emulation of esteemable behaviour projected by courtesy 
manuals and pamphlets on civility is transliterated into a fractured emulation of a Deleuzian time in 
itself. From a public medium presupposed by all social systems, fractured emulation ensures that 
race intensifies and sensitizes the channeling of irritations between social systems. The 
communication of race indicates a movement in which matters become visible and less visible, 
transparent and opaque. This active modality compels race to communicate through inconsistency 
and the reduction of complexity because only this structure can reveal at once that which was seen 
and not seen, spoken and silent, near-at-hand and distant, communicable and incommunicable.  
The positioning of race in the public medium allows it to operate between social systems. It can 
therefore contribute to the de-paradoxicalization of society's self-description through combining the 
universal and specific aspects of society in terms of visibility. As a singular identity it can throw into 
relief the universal and specific scheme that concerns the universality of society and its specific sub-
systems and the universality of each system and its specific operations. It avoids the paradox by 
making one side of the scheme visible in respect of the invisibility of other side of the scheme.7 
                                                                
7
 For example, one can communicate about the universality of society in respect of the incommunicability of a 
sub-system. Race makes the direction of society transparent by association with the opacity of a specific sub-
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Chapter 6 will illustrate this predicament by focusing on how labour and employment is a context in 
which race can handle the struggles faced by modernity in providing a description of society that is 
both universal in its scope and which can also account for the singularities of life and lived 
experience. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide a description of discrimination from the perspective of systems theory. 
The argument is made that the social basis of racism, and discrimination in toto, is a distinctively 
modern phenomenon tied to functional differentiation. Chapters 7-10 turn to the legal perspective 
and produce a re-description of law's responses to discrimination with regard to argumentation and 
decision. 
Chapters 7 and 8 focus on legal argumentation. Here Luhmann's theory of legal argument is 
explained. It is then applied to the conceptions of justice in anti-discrimination law whereby a 
different notion of justice is advanced with reference to the limits of legal argumentation. In chapter 
8 Luhmann's theory of argumentation is extended to assess the range of doctrinal justifications 
provided by discrimination law scholarship. It is deployed with reference to how the concept of 
liability is produced in discrimination cases. This theory of legal argumentation is then extended to 
emphasize the constraints of redundancy and variety on the generation of key concepts and 
interests in direct discrimination cases. 
Chapters 9 and 10 develop a Luhmannian understanding of a legally valid decision. The 
jurisprudence of Joseph Raz is used as a foil for this development. Decisions are distinct legal 
phenomena contrasted to legal arguments, and they provide another crucial position from which 
discrimination is constructed and dealt with by the law. The framework of a legal decision 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
system - the future of our country is in jeopardy because (i) we don't know the actual immigration figures, (ii) 
the real level of socio-political commitment of non-white and foreign members of the population, (iii) the 
actual number of illegal acts committed or not prosecuted against non-white and foreign members of the 
population. The connection between the real and artificial, actual and fake in such accounts indicates that 
there is a semantics of revelation already at work in such exempla.  
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expounded in Chapter 9 is then illustrated in Chapter 10. Here the principle of equality is re-analyzed 
as a limitative principle on the making of legal decisions that is preconditioned by the underlying 
actions of decision-makers. Consequently, rulings and rules are produced by such decisions in anti-























This chapter will establish the context in which this thesis operates. I will contend that the 
application of a methodology infused with the sophistication of systems theory and the verve of a 
Deleuzian philosophy on repetition can illuminate the field of anti-discrimination law; but in order 
for this to take place, this chapter must establish the topics and areas of debate which act as 
foundational concerns for law’s excursion into anti-discrimination and its attendant scholarship. This 
section will provide an overview of the academic approaches to the philosophical and moral 
implications of discrimination alongside coverage of the topics which have interested discrimination 
advocates and lawyers. By the end of this chapter such concerns will have been collated so as to 
highlight the limitations in the scholarship when it comes to addressing (i) the social basis for 
discrimination and (ii) the legal conceptualization of anti-discrimination claims. Once these limits 









WHAT IS DISCRIMINATION AND HOW CAN IT BE OBSERVED? 
 
Racism is a type of discrimination. For many, it is the archetype of discrimination and so if a thesis is 
to illuminate the social basis for discrimination in modern society then racism would seem to be an 
appropriate point of focus.8 Racism is chosen also for reasons of economy. The literature on 
discrimination and racism itself is vast and one can only hope to provide useful insights within a 
narrowly confined field. Before we reach a discussion on racism, however, a template for recognizing 
discrimination should be offered. Since I will be adopting a methodology which recruits an 
epistemology reliant on a radical, constructivist perspective, then I will be assuming that 
discrimination - even within the rarefied atmosphere of philosophical enquiry - in its identification 
and description is a product of social operations. Discrimination is a 'highly protean concept' 
(Sunstein, 1991: 34) that seems to encompass a bewildering array of social situations. It is a topic 
that attracts the attention of journalists, politicians, legal experts, artists, and the public.9 The fact 
that racism has the capacity to operate as a proxy and at a distance is a feature referenced in the 
scholarship.10  
                                                                
8
  This is particularly the case in French scholarship. Taguieff (2001: 22) considers racism to be a social ontology 
of 'essentialism' communicating the idea of nature and the eternal: 'the vocabulary of race borrowed from 
zoology through the mediation of physical anthropology'. Bourdieu (1993: 133) finds that 'every racism is an 
essentialism' functioning as a sociodicy for a dominant class that seeks to justify the social order and whose 
power is based on a new range of 'titles' (taste, distinction, education) reminiscent of the older titles of 
property and nobility. Colette Guillaumin (1995) concurs with this direction. She suggests that modern racism 
develops from an older aristocratic notion of race (race of the Bourbons, blue blood, inheritance) into a 
scientific essentialism utilized by the dominant class to denote an inferior group.  
9
 Viral might be a more appropriate description of discrimination. Luhmann (1995: 394-400) imagined moral 
communications operating as a virus upon society with law functioning as an immune system to fight against 
such threats. Discrimination is a topic of moral concern, not just as a subject for moral reflection and criticism, 
but also in its very actualization. These viral and dissimulating qualities are examined in Chapters 5 and 6. 
10
 For example, Guillaumin (1995: 52-55) suggests that the older 'pre-racial' forms of discrimination were in the 
shape of a diachronic genealogy connecting the present of an individual to a line from the past; modern 
racism, on the other hand, is synchronic using bio-physicality to imply a 'spatial but a-temporal commonality' 




Discrimination is communicated and observed through recourse to a semantics of revelation in 
which that which operates secretly and publically is called out. This elusive quality of discrimination, 
and racism specifically, will be taken as indicative of its particular construction.11 As I will set out 
further in this chapter, the issues which discrimination scholarship tries to focus on can be more 
completely addressed if we take the social construction of discrimination seriously. Systems theory 
has the advantage of an epistemology that can theorize both the communication of discrimination 
and the communications on discrimination. Scholarship predicated on the tenets of analytical and 
moral philosophy does not have the necessary reflexivity to observe both of these positions at once, 
nor do they have the internal capacity to absorb the sociological and historical developments of 
discrimination which reside comfortably alongside the analysis of legal decisions and legal 
argumentation. Systems theory can see all these positions at once, but can it can also refuse to fold 
each perspective into a singular totality. 
Most of the world has enacted some kind of constitutional and statutory provision outlawing 
discrimination. On the international level, Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights prohibits "discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, birth, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. Article 14 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights declares "The enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status." In the UK, the Equality Act 2010 codifies 
several generations of anti-discrimination law into a comprehensive statute. The 14th Amendment 
of the US Constitution contains the Equal Protection Clause that has been highly influential in 
advancing equality and anti-racism. 
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 This position is developed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
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In general, scholarship on discrimination, perhaps because of its close connection with social reform, 
has been heavily tied to legal developments in statute and case law.12 While very understandable 
this has often narrowed the focus into technical legal analysis and it may have blocked more creative 
forays; however, there are a growing number of scholars seeking to expand this area of enquiry with 
reference to robust philosophical analysis. This thesis is a socio-legal contribution to that 
expansion.13 
A great deal of effort has been expended on providing a complete description of anti-discrimination 
law that unifies its various manifestations - direct and indirect discrimination, reasonable 
accommodation of disability, affirmative action, harassment, and so forth. Tarunabh Khatian (2015), 
for example, has sought to theorize the legal model of regulating discrimination in order to provide a 
distinct legal conception of discrimination that can be normatively justified. Broadly put, Khaitan 
asserts that the moral foundation for the law is located in freedom, rather than equality; 
discrimination involves an individual who belongs to a group that is disadvantaged relative to 
another social group; and the forms of discrimination should be understood in terms of the effects 
that these acts have as opposed to the intentions of the discriminator.14 The difficulty with such 
approaches is that they assume that discrimination adopts a consistent structure that is amenable to 
philosophical analysis. Such an approach adopts what Isaiah Berlin (1999: 19-22) has contended are 
key tenets of the enlightenment: a belief that absolute and universal truth can be attained and if an 
answer cannot be found then either the question is incorrect or the questioner is in error and the 
answer can be provided by someone more virtuous or knowledgeable. These truth propositions can 
be ascertained by the application of reason. Such propositions are compatible and non-
contradictory. As a consequence of this unacknowledged methodology, Khatian (2015) concludes 
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 See comments made by Smith (2007: 499 ff.) for such an analysis.  
13
 The recent efforts by contributors to Hellman & Moreau (2013), Lippert-Rasmussen (2014), Khaitan (2015) 
are indicative of this trend. Classifying systems theory as within the socio-legal tradition is justified in Chapter 3 
of this thesis. 
14
 This latter proposition is controversial especially because direct discrimination is normally assumed to 
involve the intentions of the discriminator.  
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that certain cases have erroneously found discrimination where in fact there is none. But such an 
approach assumes that the legal understanding of discrimination necessarily accords with its social 
manifestation. If we would not claim that the legal definition of murder accords with other 
interpretations - a lay understanding or a literary understanding - then why does it make sense to 
claim that discrimination has a consistent and universalized meaning? 
George Rutherglen (2013: 117-118) provides a meta-theorization of discrimination law contending 
that the meaning of discrimination operates at an intermediate level between the relevant, local 
norms and a comprehensive normative rationale. The law engages with discrimination never in 
isolation but ‘only as part of a surrounding legal structure that gives them form and meaning.’ The 
only points of consensus in this under-theorized concept are the questions: who is protected (the 
protected class or group), who can be held responsible, on what grounds do actions give rise to 
liability, what rights and opportunities must be affected, and are there exceptions in certain 
situations?  
These points of consensus are a template reflected in prominent legislation – for example, Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act 1964, Age Discrimination in Employment Act – , which is produced by and 
continues to influence lawmakers, interpreters, and more abstract philosophical discussion 
concerning values.15 Apart from these structural components there is no other obvious reference 
point that grants internal coherence to the concept of discrimination. Indeed, Rutherglen contends 
that apart from the template there are no substantive commonalities between anti-discrimination 
laws, non-discrimination articles, disability accommodation, positive action, bona fide occupational 
requirements. He admits that there are historical trends: the progress of the field might be from 
narrow to broad prohibitions against newly identified forms of oppression; there may be a move 
from negative duties to positive rights; there may also be a gradual movement towards a particular 
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 As Rutherglen rightly points out, this template appears in other jurisdictions. Sandra Fredman (2011: 210 ff.) 
provides the analysis in these terms for the UK.  
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goal such as equality, efficiency, the promotion of liberty, or preserving dignity. That said, other 
observers would see the field very differently. Pluralists can see a variety of values at work - a 
person's claim of unlawful discrimination can be a violation of the principle of equality and a 
challenge to freedom of expression and association.16 Furthermore, the construction and 
development of anti-discrimination law may be heavily reliant on political expediency (Rutherglen, 
2013: 122-130).17 This description of anti-discrimination law holds out some hope for our analysis 
because it emphasizes the likely inconsistency of the legal framework. If scant points of focus can be 
found in substantive norms or general trends, then this suggests that an approach which looks more 
closely into the social constitution of law may offer a more profitable way forward.  
There are many intricate arguments projected from the perspective of moral and political 
philosophy, which touch upon significant debates around liberalism, egalitarianism, pluralism, 
teleology, and deontology. It is not the aim of this chapter or, indeed, this thesis to engage with 
these discussions on their own terms. This chapter aims to point out common assumptions in this 
scholarship with a view to highlighting the limits of such an approach. As a consequence, the 
necessity for a sociological component and a more precise methodology is proposed.  In the next 
section, we will turn to an area of concern which has long held a fascination for anti-discrimination 
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 Rutherglen refers to the landmark case of Brown v Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a systems 
theoretical consideration analysing why various doctrinal developments were available in terms of the 
functional differentiation of society, consider Baghai (2015). 
17
 I suspect this latter point will have more force due to the recent ascent of religious and nationalist political 
causes in the US and Europe.  
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THE MORALITY OF DISCRIMINATION - WHY IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 
 
Unlike other engagements with this question, the following analysis is not a philosophical or ethical 
exercise in which the various moral justifications for anti-discrimination are assessed by reference to 
their correctness or cogency.18 This thesis attempts to observe the context, literature, and debates, 
as constrained and given by the possibilities of communication in society. The literature on 
discrimination and racism is voluminous. That said, the following sections have the purpose of 
detailing the proposed moral justifications and explanations of the law but, in particular, to highlight 
a need for an account that is more sensitive to sociological precepts and more comfortable with a 
phenomenon which is, at its heart, inconsistent and elusive, and yet remains distinctive. 
What am I observing? It would be disingenuous to suggest that academic commentary in this 
particular area constitutes a social phenomenon. The data set is too small. The communications of a 
handful of philosophers and academics does not represent a sufficiently complex social object.19 
There are certainly ways in which they could. One might choose to interpret them as representing a 
cultural and economic elite. Alternatively, we might suggest that their communicative meaning relies 
upon particular ideas or concepts, generated through social communication. This seems a more 
plausible route for a systems-based sociology.  
Why does discrimination occur when a person is disadvantaged because of their race? Do we also 
think that discrimination occurs when a job applicant is rejected because they are less attractive, 
have a taste for a genre of music, or support a particular football team? Most persons would 
probably concur that racism is a morally objectionable action and additionally many would probably 
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 For example, whether such explanations are over-inclusive or under-conclusive with regard to recognized 
categories of discrimination or key debates within the field is not of primary concern. For an examination of 
the philosophical requirements for an adequate conception of racism, see Garcia (1997: 6). 
19
 Luhmann criticized Parsons for assuming that the university held a central position in modern society. We 
should be equally skeptical in the implied assertion that academic discussion concerning anti-discrimination 
law holds a central position in its social communication and actualization. 
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agree that rejection based on the preferences alluded to in the previous sentence is not as 
objectionable.20 Although, in general, many scholars and lay-persons may agree with the last 
proposition, there is nevertheless not a substantive consensus over which moral principles or other 
significant factors can comprehensively explain why racial discrimination – and other established 
forms such as gender – are so very different from these other preferences. 
IMMUTABILITY 
Is racism wrong because race is an immutable characteristic? Discrimination may involve a judgment 
upon the relative moral worth of the victim. If this is so, then a judgment predicated on an 
immutable trait is morally repugnant. From a broadly Kantian perspective, moral worth must be 
based upon choices, not upon characteristics. Some commentators lean upon this idea as providing 
a foundation for why discrimination is wrong; however, there are a few notable defects with this 
argument.21 Both religious affiliation and gender are protected characteristics under the Equality Act 
2010; however, they are also to an extent mutable: the choice to change religion or gender may not 
be made lightly and individuals who make such choices may incur significant socio-economic costs 
(Alexander, 1992: 200).22 But the possibilities of change here allow us to question whether 
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 A distinction that this thesis attempts to capture, by relying on Luhmann and Deleuze, is that eye-colour and 
appearance do not have the same intensity of communicable meaning as found in race. This is a conceptual 
position, which cannot easily be comprehended by the politico-moral philosophies adopted in the literature. 
This theorization is pursued in Chapters 5 and 6. 
21
 Robert Wintemute (1995) concludes that discrimination because of sexual orientation is wrong for precisely 
this reason. Immutability refers to a personal status, which cannot be changed or chosen. However, in tune 
with other defenders of the immutability argument, such as Hoffman (2011), Wintemute explains that 
immutability should be used in tandem with another justification - that of fundamental choice. As Gardner 
(1998: 170) explains, the problem with this approach is it that it seems to be positing that both choice and the 
absence of choice explain the wrongness of discrimination. If this is the case then the liberal ideal of the 
autonomous life may provide a more comprehensive justification for the wrongness of discrimination. 
22
 On the other hand, the choice component can be distinguished: (i) those under-going gender-reassignment 
may view the process as less of an autonomous choice and more of a revealing to the world of the person they 
have always been or are destined to be; (ii) the choice of religious affiliation is undermined by the likelihood 
that one is pre-destined by reference to the locale in which that person lives, parental affiliation, and tradition. 
Moreover, they may consider religious conversion as a revelation of the person that they have always been or 
that they are destined to be. This correlates with Deleuze’s considerations of the pure past and destiny which 
are topics examined in Chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
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immutability can be a unifying principle that accurately explains the protection of characteristics 
under anti-discrimination law; and, moreover, adequately explains why racism is wrong?  
Sharona Hoffman (2011) has tried to salvage the argument for immutability by broadening its 
definition. She has contended that when we say immutable what we indicate is something, which 
cannot be changed through personal action. Many followers of a religion, therefore, would consider 
conversion out of the question because their adherence is held in place by a higher and 
transcendent power (Hoffman, 2011: 1508). In addition, immutability implies a status that cannot be 
altered by empirical verification and as such a person of religious faith would find their membership 
to be unaffected by a factual or legislative re-definition. In sum, Hoffman contends that immutability 
implies an attribute that is either an accident at birth, unchangeable in absolute terms, or a 
characteristic so fundamental that it is not legitimate and/or practical to require individuals to make 
such an adjustment.23 This reasoning certainly offers a rationale in which religious affiliation and 
gender are morally immutable, but by stretching the principle to encompass legitimacy and 
practicality it struggles to provide a definitive and coherent model.24 
The last major argument that supports the immutability thesis is that the public policy goals of 
fairness and justice demand protection of such characteristics. Why does justice demand protection 
of immutable characteristics? Is it because employers operating behind a veil of ignorance would 
choose to prohibit such actions in order to minimize the possibility of discrimination against 
themselves? This might carry weight – although it is admitted that is does not do justice to the 
complexity of Rawls’ theory - because behind the veil a person would not know whether they are an 
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 Sharona Hoffman (2011: 1513), quoting Samuel Marcosson, makes an intriguing remark that offers a 
hospitable gesture to systems theory. Immutability indicates a characteristic that is fundamental to the 
person's identity; it is a 'self-concept which is a complex mix of cultural, familial and internal factors'. Such a 
definition is not too dissimilar to Luhmann's idea of a self-description, which is a crucial component in this 
thesis explained in Chapter 4.  
24
 Indeed, the reference to practicality indicates the social context in which such statuses operate. It suggests a 




employer or an employee and therefore it is in their interest to curtail such decisions. From this 
position, fairness flows because the interdiction safeguards personal autonomy with respect to 
important life decisions (Hoffman, 2011: 1519). 
Most commentators do not find the immutability thesis convincing. It does not seem to offer an 
adequate description of the actions of courts in recognizing and protecting a person from 
discrimination.25 Immutability fails to provide a coherent and unifying principle that explains why 
discrimination is wrong in many situations in which many agree it is wrong without either recourse 
to further values (justice and fairness) or further moral tenets (legitimacy and choice). At best, it can 
cover all the accepted grounds if it is unfolded into a series of distinctions so that immutability can 
indicate both a non-chosen status and a chosen status. As we can see from Hoffman's reasoning this 
can be achieved by drawing the following distinctions: it might be a choice in theory, but it is not a 
real choice in practice; it may be mutable, but it is a fundamental (and therefore immutable) choice; 
and for the internal, personal life of the individual it is immutable even if externally it is mutable.  
The point I wish to highlight is that these distinctions produced in order to avoid a contradiction 
between the philosophical explanation and social reality may be indicative of a deeper issue. 
Namely, that a philosophical perspective that seeks to establish consistency, coherence, and 
universality may not be best placed to observe these particular phenomena. The reason being that 
the contradiction and the universal/specific distinction may be part of the social basis for 
                                                                
25
 There is a caveat to this statement. A major issue within anti-discrimination scholarship is that a great deal 
of commentary approaches the subject with unacknowledged assumptions and at cross-purposes. Replicating 
long-standing jurisprudential tensions, the normative and philosophical methodology of such scholarship is 
rarely clear. Is the correct moral justification derived from the norms established by legal doctrine, decisions 
by the courts, and legislative developments; or is it external to such phenomena and as such can be used as a 
means to criticize such developments? What do we mean by norms? How do such moral justifications interact 
with the law – do they underpin the law or rationalize it? What does this mean? Is the law and are such moral 
justifications derived from a higher political theory such that the moral justification can be used to assess the 
legitimacy of the law? There is little consensus on this point and, in this reader’s opinion, this may be indicative 
of the phenomena at hand. Rutherglen (2013: 128), citing Sunstein, notes that discrimination is an under-
theorized concept from which a range of concrete, abstract, and general descriptions have emerged. This 
thesis certainly sees the validity of this conclusion. This thesis offers the precision and austerity of systems 
theory as a more satisfying methodology. 
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discrimination; moreover, the moral communication of discrimination may indicate the intimate and 
personal aspects of discrimination alongside its connections to broader conceptions of group 
membership and society. These qualities can better be understood through a theory that can both 
explicitly delineate between morality and law, and further an approach expressly reliant on the 




Larry Alexander (1992) offers one the most influential accounts of discrimination. He locates the 
morally objectionable aspect of discrimination as concerned with respect. For Alexander, 
discrimination is morally wrong intrinsically because the mental state of the perpetrator evinces an 
attitude of disrespect towards the victim amounting to an implication that they are of a lower moral 
status than others by virtue of their group membership. The attitude of the perpetrator is one of 
animus, hostility, or a belief in the moral inferiority of the other.  
This approach articulates a moral philosophy reliant on Kantian foundations. Individuals are 
autonomous subjects with equal moral worth. It is only objects which have a price and so it is only 
objects that can be graduated according to a higher or lower status. So what does it mean to express 
disrespect? The paradigm cases of racism involving an animus and a deep belief in moral inferiority 
can certainly be explained by Alexander's argument. Moreover, biases and prejudices drawn from 
incorrect beliefs about the moral stature of a person because of their group membership would be 
caught by this explanation. 
The difficulty with Alexander's argument can be located in two major issues. Firstly, it fails to 
account for many types of discrimination which do not involve disrespect. It would not be tenable to 
suppose that indirect discrimination or institutional discrimination involves an accompanying mental 
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state that expresses disrespect or a valuation of moral worth. Indirect discrimination in which a 
neutral set of rules creates an unequal outcome is defined through the absence of an intentional 
mental state.26 Perpetrators are not intending to discriminate in such cases and they are not 
exhibiting hostility; they are simply failing to reflect on the possible outcomes of their actions and 
whether such actions contribute to substantive inequality. One might argue conversely that such 
blatant cases of racism are still well-recognized instances of discrimination; however, if we do so 
then we fail to provide a comprehensive formula for explaining why racial discrimination is observed 
when we consider the unjust distribution of resources in terms of race. Secondly, Lippert-Rasmussen 
(2014) contends that Alexander fails to account for the precise wrong of discrimination. This is 
because in constructing the moral wrong on the basis of a recognition of lower moral status in 
Kantian terms he exposes one to the contention that this account would not cover cases in which 
the rationality of the victim is in doubt. This would have the consequence that individuals that do 
not have the rationality and self-legislative capacity - either due to age or mental capacity - which 
underpins the idea of Kantian moral status could not suffer discrimination.  
A final issue concerns whether respect explains why egregious examples of racism are wrong. They 
are wrong because they are clearly false despite rationalizations made by the discriminator. Nazi 
ideology is clearly wrong because it resists evidence and abundant reasons to the contrary.27 This is a 
point I wish to take further. It is this demand which states that discrimination is manifestly and 
assertively wrong that I find particularly compelling. Not least because most accounts that tackle the 
moral wrong of discrimination suffer from being too broad or too narrow. In the former case they 
explain all recognized types of discrimination but for some reason fail to accord sufficient precision 
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 See for example, section 19 of the Equality Act 2010. The fact that a moral framework does not completely 
cover the actual categories of legal discrimination is a recurring impediment to theorization in this area. For 
example, Khaitan (2015) has produced one of the most substantive attempts of recent times, but since he 
frames his theory in terms of the ‘effects’ caused by a discriminatory action he struggles to explain why direct 
discrimination is wrong in these terms since this is a category normally defined with reference to the mental 
state of the discriminator. This thesis suggests that the semantics of racism cannot be tied to either the 
statutory legal framework or the strictures of moral philosophy. Racism is a complex, social phenomenon.   
27
 Lippert-Rasmussen (2014: 122) 
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or moral salience to discrimination itself. In the latter case such accounts narrowly explain the 
salience and distinctiveness of discrimination, but fail to encompass the various types of 
discrimination within their description.  
WRONGFUL ACTION 
A series of influential accounts attempt to explain the moral wrong of discrimination in terms of an 
objective meaning. The most extended descriptions are provided by Deborah Hellman and Thomas 
Scanlon which I shall outline below. 
Deborah Hellman (2008) holds the view that acts which are discriminatory carry an intrinsic moral 
wrong. They do so because such treatment signifies that the victim has less moral worth than the 
perpetrator. Hellman locates this signification within actions which denigrate and demean the 
victim. To demean a person is distinct from simply insulting that person because in some way it 
suggests a lower moral status. This formulation follows the Kantian categorical imperative of 
treating persons as ends in themselves as opposed to a means to an end. Hellman's account 
captures the most egregious examples of racism, such as when a victim is treated as sub-human.  
The second aspect of Hellman's exposition is that the discriminator has to be in a position of power 
or dominance vis-à-vis the victim. This requirement intends to capture discrimination involving 
groups who have suffered a history of domination and exclusion. Clearly, race will satisfy this 
condition, however in most cases a social group which contains persons who exhibit a particular 
musical taste or style of dress will not. The difficulty with Hellman's account is that the idea of 
demeaning remains imprecise and furthermore as a concept it is not always co-existent with an 
indication of a lower moral worth. Lippert-Rasmussen (2014: 135) points out that paying less 
attention to the opinions of a teenager may be demeaning, but this does not amount to an 
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implication of unequal moral worth.28 Instances of indirect discrimination, moreover, for the most 
part fail to express denigration towards the unintended victims. More often than not such 
discrimination arises from a failure to modify habitual ways of working to ensure that the interests 
of minority groups can be fulfilled. Finally, Hellman's explanation is uni-directional because it means 
that morally impermissible discrimination does not occur when a victim is a member of a dominant 
group. Therefore, although this approach permits affirmative action it does not consider that racial 
discrimination can take place against a dominant racial group.  
Thomas Scanlon (2008: 37-89) provides an account in which the discriminatory action in itself is 
intrinsically immoral.29 He argues that discriminatory actions express a view that certain people are 
morally inferior or socially unacceptable. Such actions insult the victim. In order to avoid the pitfalls 
that an intention-based account of discrimination encounters – that most recognized instances of 
indirect discrimination or statistical discrimination do not involve an expression of animus30 - Scanlon 
suggests integrating intention into the meaning of the action in an intriguing manner. He argues that 
the intention of the discriminator operates in an indirect manner by its being of predictive 
significance. Simply put this idea attempts to highlight that individuals may interpret a particular 
action differently from its consequences. A refusal of promotion from the employer's perspective 
may have nothing to do with race. It may have been a decision made purely on merit. On the other 
hand, the victim of this action may consider that the decision was an act of racial discrimination. This 
is enabled because of the 'predicative significance' of intention. The victim may draw a conclusion 
from the past performance of the employer or from an appreciation that the employer holds 
prejudicial opinions that the action expressed an opinion of lower moral worth for a racial group. 
                                                                
28
 Furthermore, adolescents have not been a traditionally powerful social group. 
29
 Lippert-Rasmussen (2014: 139ff.) explains and provides a series of weighty criticisms. 
30
 Institutional discrimination occurs when broad injustices are produced through collective behaviour. There is 
a difficulty in addressing this type of discrimination through current legal frameworks. Iris Young (1990) 
disputes the significance of group-predicated discrimination because it presents discrimination as an exception 
and aberration to the rule, when in fact the profound wrongs of exploitation and marginalization can only be 
understood systemically through an institutional account of discrimination. 
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Namely, it manages to 're-enter' perception into communication and highlight this movement as a 
distinctive feature of discrimination; moreover, unlike other accounts it acknowledges that various 
parties may interpret an action very differently. Noticeably, Scanlon makes this argument within a 
philosophical frame that identifies agency, action, subjectivity and objectivity as axioms. These pre-
conditions are not shared by systems theory.  
In conclusion, explanations which attempt to explain the wrong of discrimination as intrinsic to the 
action itself encounter a number of drawbacks. They either fail to be sufficiently broad so as to align 
with all types of discrimination or they fail to be sufficiently precise such that the 'nature' or 
distinctive quality of discrimination is not identified. 
HARM 
Another direction for the identification of discrimination relies on the idea of harm. The advantage 
of such an approach is that it easily admits indirect discrimination and statistical discrimination 
within its remit. As we have seen, those descriptions which rely upon the identification of a 
subjective state of mind (prejudice, animus, disrespect, a judgment of moral inferiority) have 
struggled to convincingly explain why commonly accepted and legally constructed examples of 
discrimination are morally impermissible.  
By focusing on harm, the wrong of discrimination is calculated in terms of consequentialism, namely 
a consequentialist philosophy. A generic account of harm will point out that racial discrimination is 
not intrinsically wrong; it is wrong by virtue of the harm caused to the victim and/or the community. 
In fact, in certain instances racial discrimination may be morally permissible if it enables greater 
benefit, happiness, or welfare than it prevents.  Affirmative action or 'reverse discrimination' can 
thus be easily accommodated as permissible because to take such action may increase overall 
welfare. To be fair, most accounts which postulate that discrimination is intrinsically wrong because 
of a deontological principle can also permit such actions, for example, by expanding a notion of 
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equal treatment from a formalistic interpretation of equality to a more substantive egalitarianism. 
However, although this is readily accepted within the communications between moral philosophers 
and equality advocates it would be productive to remember that 'reverse discrimination' is often 
received as an example of blatant discrimination by members of the public. 
Advocates of a harm-based account of discrimination can take many different paths towards 
calculating harm.31 Harm can be assessed by focusing on whether the well-being of the individual is 
affected or whether the preferences and interests of the individual have been frustrated. 
Alternatively, harm may be interpreted in terms of material opportunities, access to important 
resources, or welfare. Indeed, if harm is calculated in certain ways particular forms of discrimination 
may be found to be permissible. If we consider harm in terms of how an individual's opportunities 
are affected over their life-time, then age discrimination may be permissible because where a 
person suffers at a certain stage of their life then they may gain at another stage. Furthermore, 
various subtle distinctions and debates coalesce around whether the idea of harm should be 
interpreted to indicate actual consequences or consequences as the perpetrator believed them to 
be.  
Lippert-Rasmussen supports a particular strain of the harm-based explanation, which he argues 
contains both intrinsic and instrumental features. He labels this argument a 'desert-prioritarian' 
account.32 In such a framework moral value is assessed by reference to three elements. Firstly, the 
moral value of an action is greater if it increases the well-being of the individuals impacted by the 
act. Secondly, the approach also stipulates that the lower the level of well-being that an individual 
possesses then the greater moral value is to be achieved in its amelioration. Therefore, an act which 
assists the most-needy is of a greater moral value than those acts which assist those persons who 
already have great access to resources. Conversely, this means that actions that discriminate against 
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 Lippert-Rasmussen (2014: 153ff.) provides a detailed exegesis of such accounts. 
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 Lippert-Rasmussen (2014: 165) 
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a historically disadvantaged racial group will be of a lower moral value than those actions that 
discriminate against a historically advantaged racial group. Such an account should also be able to 
draw a line between social groups who have suffered stigma and disadvantage and those who have 
not. Hence, discrimination against racial groups will be more harmful in the vast majority of 
conceivable cases than the harm caused to members of a group who have a taste for classical music, 
cuisine, or sports. Similarly, the fact that an employer chooses to discriminate against those who 
have inadequate qualifications will probably be less harmful because it is not accompanied by a 
history of systematic disadvantage.33  
The harm account may be more convincing than those that depend on an intrinsic reason for the 
moral impermissibility of discrimination. As an account it encompasses indirect and institutional 
forms of discrimination. The principle objections are that discrimination is neither recognized as a 
distinctive moral wrong, nor does it satisfy the need for discrimination to be intrinsically wrong. And 
so we return to the intractable position in which discrimination must be intrinsically wrong in some 
manner, but in doing so no theory can also encompass adequately or sufficiently indirect and 
statistical forms of discrimination. In brazen terms: deontological theories are too narrow and 
teleological theories are too broad. I would suggest that this predicament may actually be 
informative in itself, and may call out for a theoretically informed approach constructed through 
sociological axioms as opposed to those provided by moral philosophy.  
DELIBERATIVE FREEDOM 
A relatively recent and innovative explanation has been set out by Sophie Moreau (2010). Moreau 
contends that anti-discrimination laws are activated when a personal wrong has occurred. She 
makes the argument that the best interpretation of these laws and their doctrinal development is 
through a consideration of tortious principles. Anti-discrimination law seeks to protect an interest 
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and provide a remedy when this interest is violated. For example, individuals have an interest in 
their reputation (tort of defamation) and their bodily integrity (tort of negligence). The interest 
which anti-discrimination aims to protect is deliberative freedom. 
According to Moreau discrimination is wrong because such actions violate the deliberative freedom 
of the individual. In a liberal society individuals are entitled to make decisions about what they value 
and how they should live their lives in light of these values. Deliberative freedom is the capacity to 
make such valuable decisions insulated from the effects of 'normatively extraneous features' such as 
skin colour or gender. There are legitimate normative constraints that we can expect and structure 
into our decisions - cost of an activity, the resources required to pursue it, the needs of our 
dependents, expectations of those whom we trust. 
Race is 'normatively extraneous' because in a liberal society we should have the freedom to engage 
in activities without being burdened by our race when we make a decision of moving to an area or 
applying for a job. The difficulty for Moreau is explaining how 'normatively extraneous 'differs from 
simply stating that irrelevant or irrational considerations ought not to impact a person's decisions in 
life. Why is race protected, but not other personal traits, such as styles of dress and musical taste? 
Moreau (2010:160) responds that an account of discrimination cannot give a single principled 
explanation for why each ground (sex, race, religion, etc.) is worthy of protection, except that over-
time individuals have reflected and accepted that such grounds should be protected to safeguard 
deliberative freedom.  
Yet again the difficulty with this account is that it does not seem to explain why racial discrimination 
is far more morally repugnant than discrimination based on idiosyncratic tastes or nepotism.34 
Simply stating that 'normatively extraneous reasons' should not impact decisions does that explain 
why certain very significant traits are normatively extraneous while others are not. Moreau (2010: 
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160 ff.) readily admits this weakness and as a fall-back position contends that such traits are 
recognized by reflection and acceptance over-time, and cannot be drawn from a priori principles.  
In previous decades of the 20th century it was unthinkable for women to enter certain professions 
because they were deemed to be too diminutive, mentally incapable, or lacking in strength - 
institutions such as the army, police, and fire service. Similarly, it was only a short time ago that it 
was unthinkable for parks and buses to be re-designed to accommodate disabilities. As such, instead 
of suggesting that race has become normatively extraneous over time, we might note that in reality 
race (and gender, too) have become distinctive and visible in time.35 Moreau, and other 
commentators, recognize the distinctiveness and exemplary character of race, but they fail to accord 
this quality the significance that it deserves.  
SOCIAL SALIENCE 
One noteworthy argument is that a social group can be the subject of wrongful discrimination if it is 
socially salient. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2014: 30) reasons: 'A group is socially salient if perceived 
membership of it is important to the structure of social interactions across a wide range of social 
contexts.' Lippert-Rasmussen admits that this is not a concept which offers a high-degree of 
theoretical clarity; however, as a rule of thumb, he contends that it explains why some groups, as 
opposed to others, have come to be the subject of discrimination. The argument goes that salience 
is linked to both perception and self-identity. So firstly, the more that a characteristic becomes the 
focus of perception the more socially salient the characteristic. If a characteristic becomes 
increasingly perceptible then discrimination can occur because of increased social salience. 
Race and religion are social groups often open to direct perception through bodily and clothing 
distinctions. An example of this is the marking out of Jewish people under the Nazi regime. Requiring 
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Jews to display the Star of David made the social group both salient and present within everyday 
interactions. This prominence further contributed to the probability of discrimination. The 
significance of perception is also recognized by those individuals who fear discrimination. The 
appreciated threat of perception may compel individuals to undertake 'information management.'36 
An individual may shorten their name or amend their details on a job application so as to avoid the 
possibility of racial discrimination. An employee may choose not to disclose details of their private 
life so as to avoid unwanted advances or to limit the possibility of their, for example, sexuality 
becoming a factor in the workplace. The point is that an individual prevents certain ascriptions 
becoming a topic of communication within the interactive order. The second factor that contributes 
to social salience is whether the characteristic forms part of the member's self-identity. This line of 
argument parallels other justifications in which autonomy and self-determination have been posited 
as the values which underpin discrimination. Harriet Baber (2001) offers a productive explanation of 
salience. Social salience is the degree to which an idea can allow an observer to predict the 
individual's character trait, taste, belief, or psychological quality. Salience signifies a generative and 
connective capacity. In sociological terms this might be expressed as a tight coupling between social 
forms.37 Accent, for example, has a greater social salience than eye-colour because in registering an 
accent a person can then proceed to consider social class.38 
This last explanation offers another facet to understanding why racial discrimination is wrong; 
however, similar to other accounts, it fails to be complete or sufficiently precise.  
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WALDRON'S ACCOUNT OF DIGNITY 
The final account which I wish to cover is the nearest the legal literature comes to adopting a more 
socio-historically informed methodology.39 In his recent work Jeremy Waldron (2012) has been 
exploring the idea of human dignity. This is especially pertinent to anti-discrimination law because 
recent scholarship has turned to the idea of dignity as an explanation and normative justification for 
anti-discrimination law.40 
Dignity functions as a value that signifies both self-esteem and expectations of esteem from 
others.41 It denotes the commonalities and similarities of mankind (Smith, 2007). The concept has a 
history. As Waldron begins to explain, dignity used to refer to rank. Drawing on Kant, Waldron 
emphasizes that dignity in the history of England was distributed in accordance with rank: a duke has 
more dignity than a baron, a bishop has more dignity than an abbot. The monarch has more dignity 
than everyone else. Waldron asserts that dignity was 'trans-valuated' away from rank towards 
humanity. It was universalized by Judeo-Christian notions of the dignity of man. The idea of human 
dignity concerns an upwards equalization of rank so that every human being has dignity and an 
expectation of respect. What more Waldron (2012: 32) draws upon Romantic literature to signify 
this sea-change. The poetry of William Wordsworth and Robert Burns is held up as contending that 
true dignity was located in the lowly man and in those closest to nature.42  
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Waldron further claims that the sacral quality of nobility has now been distributed to everyone in 
line with dignity. Every member of society is now dignified and entitled to respect, esteem, 
deference and due consideration. In previous times it was sacrilege to assault a duke. The dignity 
and distinction of classes were protected by sumptuary laws which defined the appropriate style of 
dress, sport, and etiquette.43 On the other hand, in our society everyone's person is now sacrosanct 
with such interests protected by the law of torts - defamation, negligence, and intentional harm. 
Anti-discrimination laws protect racial groups from suffering disadvantage but also public contempt 
in the form of hate speech. 
Waldron's account is of interest because it points towards the analysis conducted in Chapter 4. In 
particular, his focus on manners, styles of dress, and ritual coincides with my argument that these 
types of communication serve as way to understand the history of discrimination semantics, and 
point towards a needed re-description of anti-discrimination law. 
WHY A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH IS NEEDED 
The above analysis has sought to explain some of the prevailing theories of discrimination. I have 
emphasized the deficiencies in each which suggest that a sociologically informed analysis may prove 
beneficial.  
Firstly, there is the persistent argument that discrimination, in some sense, involves a salience or 
distinctiveness which must be reflected in its moral description. Hence, those moral arguments 
appear to be inadequate which explain the wrong of discrimination in terms of harm, for example, 
but fail to explain the unique and compelling quality of discrimination which most observers seem to 
think should be present. This compelling quality of discrimination is indicative of a social basis which 
can be located in a notion of informativity. The salience expected by commentators is external to the 
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moral evaluation of discrimination. This theme will form one of the strands of discrimination which is 
emphasized throughout chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this thesis.  
Secondly, I have implicitly asserted that the philosophical approach to discrimination may not 
adequately address the relevant phenomena. This is because the approach seeks to provide a 
comprehensive, non-contradictory, and specific, examination of discrimination. This may not be 
possible. I would suggest one of the reasons is that discrimination is indicative of social conflict or 
social contradiction, and so it cannot be captured by a formula which does not admit similar 
impressions. The second reason is one not likely to be mentioned by such accounts. There is an 
element of self-implication in which the philosophical explanations of discrimination already 
contribute to their object of inquiry, not least in the fact that in discussing discrimination we turn to 
hypotheticals and definitions which are drawn from cases and legal doctrine. The problem is that 
such examples have been formed via an implementation of the philosophic ideals of anti-
discrimination. Marxist analysis encounters a similar problem in which it attempts to describe a 
society in which spectres of Marxism already circulate. 
 
CONCLUSION: WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF DISCRIMINATION WHICH I HAVE IDENTIFIED? 
 
Are philosophical approaches best placed to analyze and theorize this phenomenon. Are such 
approaches able to provide an adequate reception to the themes and factual scenarios which fall 
within the concept of discrimination? If we take the act of theorization in its broadest sense, it is one 
that seeks to establish limits by (1) delimiting a unified field of inquiry and (2) by identifying 
measures which can ensure consistency and coherence between elements within this field.  
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Theories of discrimination that adopt philosophically inclined methodologies should be able to 
differentiate and isolate discrimination as a phenomenon. This may mean establishing the edges of 
discrimination by utilizing a series of distinctions, such as between morally permissible and 
impermissible types of discrimination, or by distinguishing between central instances and peripheral 
instances of discrimination. A limit is exposed in that very few accounts of discrimination can provide 
a diachronic perspective. Whereas anti-discrimination may be a relatively new phenomenon, this 
does not entail that discrimination as a social phenomenon does not have its own conditions of 
emergence.  
Only a short time ago, discrimination was associated with virtue as indicative of refined taste and the 
ability to choose well.44 How do we distinguish between this meaning of discrimination and modern 
unlawful invidious types of discrimination? Sandra Fredman (2011:208-9) observes that there is a 
further dilemma in how we treat people. On the one hand, individuals should be judged according to 
their personal and subjective merits, qualities and values. Treatment should not be accorded on an 
objective or group status. Nevertheless, not every objective and status-based distinction can be said 
to be discriminatory. Many individuals define themselves by group membership and objective status 
and feel if they are not represented in this manner then they are misrepresented. This is a topic 
which I pick up in Chapter 4, which I label the racial dilemma.  
Describing discrimination from a moral perspective can only provide an incomplete picture. It misses 
its social manifestation. The fact that so many commentators emphasize the invidious and salient 
quality of discrimination should be taken as a clue that points towards the social basis for 
discrimination; furthermore, the fact that discrimination has a history in terms of taste should be 
considered more closely. The history of discrimination does not begin with the first anti-
discrimination statute nor with the elevation of universal human rights in the 20th century. This 
history will be sketched in terms of manners and courtesy in Chapter 4. Further, the fact that there is 
                                                                
44
 A point noted in passing by John Gardner (1998: 167). 
45 
 
a tension between individual treatment and group status should be taken as evidence for a further 
limitation to the field which can be re-described by a methodology that has the appropriate level of 
depth to conceptualize dilemmas and paradoxes. It should not be discounted. Finally, the social basis 
for discrimination should be delimited from the legal understanding of discrimination. The 
limitations on a legal understanding of anti-discrimination law must be observed from a position that 
does not assume that law operates according to underlying moral norms.  
Indeed, it is strange that anti-discrimination scholarship often assumes that the field can be limited 
by reference to a value of equality or freedom. Scholars are hard-pressed to describe other branches 
of law in terms of economic efficiency or justice. The complexity and contingencies of anti-
discrimination law, like any other area of law, creates its own internal dynamics, which are non-
reducible to an external model. Bearing these matters in mind, this thesis will re-describe some key 
elements in anti-discrimination law from a systems theory perspective by analyzing the relevant 












CHAPTER 3 - THE SOCIO-LEGAL METHOD AND SYSTEMS THEORY 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will argue that systems theory can be placed within the socio-legal tradition. A 
particular effort is made to explain how systems theory is a sociology that can provide systematic 
and empirical insights on the operation of law and society. The key axioms of systems theory will be 
explained denoting points of particular relevance for discrimination law and this thesis: forms of 
societal differentiation, individuality, and human rights.  
HOW IS SYSTEMS THEORY A CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIO -LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP? 
This thesis can be most broadly construed as a socio-legal contribution to (i) the study of racism, (ii) 
'anti-discrimination' law, and (iii) the jurisprudential examination of legal argumentation and 
decision. There have been notable disputes surrounding the suitability of sociology qua discipline to 
reveal the 'truth' of law which I will set out below. These disputes will be analyzed with the aim of 
contending that a Luhmannian inspired systems theory can offer a path that avoids these 
controversies.   
The label socio-legal studies has become a general term encompassing a range of disciplines 
applying a socio-scientific perspective to the study of law, including the sociology of law, legal 
anthropology, legal history, psychology and the law, and political science studies of courts 
(Tamanaha, 1999: 2ff).  This variability in research-design can be both a weakness and a strength. A 
persistent critique questions whether the application of socio-scientific methodologies can firstly 
account for the internal 'truth' of law and further whether it can present findings that are interesting 
to legal professionals. For example, David Nelken (1994) doubts the capacity for sociology to 
illuminate the uniqueness of law as a discourse. Additionally, applying economic theories of 
rationality fails to appreciate how actors who negotiate, participate, and co-ordinate legal processes 
actually comprehend the legal system. If we take the development of legal doctrine seriously then it 
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needs to be admitted that lawyers articulate opinions with respect to very different signposts from 
those adopted by social scientists. Legal arguments directed towards causation are typically 
concerned with responsibility, as opposed to the economic consequences of imposing liability or 
with consideration of the underlying socio-economic circumstances which underpin defendants’ 
unlawful actions. When social science fails to appreciate this internal aspect it fails to grasp law 
itself. 
The second indictment against socio-legal studies is that it has failed to present findings that are 
sympathetic to the needs and concerns of legal practitioners or legal theory. Access to justice, the 
organization of the legal profession, lay-knowledge of the law, and criminology are worthwhile 
subjects of study, but they are not the traditional concerns of the legal profession (Tamanaha, 1999: 
15).45 This has meant that sociological insight has not delivered the radical reform which it promises. 
Roger Cotterrell (1998) has offered a response which seeks to contextualize these accusations. He 
observes that the division of labour between lawyers and sociologists does not stand up to scrutiny. 
There are numerous examples - Weber, Durkheim, Ehrlich, Luhmann - in which sociologists have 
been able to study law through utilizing the development of legal ideas, concepts, and doctrine. 
They have often been trained in law and in some cases like Weber have placed developments in 
legal rationality as a cornerstone of societal change.  
Another manner in which Cotterrell (1998) contends that this internal/external dichotomy can be 
abridged is to admit that law and society co-exist as non-differentiated phenomena. He proposes 
that the best understanding of law is as a combination of many motivating factors - ideology, the 
experiences of legal advocates, procedures, concepts, and doctrine.46 Accordingly, law should not be 
considered as an object of knowledge but as a working practice. We may be able to analyze the legal 
concepts and relevant cases which impact on a legal issue, but this is only half the story. A lawyer 
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will still engage in observation (of his client, the bench, or his opponent) and consider what is the 
best route forward in line with these observations. For Cotterrell (1998: 187) the sociology of law is a 
‘transdisciplinary enterprise and aspiration to broaden understanding of law as a social 
phenomenon.'47 
Systems theory can also respond to these charges. The uniqueness of law is readily admitted when 
the theory proposes that law should be recognized as an autopoietic sub-system of modern society. 
The fact that law is only meaningful by reference to law is a basic postulate of the theory. Although it 
may employ a highly technical lexicon, the theory is not trapped in the clouds of highfalutin idealism. 
It is a sociological theory that captures the verve of legal communication as it is delimited and 
energized by practical issues, legal procedures, and arguments over key concepts and protected 
interests. The boundary that law holds between itself and its environment is observed within legal 
communications. Therefore, the fact that lawyers are cognizant of this internal/external distinction is 
recognized by the theory in terms of the 're-entry' of the system/environment distinction into itself. 
Consequently, the world is translated into legal artefacts. The legal conceptions of property, 
contract, or a constitution differ fundamentally from their meaning in terms of economic 
transactions, or political settlements.48  
Lastly, Cotterrell (1998: 177) indicates that research can be a sociologically informed contribution to 
legal scholarship if it can meet three foci: an emphasis on law as a social phenomenon, the bringing 
of particular instances within a systematic context, and the exhibition of an empirical aspect to the 
study. In the following sections I will establish that this present thesis can meet Cotterrell's 
stipulations. 
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UNDERSTANDING LAW AS A SOCIAL AND SYSTEMATIC PHENOMENON  
Cotterrell (1998: 173) contends that for law to be comprehended as a social phenomenon there 
needs to be an appreciation of certain basic sociological tenets. Firstly, that the social world is a field 
of experience in which actors subjectively construe their own actions. Secondly, that social life is 
structured through symbolic frameworks or constituted by forms of collective understanding. And 
thirdly, that social rules are continuously created and recreated through interaction. A systems 
theory approach satisfies these requirements for comprehending law as a social phenomenon; 
however, it addresses these concerns by providing highly distinctive representations. In the 
following sections I shall address each of these tenets respectively.  
In contrast to many valuable sociological contributions, Luhmann does not think that the most basic 
social processes are performed by individuals, groups, or actions. These units are foresworn in 
favour of communication as a basal unit of analysis; they are re-configured into different slots within 
the theoretical architecture. Persons are pushed outside society and arrayed within different 
autopoietic systems - the psychic system of consciousness, the nervous system, the body. Personage 
and individuality are communicated as 'semantic artefacts' perturbing and 'interpenetrating' the 
sub-systems of society.49 The crucial argument is that persons are only able to affect societal 
communication indirectly through irritations that generate further communications. Action becomes 
a communicative 'attribution as a reduction of complexity' and 'as an indispensable self-
simplification of the system'.50 The consequences of these re-formulations are that the subjective 
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interpretation of actors and the possibilities for consensus are distilled via several problematic 
relationships: the theorem of double contingency and the interpenetrative relationship between 
psychic systems and social systems.  
Double contingency is a central problematic emphasized by Luhmann as exemplifying the sheer 
improbability of both communication and the continuation of a complex society.51 The theorem of 
double contingency is linked to Cotterrell's sociological tenet that actions are meaningful through 
the subjective interpretation of the actor. This was fully articulated by Talcott Parsons (1951) as a 
key problem for social action. As a theorem it is a distillation of a fundamental question of sociology: 
how is social order possible? Several very famous answers have been posed to this question that 
may well be familiar to lawyers - the Leviathan State of Thomas Hobbes that keeps the violence of 
nature at bay, or Adam Smith's invisible hand of the market. Parsons contends that the theorem of 
double contingency clarifies this question of social order. 
In focusing on this theorem I intend to explain how Luhmann's contribution differs from many 
sociological accounts when it comes to the subjectivity of actors and the role of social consensus. My 
account will position Luhmann's theory as offering a unique reservoir of tools from which socio-legal 
scholarship can be initiated. 
Parsons' theorem of double contingency focuses on the difficulties actors have in achieving 
'collective action' and the mutual dependency which appears to occur between such actors. The 
theorem ties together the following enquiries within a neat problematic. How do individuals 
establish an 'understanding' with one another despite the extant gap between them? How does the 
self-orientation and the other-orientation in each of the participants emerge and stabilize as a social 
relation? How is coordinated action between participant's possible? How can mutual comprehension 
emerge and continue? Few would doubt the importance of these question.  
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There are two instances of contingency which appear on both sides of the participant equation. 
Firstly, in performing an action the participant will likely realize that they are seeking to influence the 
behaviour of another participant. In turn, this responding participant will also be seeking to perform 
an action or a re-action with the realization that the other participant is in a similar position. 
Consequently, each participant is aware that they are attempting to communicate with a conscious 
person who is opaque, self-directing, and capable of making their own choices according to their 
own motivations. The first contingency arises through this impasse.52 Secondly, the choices made by 
each participant are dependent upon the choices and actions of the other participant. Therefore, 
there is an 'immanent circularity' endemic to this problematic: Alter's behaviour depends on Ego's, 
at the same time Ego's behaviour depends on Alter's.53 From this position of dependency we can see 
the second contingency. 
For Parsons this problem of double contingency can be resolved by a consensus anchored on a 
shared symbolic system of values. The cultural system maintains social order for a long duration by 
instantiating a common cultural inheritance. Reciprocal expectations condense into role-
expectations in the personality system and the social system.  Roles can then become 
institutionalized through the influence extended by the cultural system of value orientations. Values 
can be super-added to create expectations of moral conformity and deviance. Mutual orientation 
between ego and alter is therefore secured by values.54  
Both Habermas and Luhmann criticize this position as overly reifying culture and operating on a 
presumption that values are able to perform such a guiding and stabilizing function. Habermas 
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contends that the problem is solved by the communicative process itself. Simply put, participants 
are to be conceived of as orientated towards validity claims raised in communicative action that 
produces a shared understanding and a negotiated common perspective.55 Luhmann provides a 
different resolution. He eschews all prospects of a grand consensus or tantalizing inter-subjectivity. 
Luhmann positions double contingency as the point from which social systems emerge. He casts the 
problematic and its indeterminacy in a positive light. The meaning of contingent is extended beyond 
Parsons' interpretation that indicated indeterminacy and dependency (the first and second 
contingency highlighted supra). Instead, Luhmann draws from Aristotelian modal theory to point out 
that contingency invokes an observation of the distinction between actuality and potentiality, 
selection and non-selection.56 To this disjuncture he affixes the concept of communication. For 
communication assists in the reproduction of what it requires for autocatalysis, namely the double 
contingency of participating actors. This double contingency enables and is replicated by the 
communicative distinction between utterance and information. The recipient observes the utterer 
and attributes the utterance to that person; however, the recipient also observes the utterer as 
indicating a piece of information. The form of utterance and information thus correlates with the 
well-worn distinctions between the indicator and indicated, signifier and signified (Luhmann, 2012: 
126).57   
As a generative dynamic double contingency initiates communication, and this communication 
inevitably constitutes a social system as a network of meaningful reciprocal selections between 
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participants – which reproduces the very problem of double contingency. Luhmann's solution to the 
problem is enabled through the mutual implication of the communication concept and the theorem 
of double contingency. Recognition of the theorem initiates greater sensitivity to the contingency 
and specificity of a person's actions. Topics are produced which can process contingency as the 
difference between actual and potential meaning. For instance, the topics of chance, fate, and 
serendipity are frames by which the unobservable vicissitudes of history can be conceptualized.58  
This mutualistic constitution means that, in effect, participants engage as  black boxes and manage 
to achieve only a partial transparency for one another and an ersatz level of control.59 They can 
observe what they consider are causal patterns towards the behaviour of the other by examining 
inputs and their corresponding outputs. Patching together these expectations the unobservable  
become observable entities: the private composition of the system, the latent structures of the 
system, and so on.60  These abstractions can then be geared towards the observations of the other - 
denoted as actions if attributable to the self-selections of the other, and denoted as experiences if 
attributable to the external-selections of the other (Luhmann, 1995: 104). The theorem is acutely 
felt and reaches prominence by posing the question: will the partner accept or reject  a 
communication or, in terms of action, will an action help or harm the partner? (Luhmann, 1995: 112) 
Hence, we can see Luhmann's highly original resolution to this problem in which an emergent 
system arises from the reduction of complexity and the attenuation of uncertainty. The significance, 
for the purposes of this thesis, is that meaningfulness is re-directed away from the orbit of individual 
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interpretation or consensus between participants towards an orthogonal relationship in which 
communication recursively connects to further communications steered through a self-reproductive 
process. This means that the meaning of racism, discrimination, and law, is defined within these 
communication loops and not by reference to higher norms or the subjectivity of actors.  
The penultimate argument made by Cotterrell (1998) is that a contribution to socio-legal studies 
must be propelled forward with reference to symbolic, systematic, or structural constraints. This is 
not a problem for systems theory. For Luhmann, social life is structured by a multitude of processes 
including symbolic generalization, system differentiation, and social complexity; however, the idea 
of consensus and conflict are no longer 'constitutive' features of society; although, they do re-appear 
as social configurations. Lastly, the fact that 'social rules' are created and re-created continuously is 
heavily integrated into the theory. The radical 'temporality of complexity' means that the present as 
it appears and disappears has to re-draw new horizons signifying the future and the past through 
connections to available communications. Systems theory draws on a tradition of social 
constructivism expressed most famously in the work of Berger and Luckmann (1966).    
The preceding section has sought to establish that systems theory, as developed by Niklas Luhmann, 
can meet the requirements set to denote a contribution to socio-legal scholarship. Luhmann's 
sociology advances from the sociological tenets highlighted by Cotterrell providing a profound and 
original theory of society. The second point made by Cotterrell concerns the capacity of the method 
to place matters within a systematic context. Systems theory no doubt achieves this in abundance, 
however it goes further because it can examine methods of thought - such as the relations between 
general and specific - as tied to epistemic epochs and societal complexity.61  
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IS THE APPROACH EMPIRICAL?  
One of the most persuasive arguments for the sociology of law and the socio-legal movement is the 
centrality of an empirical element in its research.  At first glance, this is a demand which an abstract, 
autopoietic theory of law cannot easily meet. Legal empiricism is habitually allied with the analysis of 
'law in practice' as contrasted to 'law in the books'. Systems theory, however, is not constructed 
upon traditional philosophical categories such as the transcendent and empirical, subjective and 
objective, or idealism and realism. As a consequence, the distinction between practice and text 
cannot automatically be reflected in the theory. 
Cotterrell (1998: 179-183) contends that systems theory cannot outline the uniqueness or the 
empirical existence of law. The formalism of the legal code provides limited purchase for 
understanding topics such as integrity, fairness, justice, authority and acceptability, nor can it explain 
how procedures and practices relate to social constraints.62 He also offers doubts as to whether the 
universality of the legal sub-system can touch upon the diversity of legal perspectives - lawyers in 
particular courts, claimants and defendants in particular claims, political actors pursing special 
interests, practices differing across jurisdictions. Empirical perspectives, moreover, must be able to 
examine variation, continuity, and historical patterns, rather than idealized and abstracted social 
conditions.63  
How can systems theory respond to such charges? If offering a diversity of perspectives indicates an 
empirical dimension, then this may simply suggest that further work needs to be done in deepening 
the systems theoretical understanding of law. That said, there is a fairly extensive literature in which 
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theory to a range of legal debates: legal pluralism, obedience to law, the appeal system, and so forth. 
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law as a self-referential, autopoietic system has been deployed to explain legal phenomena.64 
Furthermore, the theory itself is heterogeneous and labyrinthine. There are multiple points of exit 
and entrance such that key concepts obtain a different prominence dependent upon one's frame of 
reference.65 Indeed, Chapters 7 and 8 in this thesis presume that legal argument is recursively 
distinct from the perspective of a legal decision explored in Chapters 9 and 10 of this thesis. The 
structural coupling of law to other sub-systems provides a fulcrum from which divergent 
perspectives can be observed. Chris Thornhill (2011) examines the evolution of constitution as the 
legal and political sub-systems of society differentiate and become more complex. Gunther Teubner 
(2011b) examines the multifarious ways in which contract structurally couples the economy and the 
law. 
Luhmann has consistently maintained that the theory is not constructed with the aim of reform in 
mind. Its foremost purpose is to provide an explanatory grid which can reveal law as a self-
referential social subsystem.66 This non-prescriptive and non-normative component of the theory 
does not deny an empirical element. It merely demands that the construction of such results openly 
acknowledge the unavoidable epistemological connection between the research method and its 
object of analysis.67 In a similar manner, Foucault's genealogical method undoubtedly produced 
detailed, empirical insights, but Foucault remained adamant that reform proposals cannot be easily 
produced because of the entanglement of every observer in epistemic power structures.  
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 For example, the analysis developed in Chapters 9 and 10 of this thesis focuses on valid decisions and the 
medium/form distinction. This does not disavow the cogency of the legal code and the system/environment 
distinction. It simply places them in the background while these other concepts are put to use.  
66
 This is a point of dispute. For example, Ralf Rogowski (1994, 2001, 2013) has developed a model of reflexive 
law on the basis of systems theory which has been influential in the domain of labour law and regulation 
theory. 
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 Reza Banakar (2000: 275) recognizes this problem for the socio-legal method in which one observes 'a social 
act ... in which those being studied usually participate with the investigator to produce the final observations.’ 
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Empirical insights that expose the difference between legal practice and legal theory manages to 
illuminate the contingency of legal ideology. On this condition, systems theory excels.  A social 
science that critically observes social relations ‘must be able to pose alternatives to the conditions he 
is criticizing' (Tamanaha, 1999: 23). The neo-functionalism of the theory ensures that diverse social 
entities can be seen to be performing a comparable function. Judicial decisions can be seen in line 
with decisions made by other organizations such as banks, schools, and executive bodies. Legal 
argument as the specialization of second-order observation can be compared to the pricing 
mechanism in the economy and the discussion of scientific discoveries in academic journals.  
Social systems theory is able to bring a high degree of theoretical precision informed by a cornucopia 
of sociological, philosophical, and scientific sources. The sociological concepts by which law is 
analyzed attempts both to offer an intra-mural and an extra-mural perspective. The uniqueness of 
legal meaning is confirmed at the same time as technical categories are identified that provide an 
analytical grid for social phenomena in general: system/environment, code/programme, 
medium/form. It is certainly the case that systems theory does not admit an obvious empirical 
dimension, but it may still, as highlighted above, produce many of the insights available to such 
methods; however, this is achieved by pursuing a radical and constructivist perspective on the 
empirical.  
In the preceding sections, I have established that systems theory can be considered as a contribution 
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 Systems theory may also have the capacity to be a critical, value-free sociology. See for example 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ developments of a critical autopoiesis (2010, 2015). 
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AXIOMS OF LUHMANN'S SYSTEMS THEORY 
In this section I shall explain the methodology of a modern systems theory approach. In particular I 
will provide, using a broad brush, a panoramic of Luhmann's profound theory of society. After this 
point, we will then turn our attention towards Luhmann's unique vision of the legal system. Once 
achieved, the possibilities of systems theory to highlight the social constellations of racism and 
legality should be radiantly apparent. 
METHODOLOGY 
Niklas Luhmann's theory of society is the culmination of a thirty-year project to produce a theory 
that can adequately reflect the complexity and auto-logical dynamics of contemporary society.69 The 
tapestry produced is threaded from a bewildering array of sources and disciplines - ranging from 
mathematics and biology to philosophy and sociology. He famously used a card-index system 
(Zettelkasten) to construct a theoretical architecture composed of concepts (code/programme, 
observation, operation, function, communication, medium/form) sufficiently supple as to allow the 
theory to have many different entry points. Once certain concepts are chosen as theoretical tools, 
then the remaining concepts are re-calibrated in line with these initial choices.70 Luhmann's 
concentration on the complexity of social life has infected his theoretical architecture so that 
concepts arrange themselves into a complex system with its corresponding qualities: non-linearity, 
dynamic-stability, emergent properties, and self-organization. Consequently, key concepts acquire a 
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self-referential capacity and become non-reducible to one other: each comprises a scale in the 
imbrication of an emergent order.  
Luhmann envisaged his approach as a combination of “systems theory” and functional methodology 
(Luhmann, 1995: 55). Lawyer's are certainly familiar with thinking of law as a system in terms of 
Kelsen's implicative legal norms and rationality; however, Luhmann's use of the 'system' concept is 
drawn from a completely different intellectual heritage than that commonly indexed under the 
heading of jurisprudence. We might think of the 'system' concept as a development on a long 
European tradition of describing the world via frames which play upon the distinction between 
whole and part or the distinction between universal and particular. Throughout the Enlightenment 
of the 18th century numerous intellectual endeavours sought to find how the entire world was 
present in each man. A priori judgments were located that identified the concept of reason, the 
moral law, or the concept of the State as a guiding distinction that provided the epistemic 
foundations of a universal theory (Luhmann, 1995: 4-7).  
Systems theory is a grand theory which offers a significant paradigm change. First developed in its 
early stages by Ludwig von Bertanffy the insights of thermodynamics, evolution, and biology were 
combined into a general systems theory. A difference was established between open and closed 
systems with the latter representing those systems unaffected by environmental pressure either 
completely or only through specified channels.  In contrast to older conceptual frameworks modern 
systems theory can manage self-reference as a basic premise. System differentiation is 'nothing 
more than the repetition within systems of the difference between system and environment’ 
(Luhmann, 1995: 7). A differentiated system is no longer composed of different parts and relations 
between them. It is instead composed of a large number of operationally employable 
system/environment distinctions. If we take a classic utilization of the whole/part frame, then this 
point will become clear. The whole of the human world is composed from its parts and relations 
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which are persons and the relations between persons. The issue is how and whether we can 
sufficiently define either persons or their relations. In the human sciences there is little consensus on 
how this can be done. 
 A second issue to which the dexterity of systems theory offers a solution is the fact that mapping 
the human world (and world more generally) according to one description often precludes different 
descriptions which may be better attuned to the research object. Discussing the world in terms of 
gender, class, or homo economicus preclude more viable approaches. Thus, we can already predict 
the likely conclusion of such descriptions when applied to fresh phenomena.71 The relative poverty 
of these positions is exposed by their inability to offer surprising or counter-intuitive proposals. 
Systems theory offers a level of abstraction, however, in which the complexity and self-referentiality 
of systems are taken into account.  
For modern systems theory, system differentiation can only occur on the basis of self-reference. 
Each element, takes form by reference to another element contained within the same system. To 
enable this self-organization on the basis of recursive self-reference:  'systems must create and 
employ a description of themselves; they must at least be able to use the difference between system 
and environment within themselves for orientation and as a principle for creating information' 
(Luhmann, 1995: 9). Hence the 'environment' is a necessary correlate of the system concept. The 
concepts of distinction, self-reference (and other-reference), system and environment, congregate 
together in a nexus. From this holding further concepts can be generated of description, self-
orientation, and information. The environment is necessary because we need to know how closed 
systems can also be open.  
                                                                
71
 A recent study (Porter and Adams, 2016) springs to mind in which economists 'discovered' that parents are 
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This theory design moves perspectives for research onto different territory which is an equally 
compelling proposal for socio-legal research as it is for sociology. Interests in regulation and control 
are turned towards considerations of autonomy and environmental sensitivity. Interests in planning 
and governance move toward issues of non-teleological evolution. Interests in structural stability 
(for example, norms) and consensus re-align through dynamic-stability.  
The systems theoretic paradigm is anchored by the prominence of the system/environment 
distinction, which is heavily asserted within all of Luhmann’s later work (Luhmann, 1995; Luhmann, 
2014). The distinction operates asymmetrically in the sense that only the system side can be marked 
and only this side is capable of generating meaning. Meaning is the evolutionary achievement and 
distribution of a system’s complexity and possibilities for self-reference.  We must refer to the 
system-side of the distinction primarily and use the environment as a negative which delineates the 
edge of the system. Importantly, we should not view the environment as accidental and peripheral 
in contrast to the essential significance of the system; the environment is constitutive of the system. 
The system/environment distinction when actualized in the medium of meaning can be observed as 
the difference between self-reference and external-reference. Luhmann asserts that the self-
reference of systems is a key characteristic of modern society. His argument proposes that the idea 
of a distinction is ‘conceptually identical’ to the idea of self-reference (Luhmann, quoting Louis 
Kauffman (1987)). These ideas are conjoined because they emerge from George Spencer-Brown’s 
calculus of forms. Luhmann’s reliance on Spencer-Brown’s work is an important theoretical direction 
in his later period, so it is appropriate that I spend some space explaining the conceptual 
architecture of Spencer-Brown’s work.  
George Spencer-Brown (1972) developed a theory of how distinctions operate through the creation 
and subsequent manipulation of a ‘form’. A form is a triadic composite of an indicated (marked) 
space, a separating boundary (distinction), and a non-indicated (unmarked) space. From this insight, 
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Spencer-Brown was able to develop an innovative calculus that established a collection of 
manipulations through which forms could be constructed. He manages to tie together the concepts 
of self-reference and distinction by noting how this idea of form can be both an operation and an 
observation. A form operates through indication and distinction, for example: the car is red. An 
observation involves observing the indicated, the distinction, and the un-indicated space. The car is 
then observed as being both red and also not any other colour.  
The system takes the place of the subject in the archetypical and humanistic subject/object 
distinction. We observe, we understand and we mark all our meaning on the subject-side of the 
distinction. Furthermore, it is a basic assumption that the object is not able to generate meaning of 
its own and cannot observe the self as it observes itself. The object remains the environment of the 
self and of the system. It is this system/environment distinction which accords normative closure 
and cognitive openness to the legal system in relation to its environment.72  The closure occurs a 
second time at the second-order level when system-referential operations observe observations. 
Here, the system observes the observations of another system and, consequently, observes itself 
because every external-observation is actualized on the basis of a self-observation, and vice versa. 
This re-entry of the system/environment distinction on the side of the system engenders operational 
and normative closure in the system’s functional space. This compulsion to self-reference creates 
recursive systemic structures and when coded through the legal binary ensures that legal/illegal 
operations can only refer to other legal/illegal operations. Elevated to the second-order level, law 
observes economics by constituting self-observations based on external-observations. Therefore, 
each demarcation and observation of the environment, or a complex in the environment (another 
subsystem), in fact actualizes legal self-observation. We can observe these processes as culminating 
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in the tautology: law is law. Or, unfolded a little: the boundary and operational capacity of law are 
defined by law itself.73    
Secondly, Luhmann’s approach is predicated on a functional methodology. Functional analysis allows 
the construction of problems because it ‘uses relations to comprehend what is present as contingent 
and what is different as comparable.’74 The relationship between problem and solution generates 
additional questions and possibilities, stabilities and instabilities; as opposed to simply forcing the 
dissolution of the problem. Functionality differs from dialectical movements in two important 
respects: (1) contingency is derived from the complexity of the system and indicates a possibility for 
actualization which is not necessary; and (2) it holds no prospect for a final resolution or end of 
history. The functional approach allows the comparison of causal patterns and so provides a second-
order observational position whereby we can perceive the relations between relations. In comparing 
these causal streams, we attempt to obtain information i.e. the norms and factual conditions under 
which a difference makes a difference. The functional process has the twin effect of generating 
information through observation of other causalities and also of generating information about the 
system itself. Every problem must be conceived through the system/environment scheme: 
therefore, every problem is a system-problem. Functionally specific mechanisms deal with each 
problematic and each system configures a problem in its own peculiar way through recursive 
reference to its own communications.75   
Functional specification does not mean that law has been designated a specific purpose by a higher 
power, such as politics or society. Function indicates the irreducibility of law to other subsystems 
and it is the non-identity of law to other systems which marks the functioning of law as different; 
hence: functional differentiation. Looking at this more closely, it explains the ability for law to be 
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differentiated from its environment, and other subsystems, not just on the level of the code 
legal/illegal, but on the autopoietic level in which the functioning of law - distinct from its 
performance - constructs the conditions of its possibility. This is not to say that other systems may 
not observe the legal code and use the code in its operations. They may very well do so. However, in 
contrast to the legal system, the code will be used as something substantial on the programmatic 
level, rather than something concerned with value attributions on the code level. The reason why 
law itself cannot use its code on the programmatic level is because the system would quickly 
encounter the paradox of the code and would be compelled to question the legality or illegality of 
the code itself. Therefore, when observed by another system the complexity of law (as a functionally 
differentiated system) can only be reduced; it cannot be matched on a point to point basis. The 
distinctive function of law in modern society is the autopoietic capacity to maintain (stabilize) 
normative expectations in the face of counterfactual events. For example, even though theft takes 
place despite the legal norm prohibiting such conduct, law still maintains normative expectations 
that it should not occur.  
Unlike other theorists who begin from a platform of unity or a form of difference, Luhmann wishes 
to start by theorizing the actualization of questions and answers within the framework of problems. 
In practice, this means that structures of circularity and recursion are of particular relevance. As I 
have started to elaborate above, operative closure and the continuation of complexity are the 
benchmarks of a Luhmannian methodology. As a result of this approach, questions of reference and 
questions of causality must remain separate (otherwise, they corrupt each other and de-
differentiate).76 The possible problematic generated by each respective question of reference and 
question of cause cannot overlap without compromising their productive force and usefulness.  
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The effect of such an exacting methodology is that any arguments which attempt to note the 
development of legal structures in the legal system must refrain from making assertions as to how 
certain legal events came about or, perhaps, how law appeared to respond to a change in the 
political system. Indeed, we cannot make accurate predictions about the future effects of a law 
because to do so is to reduce the complexity of the present by selecting some variables whilst 
ignoring others. That is not to say that this cannot be done, but if we do so we run the risk of 
offering fairly unproductive observations. Such stringency is perhaps why several commentators 
have called for autopoietic theory to be understood as an aesthetic theory which could be used in a 
creative and playful way as an artistic development of different knowledge fields.77   
The technical issues elucidated above sought to situate the idea of a systems-problematic. At this 
stage, it would be useful to explain the axioms of modern systems theory that will be applied later 
on, and also to explain law as a social system. This is not a complete description of Luhmann’s 
observations on law. Inevitably, I have placed emphasis on particular features which are productive 
for the subject matter at hand; however, I do not think that Luhmann would object to a re-framing 
of certain features as long as it is done self-consciously and with circumspection to its own 
contingency. 
COMMUNICATION, FUNCTION, CODE, AND EVOLUTION 
We need to enquire: which societal constellations create the meaning of meaning and the 
interactive possibilities of interaction? Which units foreshadow the observational possibilities of 
observation? Here, modern systems theory uses communication as the unit of analysis because it 
has the flexibility to meet such demands. Social communication is the basic unit of analysis in 
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modern systems theory. Communication exists as the performance of society and consists of the 
unity of three distinctions: utterance, information, and understanding.78    
Luhmann argues that a self-referential system requires a ‘discontinuous infrastructure’. By which he 
means: the underlying units that perpetuate systems of self-reference must be inherently dynamic, 
composed of distinctions, and capable of attracting other units to produce further differences. These 
basal units actualize the system through a process of selective co-ordination which in turn allows 
further selections. Communication is the processing of selection. It forces choices to be made 
through the application of distinctions whereby something is marked whilst other things are ignored. 
In order for communication as a process to select, it must be able to draw from a prior selective 
capacity; and when communications force a selection, further selections in response to this selection 
are produced. Thus, communications become bundled together and are able to attract further lines 
of communication. From these selective processes, the complexity of the system can force 
continuous selective processes which create space for meaning to emerge. Communication is not 
transmission, for this presupposes the transmitter, the message and the receiver as independent 
elements; and as should be clear from the above discussion, communication is a far more fluid 
process comprised of differences playing off differences that are inadequately described if they are 
considered as only stable quantities interacting with one another.79    
Therefore, what cannot be communicated cannot be part of a subsystem of communication or a 
society which actualizes itself by communication. Consequently, thoughts are not coextensive with 
communication. Thoughts are the elements present in psychic systems of consciousness. Thoughts 
and communications are not identical or reducible to one another. Strictly speaking they cannot 
even cognize the existence of each other, except with recourse to their own terms of 
communication or terms of thought 
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But, what can this approach say about change, dynamism and evolution? Furthermore, can a 
statement of law (for example in a statute) provide an adequate background to understand the 
meaning of such a statute and the possibilities for its meaning within law and society in general? 
Observers can make statements about the law of tort or the law of trusts and qualify this action with 
the admission that this is a valid or sufficient observation at the time in which they are making it, but 
without a rigorous epistemology the question must be asked whether these observations are 
sufficiently complex and sensitive to highlight the dormant and dynamic characteristics of a legal 
area. Inquiries need to be made as to the part played by academics and practitioners in influencing 
the concretization of laws and their interpretative possibilities in the legal system and in other 
subsystems of society.  
Modern society is functionally differentiated into subsystems of communication, examples of which 
are: politics, law, economics, the mass media, science, religion, education. Function systems are 
closed by the fact they are communicatively coded. The code itself is a symmetrical binary that 
encodes a communication as part of one functional system rather than another. It is symmetrical 
because meaning can be generated through both sides of the binary. Therefore, any communication 
encoded by the legal system can precipitate the production of many more communications through 
reference to the legal side and the illegal side at the same time.80 In comparison to the asymmetrical 
system/environment binary distinction, the code cannot perform a stable re-entry on the grounds 
that this leads to the paradox of the legal system where the code is applied to itself. There are, of 
course, important functional systems aside from law, such as: (1) the political system encoded by 
government/opposition; (2) and the economic system encoded by payment/non-payment.  
Luhmann explains that society has evolved through several stages of differentiation. This is not to 
say that this evolution has been in the direction of a categorical finale or an eschatological plane. 
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Nor is it stochastic in the sense of an arbitrary or random production of elements independent of 
structural constraint. The evolution of society is located somewhere in the hinterland of these 
projections; society perpetuates itself via self-reproduction and the maintenance of dynamic 
stability: autopoiesis.81 Indeed, as I have elucidated above, even if the cause and effect ratio is 
complicated by functional differentiation and self-reference, stabilities have emerged for a period 
and filter patterns have allowed society to operate within particular differential models. Therefore, 
although we cannot predict and explain specific events, we can still offer observations on structural 
drifts and filter-mechanisms.82 Yet we must at the same time be very rigorous in qualifying these 
observations and acknowledging their epistemological presumptions. 
At the micro level, evolution occurs through the blind interplay between variation, selection and 
stabilization.83 Elements refer to the possibilities of variation and selection, which in turn refer to the 
possibilities of structural formation. Stabilization, on the other hand, brings about the integration 
and independence of structures within far more complex associations, such as sub-divisions within 
subsystems, for instance the courts in the legal system or the administration (civil service, local 
councils, etc.) in the political system. The process of stabilization allows the maintenance of dynamic 
stability and the continuation of autopoietic reproduction whilst striving to install a unity to the 
evolutionary process.84 Translated into the legal context, variation is manifest in the mutation of 
laws. Selection is the process wherein opinions or facts emerge in the legal system through 
comparisons between the particular information and the memory of similar situations contained in 
the legal system. Put more abstractly, this involves the utilization of the redundancy/variety 
relationship alongside continual actualization of the system/environment (self-reference/external-
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reference) distinction. Stabilization emerges through self-observations and self-descriptions. Self-
descriptions, for example, can be found in the attempts by jurisprudence to explain the unity of law 
by posing the question: what is law?85 Self-descriptions can only function effectively in offering 
tenable descriptions of unity if they can be found to be in accordance with the actuality of the 
subsystem. Hence, we can see why natural law was suitable in one period for the legal system (at 
least in reference to European legal systems), but not to the same extent in other periods. 
THE PERSON AND THE SYSTEM 
Individuals do not command an essential space within modern systems theory, or at least not within 
the context in which they are habitually presented. Detractors have often lamented this gesture as 
the marginalization of the individual through the privileging of communication and abstract social 
systems.86 They contend that Luhmann cannot provide a sufficient description of society when he is 
prepared to place the individual outside society’s possibilities of operation and communication. Can 
a theory of society be tenable and cogent if we do not emphasize a person as an undivided and 
unified agent, or as the major cause and origin of events? In answer, I should like to pick up on the 
term essential emphasized above. Perhaps criticisms simply attempt theory construction through a 
different lens; and, in the end, we may come to the conclusion that we are asking different 
questions and dealing with different problems. Theorists may place importance on securing and 
understanding the central and essential issues pertaining to society and then, in some cases, 
proceed to propose a hierarchy or set of power-relations in which these stratifications may be 
analyzed in order to uncover latent structures and forgotten perspectives. Luhmann does not begin 
his theorizing within this nomenclature. Instead, his work within modern systems theory ventures to 
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understand events and issues through the axioms of functional differentiation, circularity, and 
contingency.  
Luhmann emphasizes the polycontextuality of persons and the functionally differentiated forms of 
inclusion and exclusion in which they partake. They appear as semantic artefacts within subsystems 
reconstructed within a system’s recursivity and possibilities of communication; however Luhmann 
still accords the person a sui generis totality of an individual consciousness.87 Individuals may not be 
empowered to bend social relations to their will or avoid socialization, but they still retain the 
freedom of their own thoughts which can only be misunderstood and miscommunicated in society. 
Quite simply, the standard hermeneutical circles have been redrawn as internal divisions of society 
and as external variations within a person’s consciousness. Traces of individuals can be found like 
footprints in the system. There is little point trying to find these persons or ascertain where they 
came from. Alternatively we might try to understand how these footprints are formed in the legal 
landscape and how these formations have varied at different times. 
These footprints in the system must be interpreted with recourse to society’s semantic 
arrangement. As a result, if the semantic composition of society changes then the artefact (that 
represents the exclusion of the person) alters too. Luhmann explains that society can be theorized as 
three distinct epochs: segmentation, stratification, functional differentiation.  The transition from, 
and the particularities of, stratification through to functional differentiation are analyzed later in this 
thesis.88 When society evolved from one anchored by stratification in favour of functional 
differentiation, the person was reconstructed under the auspices of subjectivity within the 
functional sub-systems. In the legal system, this would be in the terms of subjective rights. 
Subjective rights signify the structural coupling (or interpenetration) of the legal system and psychic 
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systems.89 It is through the concept of subjective right that the legal system creates a space that is 
expressly fine-tuned for (in the expectation of) perturbations that are generated within its 
environment i.e. individual psychic systems. This high level of ‘personalization’ certainly disturbed 
the legal system, encouraging conditions with a far higher level of variety than law, hitherto, had 
entertained. Forms of legal argumentation became increasingly sensitized to the communications 
generated in reaction to these receptive channels and, as a consequence, the complexity of possible 
legal claims and the capability for variety in selections made by legal communications ballooned.90    
For example, the division between the person and the subsystem (in particular, the political system 
or the legal system) is recognized in the general principle that admissions obtained under torture do 
not constitute reliable expectations for the system in relation to its environment, which in this case 
is the individual’s thoughts and intentions.91 In essence, the system self-observes and comes to the 
conclusion that it cannot trust its environment; in theoretical terms this means that operations 
stabilize and condense the system’s reliance on expectations regarding the environment. The 
mechanisms which allow the system to trust or mistrust its environment influence the formation of 
selectivity and the openness of the system to rapid change in situations where double contingency is 
present. If the system considers the trustworthiness of its environment in relation to the riskiness 
therein, then it does so through the construction of ‘specific selective sensibilities’ that create 
greater possibilities for action. Trust becomes a very sensitive apparatus that is constituted by 
choosing to reject mistrust and in doing so sensitizes itself to occasions of mistrust.92 Mistrust rarely 
causes a re-constitution of its elements through encountering reasons to trust; mistrust relates itself 
towards trust through incremental increases of reasons to trust from the consistency of 
environmental expectations. Gradually the system’s norms learn to trust through reference to the 
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cognitive recognition of environmental actions. To take our example again: on a structural level, it is 
not the action of the victim in itself which instigates mistrust, but the conceptual irritations 
generated by the term torture and the reference field which it inhabits.93    
At the level of functional systems, personalization is internalized in different ways dependent on the 
specific system and its own internal capacity. In the political system there are voters and citizens. In 
the legal system we have litigants, victims and other subjective-formations dependent on sub-
divisions of the system. Our personal histories become episodes in which we materialize within the 
performance of each system as semantic artefacts, only to disappear as the event itself disappears. 
In a stratified society the person was in a situation of ‘total inclusion’, whereby a person’s social 
status and possibilities were primarily and nearly totally derived from the social hierarchy to which 
they belonged. Exclusion from the stratified order (or the polis, for that matter) was exclusion from 
society. However, when the dynamic-stability of society changed, so did the person; and as society 
fragmented, subjectivity (and subjective rights) became a compensation for the loss of full 
inclusion.94 In a functionally differentiated society, such as ours, persons can only be partially 
excluded from all subsystems and can no longer belong completely to any.95 Hence, through the 
vehicle of subjectivity inclusion becomes a problem for a system which is endlessly productive; and 
for the individual, there is a crisis of identity that leads to feelings of anxiety.  
The concept of the subject has metastasized through the internal norms of the legal subsystem 
culminating in the medium of constitutional rights; a similar occurrence created the form of the 
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 Luhmann (1995: 127-129). ‘In its self-referential mode - that is, with the help of legal concepts - law must 
reflect on its own riskiness’, Luhmann (2004: 473). Concepts compound distinctions for easy digestion by the 
system and create the conditions for the dissemination of a larger variety of decisions. Just as with rules, 
concepts go through a dual process of condensation and confirmation as they go through repetition. Through 
repetition their meaning is enriched because memory of past-application links with productive new strands to 
form decisions and other chains of meaning: Luhmann (2004: 337-339). 
94
 Verschraegen (2002: 106). 
95
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descriptions are primarily concerned with Western civilization and so it is a point of contention (always 
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contract which emerged as uniquely different formations in the economic subsystem and the legal 
subsystem. Both the constitution and the contract are instances of double-sided forms. They signify 
the conduits which enjoin and separate the above subsystems. But, as always with Luhmann, they 
perform a duplicitous role. For on one hand, whilst they provide a channel by which each system can 
generate ‘waves of resonance’, they also prevent systems from colonizing other systems (personal 
and social). Constitutionality, as it is referenced in legal self-observations, in all its multiplicity (civil 
rights, the rule of law, elements of substantive justice, legitimate expectations - public law in toto) 
announces the legal system’s observations on this theme. Constitutionality becomes the vehicle by 
which the political system and its ambitions to dictate and colonize are pre-empted. For instance, 
laws relating to freedom of expression and religion exemplify the legal system observing the political 
system’s tendency to colonize the individual, the mass media, religion, science, art, etc. The notion 
of the state also provides an instance of a double-sided form between the political system and the 
legal system.96 
On the societal level, this concern for colonization is manifested in a mechanism to prevent systemic 
corruption and de-differentiation. Human rights may be emerging as the social mechanism which 
prevents functional systems from regressing. Luhmann appears to hint that this may herald the 
emergence of a new functional system that arbitrates the inclusion and exclusion of the individual in 
society. Terms like ‘human dignity’ certainly employ a very high degree of variety and openness to 
change. Furthermore, when a theory establishes itself by referring to ‘inalienable’ rights we are 
seeing a reference to the environment of society, in that inalienability is a distinction that cannot be 
easily distinguished by social communications because it seems to come from the material world.97 
Although I will not specifically focus on this societal-innovation, I would like to note two points. 
Firstly, there is a very real need for human rights to be explained sociologically and more fully with 
                                                                
96
 For an examination of this relationship in terms of law see Luhmann (2004: Chapter 9); and in terms of the 
welfare state, see Luhmann (1990). 
97
 Verschraegen (2002: 270-271). 
74 
 
reference to society. At the present moment, they tend to be conceived only as political and 
legalistic themes. Secondly, it is certainly ironic that human rights on the societal plane may be 
evolving as a mechanism to stabilize the functional differentiation of subsystems, since as legal 
concepts they have led to an unprecedented level of juridification of societal issues.  
CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we have explained the position of the person in relation to a social system by 
emphasizing the difference between social and psychic systems. Persons are identified as fragments 
within the operations of each subsystem. Moreover, we have begun to analyze the complex web of 
interactions between social systems and their environments, noting how the possibilities of such 
interactions change in line with societal transformations. In this chapter we covered how systems 
theory can be understood as a contribution to socio-legal scholarship. Some of the main axioms of 
the theory, especially those relevant to this thesis, have been critically explained. From this position 
we can now proceed to apply systems theory to uncover the socio-genetics of discrimination and 










CHAPTER 4 - ANTERIOR CIVILISING SEMANTICS: ON THE WAY TO RACISM 
 
 
Mead: I was speaking in those days about three things we had to do: appreciate cultural differences, 
respect political and religious differences and ignore race. Absolutely ignore race. 
 
Baldwin: Ignore race. That certainly seemed perfectly sound and true. 
 
Mead: Yes, but it isn’t anymore. You see, it really isn’t true. This was wrong because— 
 
Baldwin: Because race cannot be ignored. 
 




In this chapter Luhmann's theory of a functional differentiated society is utilized to argue that 
discrimination can be connected to the development of major changes in the way that society 
describes itself. The form of societal differentiation prior to function was based on the stratifications 
of status.98 These were distributed by significant divisions within society between different social 
roles and institutions, such as the court and the country. The work of Norbert Elias in the Civilizing 
Process is utilized to show how developing theories of manner, courtesy, and civility provides a social 
precursor to how discrimination operates in modern society. This analysis is presented as both an 
elaboration of the social context of discrimination in terms of social esteem and respect, and as a 
prelude to discrimination in the modern world which must be understood as an emergent type of 
communication that crosses functional lines. A number of key limits highlighted in Chapter 2 are 
retrieved and employed so as to re-describe  the presumptions and difficulties of both moral analysis 
of discrimination and racism, and sociological approaches to racism by reference to societal 
evolution. The chapter does not provide a detailed historical study in terms of institutional 
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development or the grand ideas integral to discrimination. The intention is simply to identify key 
characteristics of discrimination and abstract these into a scaffold that highlights a range of 
functionally comparable scenarios. By doing I hope to be able to offer a broader and more 
innovative perspective on the social reality of discrimination.   
 
A RACIAL DILEMMA 
 
The dilemma encountered by James Baldwin and Margaret Mead lies at the heart of the 
discrimination debate.99 How can and how should race be handled by communication? When is race 
relevant and irrelevant? What is and is not racism? The answer oscillates: race must not be relevant, 
but it cannot be ignored. It is informative and uninformative, visible and invisible, disruptive and 
irrelevant. For those engaged in ethical reflection the dilemma may be handled by a more rigorous 
schematization and the adoption of various strategies, for example: by defining the limits of racism 
and pointing out errors in its deployment, or by balancing the prohibition of discrimination and the 
promotion of positive action; however, it remains to be seen whether these resolutions will survive 
or if they are sufficiently persuasive for the vast majority of the public, which is of course the 
audience who must be convinced if the equality movement is to achieve its aims.100 This indelible 
and paradoxical communication of race is worthy of further scrutiny. 
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 With reference to the Deleuzian themes developed in Chapters 5 and 6, we might say the dilemma contracts 
and relaxes at the heart of the debate. 
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 The dilemma is avoided through the manipulation of various distinctions between structural racism and 
individual racism, historical racism and present instances of racism, unconscious racism and conscious racism. 
Rejoinders appear claiming that racism as defined must be blatant and predicated on individual belief; mere 
unfortunate outcomes or cultural insensitivity do not meet this definition. A similar balancing act is provided 
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for example, Garcia (1996) who finds that the volitional ill-will of racism seeps through into institutions by a 
connection to the founders, or the will of present members. The imagination of these solutions strikingly 
mirrors that proposed in the great debate over aristocratic gentility. These concerned whether virtue was 
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Focusing on this dilemma will elucidate the social basis for discrimination while utilizing themes and 
limitations that resonate within anti-discrimination scholarship, specifically: the morality of 
discrimination, the disconnection between legal categorizations of discrimination and its social basis; 
the linkages between perception, prejudice, and racism. Indeed, by focusing on the indelibility of 
race we search within a context from which these questions radiate like spokes on a wheel. This 
dilemma is not a factor to be discarded; it is a paradox to be embraced. 
For modern systems theory the isolation of a paradox calls for a closer analysis of its communicative 
structure. Systems theory is sympathetic towards the rhetorical tradition whereby a paradox was a 
device to provoke new lines of enquiry, as opposed to a more recent understanding where it 
signifies a logical fallacy requiring the application of greater analytical rigor (Luhmann, 1994:26). 
Paradoxes occur when two seemingly incompatible positions are held together by communication 
such that an oscillation takes place between the two. Spencer-Brown (1972: 69ff, 57) phrases it as an 
oscillation between the marked and unmarked sides of the form. 
One type of paradoxical formulation of particular relevance for this thesis is the 'unresolvable 
indeterminacy' (Spencer-Brown, 1972:57) produced when a form re-enters a form. This uncertainty 
arises in self-referential systems when the difference between the system and the environment is 
observed from within the system. Another way to grasp this indeterminacy is to notice that such a 
re-entry generates an infinite regress in which the re-entry can occur ad infinitum.101 
There are two structural arrangements which may hold the key to understanding the dilemma of 
race. Firstly, we must consider the relationship between the interactive order and society. In a broad 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
allocated by birth or by performance, with one such resolution being that virtuous parents bred virtuous 
children (Saul, 2011: 171-176). Such comparisons are informative of the social basis for discrimination. 
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 A practical example would be the way that the distinction civilization/nature re-enters on the side of 
civilization as natural and unnatural civilized practices. See Luhmann (1993) for further examples drawing on 
Aristotle's Politics. The re-entry of the form into the form is a common occurrence in relation to identity. For 
example, the distinction between female and male can re-enter on the female side of the form as femininity, 
and the re-entry can occur again to produce additional semantical formulations such as ‘femme’ and ‘butch’. 
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sense, this distinction mirrors the micro-macro debate within sociology in which one tries to 
consider how the sociology of micro events, like Goffman's conversational analysis, relate to macro-
level structures, such as class, ideology, and power. Following the discussions in Chapter 2, what we 
are looking for is how this distinction maps onto the difference articulated between the individual 
and the racial group, or the actions of an individual and racist ideology. Secondly, the notion of self-
description also corresponds to this dilemma. Self-descriptions operate as observations which 
specify in their unifying gesture a world of known and unknown quantities. These descriptions 
propose a unified vision of all the many varied parts of society in the shape of grand narratives, 
myths, cosmologies, and ontological frameworks (Luhmann, 2013: 175- 180). As we will see below, 
however, they also encounter a dilemma in which the paradox of holding together a unity alongside 
its particulars is dealt with either effectively or ineffectively.102  
Before we follow this course, a question must be posed: why are we not reflecting upon the socio-
evolution of race per se? One would think that a methodology which considers race in its socio-
genesis and its manifestation within specific institutional arrangements - slavery, apartheid - may be 
more beneficial to explicating the social basis for racism and ultimately discrimination. Is the 
proposed method involving difference and paradox not likely to provide a poorer refraction of the 
intimate experience of race within the strictures of a grand theory? Can modern systems theory 
avoid the fate of Parsonian and Marxist theory in which the research framework may be thought to 
fail to apprehend its object of study?103 Systems theory can surmount this hurdle because the theory 
adheres to Kant's injunction that an enquiry should focus on the conditions of possibility. The theory 
incorporates second-order observation into its corpus.  
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 This statement does not intend to discredit such approaches. It simply suggests that the tools should match 
the job at hand.  
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The conceptual web of modern systems theory provides tools of sufficient suppleness and generality 
that a deep understanding can be gleamed of phenomena if the objects under scrutiny are aligned 
with the most appropriate concepts, in the circumstances of this thesis: paradox, system 
differentiation, and self-description; moreover, with reference to Chapters 5 and 6 in particular, 
systems theory is supplemented by some insights offered by Foucault, and Deleuze. The additional 
input from these authors strengthens the methodology employed in this thesis because they provide 
significant theoretical advances and socio-historical illustrations while maintaining a close sensibility 
to a philosophy built on difference and paradox. 
A review of the literature in Chapter 2 showed that defining racism and presenting a consistent 
moral rationalization of its structure has run into difficulties. It is suggested that the elusiveness and 
inconsistency encountered in such forays is indicative of its communicative structure. As such a 
valuable approach may be one which is wider in ambition and is targeted at the socio-historical 
conditions which enable such elusive and apparently inconsistent qualities to be fully appreciated. 
By examining the evolution of the interaction/societal relationship and societal self-descriptions this 
chapter will illuminate the operational conditions of the race problematic; however, prior to the 
application of these concepts we need to explain and justify their employment, especially in the 








INTERACTIONS AND SOCIETY 
 
Luhmann provides a systematization of the micro-instances of sociality by leaning heavily upon the 
insights developed by Erving Goffman in his descriptions of interactive orders.104 For Luhmann, the 
interaction system is one of the differentiated systems of modern society - along with functionally 
differentiated sub-systems, and organizations. Within Luhmann's oeuvre however, the interaction 
system is rarely considered with the thoroughness applied to other systems; partly, one suspects, 
because Erving Goffman provided such a rich and textured discussion of their various 
manifestations, but also because he considered them of relatively minor importance in the context 
of constructing a grand theory of society.105 Interaction systems are of relevance to the study of 
discrimination for several reasons.106 
Firstly, such systems are differentiated episodes of communication on the basis of presence.107 
Communications that indicate presence are those which are relevant for the often short-lived 
autopoiesis of the interaction system. The idea of presence drives the connectivity of operations in 
the system so that only those contributions attributed to presence can be recognized within the 
system. In practice this takes the form of face to face interaction, turn-taking in conversations, 
playing games, business meetings, crowds in public spaces, passing in the street. There is a huge 
spectrum of contexts in which these micro-systems can take place. Absence can also become a topic 
through re-entry of the present/absent schema into the system on the side of the present.  
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 For a recent consideration of Goffman’s writing on stigma in the context of discrimination, see Solanke’s 
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81 
 
There is an affinity between the indelibility of race and the fact that interaction systems establish 
their boundary on the basis of presence. It is this indelible and unavoidable quality of race which 
saturates face to face interaction. There seems to be a heightened sensibility to such personal 
characteristics in the presentation of the self, which means that actions and inactions can be 
immediately attributed to the presence of the characteristic.108 From the perspective of 
communication this points towards a greater probability of the difference between information and 
utterance being understood. The distinction between information and utterance as a component of 
communication can only emerge if some form of intentionality can be located behind the utterance 
in order to produce information. It is the processing of the difference between the ego and alter-ego 
which is required for communication to take place; and because of the salience of race this seems to 
intensify (i) the level of inadvertent communication and (ii) the uncertainty as to whether race 
should become a factor within the interaction.109 
Secondly, these micro-systems through their specificity and diversity comprise a crucial arena in 
which discrimination occurs. Disrespect and even violence may arise, and perhaps with some 
frequency, in the way individuals treat one another face to face: in the interactions between vendor 
and buyer, employer and employee, people in public spaces, all the variety of unconscious sleights 
that can take place in the close confines of life. Evidently, the decisions and programmes of 
organizations matter a great deal too. Decisions that choose to hire and fire, distribute income, or 
de-bar members on the basis of particular personal characteristics.110 Nevertheless, what the 
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 Race is readily available as an explanation for action or inaction; one might suggest that it performs a 
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interactive order holds for our enquiry is a relationship with society in which communications can 
take flight from the micro-confines of the interaction into the macro-setting of society. It is here, this 
thesis argues, that the semantics of discrimination forms a linking institution between interaction 
and society. It is this bridge traversed by moral communications, mediated communications, and 
artistic communications that consolidate into the semantics of racism and, finally, discrimination. In 
chapters 5 and 6 this notion of the interaction system is extended to encompass an emergent 
system predicated on a 'common presence' available to functionally differentiated sub-systems: 
publicly mediated communications. 
By bringing these notions within a common functional framework it is plausible to argue that moral 
education and the history of manners, as they circulated in a stratified society, performed a 
comparable function to the semantics of racism in modern society. With this equivalence in mind, 
the issues faced by each can be compared and contrasted so as to expand our understanding of 
discrimination as a social phenomenon. And with this perception, we shall address a key research 
problem for this thesis: what is the social basis for discrimination from a systems theory 
perspective?  
This section has explained Luhmann's concept of the interactive order and indicated its relevance for 
discrimination. The next concept to be explained is that of the self-description of society. This will go 
towards providing the analytical grid for proposing that a history of manners and social esteem is a 







SOCIETAL DESCRIPTIONS, SEMANTICS, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
This section seeks to apply Luhmann’s concepts of self-description and social semantics to illuminate 
the communication of racism. In order for this analysis to be effective some explanation of the 
meaning of these key concepts needs to take place. 
Self-descriptions articulate 'imaginary constructions of the unity of the system that make it possible 
to communicate in society, if not with society, at least about society' (emphasis in original, Luhmann, 
2013: 167). The unity of society in all its diversity is visualized within a scheme that steers society 
down particular pathways. Just as racism is bedeviled by paradox so too is self-description. The 
presentation of a unitas mulitiplex encounters an 'unresolvable indeterminacy' when we accept that 
a system both (1) generates the difference between system and environment, and (2) orientates 
itself by observing the difference between system and environment (Spencer-Brown, 1972: 57). The 
paradox of unity and difference can be avoided through imaginary constructions within societal 
descriptions that conceal the issue, for a time at least. These imaginary constructions conjure origin 
myths and narrative tales of genesis that unfold the paradox and skillfully conceal its indeterminacy 
through distinctions between hierarchical levels, the visible and invisible, and the civilized and 
barbaric (Luhmann, 2004: 64).111 This emphasis on social imaginaries also aligns with features of 
racism which we wish to illuminate.112  
Self-descriptions persist over time by reference (1) to particular texts which can be re-read by others 
in a variety of different circumstances, and (2) through denotations that circulate the description, 
such as the labels - Greeks and barbarians, Christians and heathens, civilized and savage (Luhmann, 
2013: 175). Texts are created and recognized through repeated use, co-coordinating self-
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observations with guidelines that Luhmann labels as 'semantics'. Specialized semantics are created 
through which orthodoxies and heterodoxies are constructed by seasoned experts who derive social 
prestige via delineating between correct and incorrect interpretation of such texts.113 The 
constructing of orthodoxies attributable to professionals and experts is intriguing because they 
enable the creation of concepts and counter-concepts. The fact that experts divine societal 
semantics provokes counter-currents, especially when textual interpretations consolidate into 
lessons about taste and morality.114 One can see how this dynamic has a long history: Martin Luther 
and the Reformation; the anti-courtier literature criticizing the apparent expertise of the courtier; 
the cult of the sublime advancing against the professionalization of art criticism; the mobilization of 
Romanticism against the rationality of the French Enlightenment; and, more recently, the 
protestations of political correctness against the perceived liberalism of mainstream experts and a 
socio-political élite.115 A few of these illustrations will be detailed in order to expand on precursors to 
the semantics of racism in modern society.  
Social semantics develop as a repository of articulated experience that contains the conditions of 
possible events. They comprise the structures of society by forming circulating conceptions, 
interpretations, and condensations around societal descriptions.116 These structures can be 
understood as generating expectations which can produce surprises (information) and 
disappointments from which learning or not learning may follow. Crucially, these structures enable 
the anticipation of possible events, but not their necessity. And so semantics can operate as a type 
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of linking institution between the societal level (self-descriptions and societal differentiation) and 
the interactive order (events).117   
In the following sections we see this relationship, between the societal and the interactive, play out 
in a variety of different socio-historical scenarios; however, before this begins an attempt will be 
made to explain how society relates to its environment by reference to a world-concept and, 
secondly, we will re-frame modern racism in terms that are comparable to the history of manners 
and esteem discussed later in this chapter.  
THE WORLD 
The idea of the world is not a prominent concept in Luhmann's theory, but it is pertinent to a 
discussion of discrimination. In this chapter, references to the world appear frequently because it 
has been repeatedly evoked alongside instructions on moral education and descriptions of social 
hierarchy. A remarkable number of permutations have occurred: the cosmopolitan as a citizen of the 
world, the demi-monde on the fringes of respectable London society, a person of the third world, a 
member of Hume's 'conversible world'.118 Some of these will be relied upon later. Luhmann 
considers the idea of the world in relation to his concept of communication; its theoretical relevance 
will be explained below. 
For systems theory, communication divides the world producing a caesura saying what it says, and 
not saying that which it does not say. The world 'is only that which endures the cut produced by 
communication' (Luhmann, 1994: 25). The world shadows communication as that which cannot be 
communicated. Consequently, to speak of the world means to communicate according to a 
paradoxical form that attempts to unify communication and non-communication; inevitably the 
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upon unearthing concepts (constitution, Bildung, revolution, utopia, crisis) and counter-conceptual formations 
(man/woman, public/secret). Koselleck's idea of a historical concept is similar to Laclau's identification of the 
'floating signifier'. For a useful survey of Koselleck and Luhmann, see Anderson (2003). 
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 Consider Gurstein (2000) for an explication of the 'conversible world' in the 18th century. 
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communication of this paradoxical form leaves behind the world, which remains fundamentally 
incommunicable. 'The thematization of incommunicability in communication can then also be 
viewed as an indicator of the fact that the world is carried along' (Luhmann, 1994: 27). There are 
many objects which cannot be captured by communication without encountering this paradox - 
perception, silence, consciousness, the blind-spot of observation, materiality. Whether 
communication takes place through the disseminating media of orality, writing, or 
telecommunication, this aporia is unavoidable.  
So how does the thematization of the 'world' as the incommunicable differ from other themes that 
focus on materiality or perception?  The idea of the 'world' signifies the incommunicable as 
juxtaposed to the communication of society in toto. Following modern systems theory, we observe 
that society is functionally differentiated into sub-systems. Law is one of these sub-systems; 
however, we know that - and law certainly knows - it operates in an environment composed of other 
systems, persons, plants, animals, and other things. It admits this by adjusting its structures to 
accommodate the environment and by doing so thematizes, explicitly or implicitly, the silence 
external to it. Well-known examples are the limits of justiciability of politically charged issues, or the 
unsuitability of granting a legal remedy (for example, an injunction) where it would be impossible to 
implement. Law clearly acknowledges the limits imposed upon it by its environment. On the other 
hand, this conception of the world suggests a silence more encompassing and more complete. The 
silence of the world indicates the incommunicable outside all the possibilities of social 
communication. The world is a 'counter-image which society projects onto its environment, or it is 
the mirror in which society comes to see that which is not said is not said' (Luhmann, 1994: 33).119 
This is not as grandiose an idea as it may seem. The semantics of anti-racism is shot through with 
such references: give voice to the voiceless, include the excluded, make visible the invisible, expose 
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 It should be no surprise then that mirrors, and other such metaphors, often indicate the attempt to map 
the world through a conceptualization of society. 
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inequalities, unearth the roots of racism, reveal the false consciousness. Explanations for the social 
basis of racism are also communicated in these terms: in reality anti-immigration rhetoric is a cry for 
help against economic forces, a protest against the dissolution of communal values and an idealized 
past no longer present; racism is an ideology that resists evidence to the contrary; racism is a 
modern ideological phenomenon that mirrors the emergence of European nationalism in its search 
for origin and unity;120 racial prejudice is a defensive attitude meant to preserve white power.121  
The steering component of self-descriptions is also evident such that the social basis for racism 
operates through blatant and exemplary instances.122 At the operational level the connectivity of 
communications into tight couplings and automatic transmissions signifies this systematic self-
steering: the recognition of race opens up a whole web of expectations about the person, as racism 
involves the insistence of an essential and a natural series of qualities read over onto the individual 
on account of their racial group (i.e. that which cannot be changed by communication).123 This 
associative quality is also communicated on the observational level through the re-drawing of the 
past and the future by (i) the equality movement with the past involving racial injustice and the 
future involving emancipation, and (ii) by racist ideologies who provide a historical and 
eschatological narrative to suit their ends.124 
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 Hannah Arendt (1958) pursues such a thesis. Her argument comes closest to that of this chapter by 
suggesting that a precursor to racism resided in the insecurities felt by the 18th century French aristocracy as 
they struggled to associate and see the whole of society with the Monarchy and Clergy. Threatened by the rise 
of the Third Estate there was an assertion of aristocratic genealogical origins. Lawrence Stone (1967) tells a 
similar story when he notes the assertion of aristocratic rights prior to the English Civil War against the rise of 
a mercantile class. 
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 Michel Weiviorka (1995: 1-34) provides a useful summary of the various historical, psychoanalytic, 
ideological, and mythical explanations for racism. 
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 There is a consistent critique in the literature that racism must not be over-inclusive, but confined to glaring 
examples. See Chapter 2 of this thesis for the extraction of this theme. 
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 Racism is 'the idea of (some sort of link) between the - physical, genetic or biological - attributes or heredity 
of an individual (or group) and the intellectual and moral characteristics of that individual (or group)' 
(Wieviorka, 1995: xvi).  
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 This associative line may also be present when the end-point of racism is located in the concentration 
camp.     
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Unlike other accounts of racism, this reliance on essence, nature, and association is not locked 
within a singular site of reference. It is not indicative of a scientific mentality or prejudiced state of 
consciousness. The semantics of discrimination resides in the communicative continuum of society 
and as such indicates relationships between systems, the connectivity of communications, and the 
relationship of society to itself. In part, the semantics of discrimination is communicated through 
unifying the communicable and the incommunicable with reference to a self-description of 
society.125 This conception of the world should be kept in mind because it appears, repeatedly, as a 
feature in societal self-descriptions. Through the invocation of such references to the world in the 
semantics of race and discrimination we can see the relevance of self-descriptions to this type of 
communication.  
THE STRANDS OF DISCRIMINATION: RACISM 
 
It is the claim of this thesis that systems theory can expose certain communicative strands that 
provide a medium from which racial forms radiate. As a consequence, an original explanation for 
racism can be put forward. Other theoretical approaches do not have the resources to either outline 
the socio-genetic influences or conceptualize its genealogy. Through an analysis of selective socio-
historical examples in which these communicative strands have congregated, this thesis hopes to 
produce several counter-intuitive precursors to the modern communication of racism. By explaining 
racism through the dynamics of societal development and differentiation a more complete  
understanding of racism is on offer. Before we delve into such an examination, we need to clarify 
that these strands are visible within what we would consider to be a racial context that is further 
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 Taguieff (2001) argues that racists and anti-racists are locked within a system of conflict and mutual 
observation. This thesis agrees that there is some truth to this insight, but instead we seek to establish the 
social basis for discrimination in terms of how communication schematizes the assertion of incommunicability, 
contradiction, and reality. For as we know, reality is communicated as that which resists and asserts itself as 
communication against communication (Luhmann, 2000b: 76-95). Ralf Rogowski (2013) suggests that labour 
relations are perpetuated as a social system orientated on conflict with a code of negotiable/non-negotiable 
delimiting the boundaries of the system. 
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recognized as such by anti-racist and racist communications. This will be developed with greater 
cogency, with the aid of more finely tuned theoretical tools, in Chapters 5 and 6; however, at this 
stage it may be salutary for the reader to provide an illustration as to why the social basis of 
discrimination can be located in the communicative strands of morality, artistic sensibility, and some 
of the restrictions on communication media. For it is within these system references that the 
qualities of communication highlighted in the previous section are apparent. 
Race is a public issue. How this can be conceptualized is formalized in Chapter 5. Race arises in what 
we might consider as the public space, public sphere, or public consciousness as a feature of an 
object, which is sufficiently pliable to capture certain communicative strands. One such object from 
which race attaches itself is a notion familiar to discrimination lawyers: the polyvalent notions of 
Labour and Work.  Each of these terms have a rich sociological and philosophical heritage; moreover, 
even amongst those scholars who may consider themselves black-letter employment and 
discrimination lawyers there is an appreciation and interest in the wider ramifications of what these 
grand terms may indicate. Their inner complexity enables the various strands and conceptualizations 
detailed above to be brought together. How do these concepts manage to implicate race and yet 
also provide a pivot upon which societal mechanisms can hinge? 
Firstly, there are well acknowledged empirical examples in which race is implicated via employment 
and these points, in turn, draw upon the various strands of communication emphasized above. The 
separation of certain types of work and distinctive ways of doing work are often brought to life and 
communicated through racial inference. This is not only accepted via statistical analysis, but also 
through the generation of social stereotypes and sundry anticipations that are at work, already set in 
motion, to produce assumptions of race alongside certain occupations, roles within organizations, 
and also ways of approaching work. The moral component of work is recognizable to all. Work is a 
theme through which people communicate their self-respect and self-esteem. It provides a moral 
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identity for a person and a method of evaluating others. The fact of being employed or being 
unemployed is a status that signals allocations of respect and value. There are also notable second-
order moral formations concerned with work in which a person's ethos to work, or a person’s work 
ethic are well-known topics of moralizing communication. Anti-discrimination discourses and racist 
ideologies offer reflections on the nature of work and the strategies required to address ethical 
dilemmas of race within different sectors of the economy and the workplace itself. To be clear, 
within Luhmann’s description of moral communications, morality and ethics are not the special 
preserve of celebrated philosophers or the academy. Moral communications are a social fact. To be 
a moral communication, such a communication does not need to cohere to a deontological or 
teleological model. Ideologies that incorporate a racial dimension, in a central or incidental fashion, 
can moralize and produce ethical reflections on the appropriate distribution of the moral code 
without being damaged through their irrationality.126 
Secondly, the idea of Labour implicates race through a reflection on communication by 
communication. In contemporary society the considerable ambit of the mass media provides one 
channel by which the informativity of communicated information is assessed. The mass media 
encompasses a wide range of programmatic silos, including the news media, entertainment, and 
advertising. The reach of dissemination media also adds to this circumscription by underwriting 
communicative possibilities. These include broad conditions that delimit the exchange of 
information and the acceptability of communication for its participants. For example, this can 
include the extent of trade and transport networks that provide sustainable communicative routes, 
or the impact of the printing press and telecommunication. One key performance of such media is 
the manner in which the limits of society are made visible by the influence of the world environment. 
In the same manner, we can perceive how silence punctuates speech by outlining each word. Once 
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 This sociology of morals is a significant divergence from the moral philosophy examined in Chapter 2. 
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this limit is exposed, it is explained by reference to the assertion of a systemic reality.127 The mass 
media performs this doubling effect (providing themes for organizing communications about 
communication) in many different ways. Specific programmatic streams and genres are generated 
on the premise of distinctions between fact and fiction, opinion and fact, imaginary and real, 
appearance and essence. Terms such as authenticity and sincerity are dependent on these 
distinctions because they measure the relationship between each side – how much does a person’s 
appearance coincide with their actual nature? The establishment of these distinctions in 
communication can be triggered by distinctive signals that a narrative and story is about to begin. 
More precisely for the purposes of this thesis, racial forms are implicated by reference to progress 
and regress, emancipation and domination: one designates an idealized side and analyzes how far 
actuality is from meeting these ideals.128 These signals indicate, for the participant, that we are now 
concerned with publically communicating about communication. Novels accomplish a similar feat 
with a typical opening phrase such as ‘once upon a time’; however, books have the advantage of 
relying on a text as a supporting medium, rather than the semantics of the public. 
These distinctions between appearance and actuality produce observations upon the informativity 
of information. A great number of themes are mobilized to explain this relationship across a wide 
thematic spectrum – prominence, obviousness, publicity, and celebrity are only a few such 
examples.  The connection between morality and the mass media is apparent whenever we consider 
how informativity can be a virtue in itself: celebrity culture, self-publicity, punctuality, and polish.129 
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 These highlighted topics were conceptualized earlier in this chapter. 
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 The communication of progress and emancipation are not the preserve of the equality movement. Racial 
ideologies may assert levels of racial maturity and regression to justify their programmes, but, in a strange 
similarity, equality advocates too rely on such terms through classifying their opponents as carrying regressive 
and ignorant mind-sets. Conservative political programmes have been co-opting the language of the future 
with the promise of reform, freedom from the state, and ‘continuous revolution’ since at least the 1980s. To 
be clear: this thesis describes racial communications, it does not argue for the normative equalization of 
racism and anti-racism.  
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 Virtue and vice are attracted to race as a ‘prominent’ form, for example - the vulgarity and coarseness of a 
person’s comments, or the vitality of racial designations ranging from the complementary (protestant work 
ethic) to the decidedly less so (non-white working methods). Garcia (1996) defines racism by relying on, 
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These themes are picked up in the context of employment and work. The sphere of work is 
distinguished from other areas of life. This enables a further internal distinction between formality 
and informality in the workplace. Informativity involving more tightly focused instances of news, 
entertainment, and advertisement depend on this differentiation of work: the differences between 
official communication and gossip, solidarity and humor, charisma and seduction.  
Thirdly, aesthetic appreciation and artistic judgment also plays a part in the meaningful 
communication of Labour. Luhmann (2000a) argues that the artistic sub-system of society solves a 
number of functional problems. [1] It allows society to observe itself as different to itself by 
combining both recognition and astonishment in the artistic object. [2] It provides a locus for 
communication to cope with the non-communicable, especially perceptual data. Through artistic 
communications one learns to see the world anew. Works of art are objects that produce a caesura 
in the world such that there is a before and an after.130 Art requires work to be produced and further 
work is needed to learn how to see what it is portrayed. One must gain expertise. There is also a 
broader aesthetic quality familiar to discrimination lawyers: the elusive quality of merit. It is the 
exercise of judgment that suggests an aesthetic component in which an employee is employed or 
their contributions are calculated. Judgment combines the recognizable with the new, it hinges 
between past performance and future accomplishments, the person at interview and their suitability 
for the role, an interaction and wider societal implications. It is the communication of judgment 
predicated on the elusiveness of the incommunicable (perception, sensibility, sensitivity, intensity) 
that produces normality and abnormality in the workplace. This will be analyzed in Chapter 6. 
Finally, the notions of work, employment, and labour manage to connect, what a previous 
generation of researchers might have labeled, the material and the ideal. With reference to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
ultimately, Aristotelian virtues in which racism only properly occurs when feelings of ill-will and the vice of 
malevolence are found in the discriminator.  
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 This feature is formalized when a Deleuzian conception of repetition is aligned with the sub-system of art in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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theorizations made earlier in this chapter we would point out that the notion of Labour manages to 
connect both the societal plane and the interactional plane. In this light, it will be shown to be 
influential in the self-description of modern society. 
This section focused on the idea of Labour as a place where the strands of discrimination 
congregate. These features need to be highlighted at this stage because in a society differentiated 
on the basis of function it can be no simple feat to bring together informative, esteemable, and 
artistically coded communications. In earlier societal semantics which operated as precursors to 
racism these strands were not so stringently divided and were distributed across the stratified 
structures of society. We now turn to these earlier forms in order to provide a socio-historical 
dimension for the basis of racism. 
MANNERS AND MORAL EDUCATION 
The following series of sections will apply the theoretical tools outlined above. We aim to establish 
that as a sociological phenomenon discrimination operates as an inheritor of various dynamics 
existing in a socially stratified society. We will cover at a necessarily abstract and selective level, the 
development of what Norbert Elias famously called the 'civilizing process' in European society. This 
civilizing process 'expresses the self-consciousness of the West' as social control was gradually 
extended  into a form of self-control during the period between the Early Middle Ages and the 21st 
century.131  
Similar subject-matter as discussed by Elias will be highlighted, however the axioms of Elias' 
figurational sociology will not be applied. Elias saw the civilizing process as an expansion of social 
control over the individual, particularly through the pressure of mutual and reflexive expectations 
becoming ineluctably inscribed in social relations. This greater binding of the personality was caused 
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by two dynamics. Firstly, the differentiation of social functions that encourages greater monopolies 
(one might say specializations) of social functions, such as the execution of violence or the means of 
exchange. Secondly, the greater interdependencies between persons and the extension of complex 
networks of action delimiting personal freedom so that increasingly a person must attune their 
behaviour to that of others.132  
Elias highlighted the changing modes of manner, courtesy, and moral education in European society. 
This will also be our concern. In contrast to Elias the axioms of systems theory will be applied to 
analyze this transition. The themes discussed will be: the self-description of stratified society and its 
associated semantics, the resolutions and dissolutions of such societal self-descriptions, the 
distinction between communication and world, and the development of dissemination media. Since 
we are concerned with a stratified society, functional differentiation has not yet (across the board at 
least) taken place, and so morality, taste, and information form an imbroglio of structures distilled 
throughout a hierarchically organized society.   
Following Elias' initiative we will discuss the transformation of manners through chivalry, courtesy, 
civilité, and etiquette. At the same time, analysis will be applied as to how these normative 
expectations coincide with societal self-descriptions and the dissemination media of communication. 
Prior to this analysis, however, we must justify the choices of research programme: (i) Can we really 
compare manners to discrimination? (ii) How can the changes in dissemination media be connected 
to manners and discrimination? 
Today few would consider that discrimination can be seriously compared to table manners. The 
impact of racism in society is far too serious and infused with compelling moral questions for it to be 
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 Elias (2000: 368ff) also notes a gradual extension of temporal horizons so that interdependent relationships 
compelled a consideration of long-term effects prior to action. Actions that align themselves with immediacy 
(violence, bodily functions, and psychological drives for pleasure and pain) were pushed to the periphery of 
social relations and stigmatized. This thesis coincides with Luhmann's (2013: 16-27) argument that social 
exclusion denotes a greater proximity to sexuality and violence. 
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placed alongside the elaborate rules of etiquette and civility of pre-modern Europe. What this 
assertion overlooks is that racism is a comparatively new identification. The term 'racism' itself only 
appeared in the 1930s alongside a broader assessment of Nazi Germany.133 If we want to understand 
why both racist communication and communications about racism occur in contemporary society, 
then we must understand the social conditions in which these themes emerged. The elaborate 
ceremonies, rituals, and intricacies that previously delimited social relations also forged the 
conditions for the allocation of (self-)respect, (self-)esteem, and their opposites. Slavery may have 
been a blight for as long as there has been human society, but the opportunities for slavery to be a 
communication of racism and for slavery to be considered as a racist institution are relatively recent.  
Racism has had to be separated out from other topics and considered on its own terms. This, I would 
argue, has only be achieved relatively recently.  
Furthermore, the dissociation of manners from morality, art, and education, is principally a 
consequence of a functionally differentiated society. Only for the last few centuries has art and 
education been differentiated from moral communications. It was only in the 19th century that 
etiquette became sidelined to such an extent that it came to be seen as trivial. The fact that it mainly 
became a feminized concern - pejoratively labeled 'the marriage market' - is evidence for its 
peripheral status to the ordering of society.134 In its previous incantations as gentility, it was morally 
infused and played a significant role in producing a series of semantics that maintained societal self-
descriptions.  
From the Middle Ages to the French Revolution manners were thought worthy of serious attention 
by young men. They constituted an important tool in the ideal of civilization which provided a moral 
education in the form of a variety of chivalric literature, courtesy books, and educational exemplars. 
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 Robert Miles (1993) traces the concept to Magnus Hirschfield's book Racism published in 1933/4. 
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 Davidoff (1986) provides an argument that the power exercised by women through the organization of the 
social calendar to affect political appointments and social conventions is overlooked. In this period class 
semantics provided a short-lived self-description of society. 
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The materials promulgated the ideals of character, the correct values, accomplishment, habits, 
manners, and morals - in short, 'the art of living in society'.135 In contrast to modern times such 
instructions were deliberated by serious scholars over an extremely varied palette of topics: steps to 
a fashionable dance, piety, Aristotelian moderation, table etiquette, and the requirements of justice. 
There was an extreme mix of high and low culture, which modern ethical deliberation is more 
inclined to leave to other disciplines. Such writers aimed to provide advice to titled nobility, 
substantial gentry, and the aristocratic class. The advice was to ensure that those with the correct 
birth and status, who were to play a major societal role, should comport themselves with the correct 
manners and virtues to do the job properly.136  
It is not only manners which have changed in their articulation. Ethics has changed too. Ethical 
reflection as a deliberation of moral judgments is a product of a functionally differentiated society.137 
Prior to its modern form, ethics was known as ethos which was a self-description of societal-political 
life. The schools of the Middle Ages sub-divided Ethos into ethics, economics and politics depending 
on whether one was concerned with the ethical constitution of the individual life, household, or 
political society. Ethos also had the latent function of delimiting exemplariness and the possibilities 
for emulation to societal elites.138 Culture is also an important concern because it involves the 
communication of learning patterns.139 It is from the following of these norms that we learn to 
distinguish between standards of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.  
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 Curtin (1985: 395) 
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 Curtin (1985) provides an excellent survey.  
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 In system theoretic terms - ethical communication is actuated as a second-order observation upon the 
application of the moral code: Luhmann (1992b). 
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 Luhmann (2013: 212 ff). Emulation was a way in which one could follow and repeat the actions of one's 
betters. The image of the mirror indicates a self-description at work in which the silence of the world is felt in 
the communication of society. Of course, this form of emulation works well when there is a central point of 
focus. But where can the mirror be placed when a functionally differentiated society is fundamentally de-
centred? One must look to the semantics of race, amongst other options, as a perch for such emulation and 
repetition.  
139
 Interestingly Luhmann (1996a: 518) argues that because the latent function of culture is to compare 
incomparable situations then there is an inevitable simplification and concealment of the differences in each 
situation. This lack can be observed and communicated as a 'culture of suspicion' in which one believes that 
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The development of communication media has had a serious impact on societal differentiation and 
social evolution. This postulate may seem over-wrought for those who have not accepted the 
legitimacy of a radically constructivist methodology, however there is great virtue in this method as 
long as precision is sought and facile generalities avoided. The fact that certain ideas, thoughts and 
contentions are successfully communicated is steered by the possibilities of society. Certain 
problems and questions emerge because of social conditions. For example, it is fair to argue that 
Aristotle did not have a conception of or concern for human rights.140 He lived and communicated in 
a vastly differently political and legal culture to our own. The world of Hellenistic Greece is not the 
world of the Enlightenment. Modern functionally differentiated society is vastly different partly 
because of the long development of dissemination media and symbolically generalized media.141 The 
possibilities of meaning, the scale, and the intensity of communication can barely compare. 
Advances in technical means and increased opportunities for communication presented 
opportunities for increasingly complex social communication.  
The advent of the printing press, for example, is considered a major precursor of modernity. The 
distribution of printed materials fundamentally affected learning, thinking, and perceiving among 
literate elites. The uniformity and synchronization of printed texts has become so commonplace that 
we have to be reminded that in the times of the scribe they were absent factors. Printed materials 
enabled 'a sharper sense of individual difference ...  fostered by repeated encounters with identical 
types' (Eisenstein, 1979: 230). Tracts which previously focused on societal exemplars and archetypes 
(princes, courtiers, merchants, councillors) now, through standardization, brought into relief 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
something is being hidden for unidentifiable motives and insidious purposes. Isaiah Berlin  (1999: 104) 
diagnoses Romanticism as containing a similar tendency towards topicalizing the ungraspable (the 
incommunicable, the world) through references to the sublime, nostalgic, paranoid, and conspiratorial. The 
contemporary reality of racism and discussions around political correctness exhibit similar tendencies. 
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 This is not to deny that his intellectual output cannot lend itself to such concerns.  
141
 Luhmann suggests that attempts were made in Ancient Greece and Rome to differentiate between 
functional areas (law, religion, politics), but without the technical means of communication this differentiation 
could not come to fruition until the development of the printing press. Only in the period between the 16th 
and 19th centuries was this societal transformation consummated (Luhmann, 2013: 226ff). 
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idiosyncrasies and the awareness of singularity. The success of Montaigne's Essays attests to this 
transition. Another effect was the expansion of self-learning and the opportunities this offered. No 
longer did Newton have to travel to Paris and sit at the feet of the masters. No longer did the laity 
have to sit in the pews and listen to the Gospels as promulgated by the priesthood.142  
In summary, manners are the everyday rituals of life that provide institutional linkages between 
societal influence and the interactive order. Their importance should not be under-estimated. With a 
close inspection of their development we can observe how standards of respect, esteem, and 
disesteem developed alongside technical innovations in communication media and unfolding 
societal self-descriptions.  
 
CHIVALRY  
In this section the societal self-description of the high medieval period is explained by reference to 
the whole/part schema. Chivalry alongside a theological framework provided ways of living and 
thinking that temporarily resolved the prevailing self-description's paradox by reference to this 
schema. These resolutions relied, however, on the practical constraints subjacent to the circulation 
of communication. As a consequence, communication media and their containment effected the 
success of such semantics. Once such circumstances changed then chivalric culture became less 
successful at taming the paradox and holding together the disparate planes of communication 
(interaction, ideology, system reference). From the perspective of systems theory, discrimination 
semantics has inherited this challenge. By surveying such a landscape, the social basis for 
discrimination can be understood at a deeper level.  
The chivalric honour code constituted one of the first steps in Norbert Elias's (2000: 45 ff., 162-3) 
description of the civilizing process. It sought to restrain violence through the application of self-
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control.143 Its reach, however, was wider than Elias' thesis allows. Medieval chivalry was more a 
lifestyle and outlook than an ethical doctrine. The virtues and qualities esteemed were loyalty, 
generosity, dedication, courage, courtesy. The semantics of chivalry, however, were versatile (one 
might say, elusive) allowing multiple interpretations: the lawyer saw it as a legal framework to 
organize war in which acceptable behaviour was clearly established; for the Church it was a religious 
vocation to wage a just war against the infidel in their crusades; for the writers of romance it was the 
attainment of virtues to impress the lady; further, it was a way to describe the military and 
aristocratic elite as the second ordo (order) of God's creation (Saul, 2011: 3-5). Since the aristocracy 
held a pre-eminent position at the apex of society the adoption of this code of honour percolated 
down into other areas of social concern: the conduct of disputes, funeral processions, architecture, 
design, and literature.144 
Chivalric culture sprang up in the second half of the twelfth century in an exotic border region called 
Latium on the edge of Latin Christendom. Here a group of milites castrorum began to adopt a way of 
life that was eventually conveyed across the mountains into Europe by entertainment literature in 
forms such as the chanson de geste (song of heroic deeds). The archetypes developed in this 
literature began to be adopted by small groups of knights. By the latter half of the twelfth century 
these ideals had entranced the European aristocracy. In 1184 Frederick Barbarossa staged a 
grandiose chivalric festival at Mainz in an attempt to revive the Germanic Empire's prestige through 
the myth of crusade and the ideal of knighthood.  At the same time the knightly values spread across 
France uniting the lay ruling class in a single body (Duby, 1980: 293ff). 
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The formalization of this knightly order stemmed from the use of the title Miles in 1025. By 1175 
Miles was adopted as a designated title preceding the patronymic of all knights. Duby (1980: 294) 
argues that this change in the legal lexicon signified the establishment of a superior body of men 
recognized by birth, rather than military specialization. Like the Church, knighthood became to be 
seen as an Ordo. On the other hand, Bloch (1965) maintains that this was not a social group of 
nobility in the strictest sense because knighthood itself could not be inherited - only the conditions 
which made knighthood available could.145 Knightly society began to self-differentiate itself from the 
unwarlike multitude through membership rituals - initiation rites, ordination and sacramental 
procedures, and dubbing practices (Bloch, 1965: 33-40).146  
Chivalry has its own behavioral ethos distributing virtues and vices, self-respect and disrespect. A 
variety of perspectives are available on account of the flexibility of the knightly ethos  - lovers and 
fighters, crusaders and soldiers. It provides a description of society compatible with the possibilities 
of the time. Titles and symbolic actions have an informative value indicating membership in a group. 
Associations are made through the journey undertaken to become a knight (revelation in the forest) 
or the possibility of inheritance.147 Specialist expertise are required in order to understand the order. 
Entertainment literature and artistic communications are an influential means to reproduce the 
mythic and imagined knightly order. 
Chivalric culture emerged within a feudal Europe. Feudalism appeared as a social structure 
amenable to a society in which centres of power were numerous and relatively minor, economic and 
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 This lack of automatic heritage contributed to its downfall. Saul (2011) documents that an increasing 
number of persons eligible for entrance to the knightly order considered the offer declinable.  
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 Communicative restrictions afforded by secretive rituals provides an intensity for the formation of 
complexity. The closed loops of the salon, coffee-house, and masonic lodges provided such a site for 
enlightenment thought - see Habermas for an extensive examination (1989). We might speculate that this is 
prevalent in contemporary society, for example: the self-restriction of loyal viewers and readerships, and the 
social bubbles of modern media. A theoretical parallel, noted by Luhmann, resides in Goffmann's schemata of 
interpretation, however my concern is with typologies exclusively confined to the communicative medium of 
meaning (Luhmann, 2000b: 107-116). 
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 The intensity is given through self-restriction that enables communication of the non-communicable world - 
the silence and seclusion of the forest, the non-variance of nature and inheritance. Contrary to Elias, this can 
be viewed as a communicative restriction, rather than a incremental restriction on the use of violence. 
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physical security was tenuous, and settlements were isolated. This state of affairs had come about 
through the period labeled the 'dark ages' of European history in which the continent had suffered 
mass migrations of the populace caused by Germanic and Moslem invasion, destruction of state 
power, retreat of towns and cities once prosperous under Carolingian rule, and a declining economy. 
The feudalistic order provided a means by which social relations and expectations could be managed 
in a tenuous and isolated environment. Insecure settlements began to band together in a frequency 
far greater than under Carolingian, Capetian, or Merovingian rule. These latter empires maintained a 
centralized authority not available to a feudalistic Europe.148 
This society, however, was unified by more than a common fear of an approaching apocalypse?149 
On a broader level, society was described by reference to a tri-functional schema known as the 
Three Orders that reflected a higher triadic division - clergy (spiritual), knight (temporal), labourer 
(corporeal) (Duby, 1980: 305). The Three Orders operated in the terrestrial kingdom which was an 
imperfect copy of the celestial kingdom above. The holy church acted as an intermediary between 
these two kingdoms occupying a place on both planes - heaven and earth, in the invisible kingdom 
and the visible kingdom, in aeternitas and tempus.150 The sovereignty of Christ is enthroned in the 
celestial kingdom bridging the divide between the two planes as right hand of the Father and as the 
apex of clerical authority.151 
The self-description of society manages to avoid its own paradox by recourse to these imaginative 
formulations. The body of Christ enjoins the visible and invisible kingdoms, and with the assistance 
of the clerical order, holds together the different functions of society. This self-description of society 
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 See Bloch (1962: 59-72) for an overview 
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 There was a belief that the invasions into central Europe by the Hungarians and Scandinavians 
communicated the end of days predicated in the Book of Revelations (Bloch, 1962: 55). 
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 In respect of this schema, Gerard of Cambrai observed: 'Priests gird kings with their swords' (Duby, 1980: 
32). 
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 For an explanation consider, Duby (1980: 32-34) and Chroust (1947).  John of Salisbury in the Politicraticus 
held that the human individual and every form of human association - from estate to class to family - is a 
microcosm reflective of the harmonious architecture of nature and God i.e. the macrocosm.  
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is suitable for a society dislocated across Europe. It reflects Luhmann's (2013: 196-209) schema of 
the whole and parts in which the paradox is made safe by finding a whole in Christ that is both part 
of each part and also the whole within each part. This self-description held, or appeared to do so, 
until the recovery of the European economy and royal court. The tri-functional scheme guided an 
elite culture in which chivalric values were highly esteemed; however, with the Gregorian reforms 
this schema become less tenable.152  
Communicative technologies and possibilities underpinned the success of these self-descriptions and 
prefigured further societal evolution.153 Consequently, the spreading of education amongst the 
upper-class laity had a profound impact. Knights were literary men. It was not uncommon for a 
prince to be a troubadour and a composer of lyric poetry, such as William IX of Aquitaine. 
Troubadour lyrics expressed a new tenderness and sensibility. The literature of the period began a 
fascination with heraldic and symbolic display, romance, history, and heroism. The genuine 
enjoyment of such pleasures was too refined to be appreciated by simple villeins. Artistic 
appreciation, taste and the development of sensibilities were distributed through the social 
hierarchy such that there were high and low cultures. 
Membership of knighthood involved a series of ritual inculcations.154 First, there was dubbing at 
Pentecost by the clergy. This was followed by an education in which one learned about the ways of 
the world through routes forbidden to the lower orders of society. The knight ventured out into the 
world. He moved in courtly high society of ladies and the lower society of maids. He went on a 
crusade against the infidel in the Holy Lands. He explored the dangerous through the tournament 
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 Berman (1983: 85-120) argues that these reforms began the out-differentiation of ecclesiastical authority 
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 Latin Christendom benefited from a common tongue amongst the upper class providing a critical mass for 
the emergence of complex communication. In contrast, Celtic and Scandinavian regions had a rich poetic and 
didactic tradition, but were confined to localized languages. See Bloch for an overview (1962: 75-78). 
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 There was a formal comparable process that occurs in scholastic schooling. The trivium provided the 
student with the means of communication through introduction to dialectic, rhetoric, and grammar. The 
quadrivium provided the student with knowledge of the world - geometry, music, astronomy, arithmetic 
(Luhmann, 2013: 219-222).  
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and the wild through hunting and ambuscade. The knight even quested into the 'anti-world' to 
glimpse what lay beyond the gates of wisdom by visiting the divinely deranged hermit in the forest; 
he traversed the world of dreams and mirages, compelled to quest from ordeal to ordeal.155  
The combination of these educational processes alongside increased literacy provides a fulcrum for 
the communication of the incommunicable. The mediation of communication, the informative value 
of communication, and the artistic sensibility of communication are strands all present in the way 
chivalric culture provided a semantics corresponding to the self-description of society. Such strands 
are present in the communication of modern discrimination; however, the self-description and 
differentiation of modern society differs greatly. Stratification ensured that such means of 
communication and understanding of the world were reserved for the upper echelons - princes, 
vassals, and the nobility; they were not suitable for the peasantry.  
The artistic and symbolic components of chivalry enabled the communication of a history.156 There 
was a keen emphasis on chronicling the deeds of knights so that they might be passed down to 
familial descendants and preserved as a collective mythological memory. Stories of valour were 
cherished for the honour conferred and accumulated over the centuries. There was also a kind of 
present memory around the chivalric order in which each knight took pride in the achievements of 
every other knight. Heraldic inventories such as rolls of arms preserved such feats. The heraldry 
would be displayed by knights in their locality, and in tournament and battle. Verse narratives were 
composed by minstrels. Coats of arms were increasingly popular as a display of such narratives - in 
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 Duby (1980: 306). This yearning for the ineffable concerns the communication of the incommunicable. We 
see the same story told in the response of Romanticism to the Enlightenment. Schiller and his compatriots 
turned their attention towards the immediate, the wild, and the other-worldly experience contained in the 
sublime and baroque. See Berlin (1999) for an examination of this topic.  
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 The semantics of discrimination also contributes to the maintenance of memory and a 'common present' in 
society. It is through these constructed histories and futurologies that connective complexes are maintained, 
and connect and disconnect operations in society. This dimension to the social articulation of discrimination is 
easily missed by anti-discrimination scholarship which views the subject through non-reflexive moral 
philosophies, or approaches dependent on legislative developments as explained in Chapter 2 and referenced 
throughout this thesis.  
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tombs, churches and households.157 In such practices we can how the informational value of such 
symbols combines moral esteem and artistic sensibility into a memory which holds chivalric 
semantics together.  
The chansons de geste cast a spell over Europe weaving myth, fantasy and historical fact. They were 
great works of romance projecting worlds of mystery and enchantment. This literature, however, 
also indicated a society in which stories need not be historically accurate because perceptions were 
sufficiently refined such that there was a presumed separation of 'literary imagination from the 
description of real events.' There was an approach by story-tellers to recount both deeds and 
feelings of such great men. It contributed to the rehabilitation of the individual and the growth of a 
more introspective habit of mind. This new literature provided a medium of thought and action not 
available to their predecessors.158 The rise of chivalric culture coincided with the French Renaissance 
in which a new outlook on life was emerging. The pessimism of the Dark Ages was receding to be 
replaced by a belief in reason as the route to understanding the mind and will of God. The world 
seemed to open up and God became a more closely human, immediate figure.159 
In this section, I have sketched out a picture of chivalric culture that was amenable to the societal 
self-description of the period. I have noted several communicative references that re-appear in 
modern discrimination - informativity, moral esteem, aesthetic sensibility -  which contributed to this 
semantics. From a systems theory perspective, underpinning these themes are communicative 
media and technologies. Similar to other semantics noted below, these infra-structures influence 
and constrain how societal semantics are able to address the paradox of the prevalent self-
description while adequately holding together the varied planes of societal communication 
(interactive order, etc.). The notion of the world was emphasized because it was through the 
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 Bloch (1962: 107) maintains that this was an extension of 'auricular confession' only formerly practiced in 
the monastic world. We can see how important such mediums are for semantic innovation. Foucault (1977) 
follows a similar route reliant on a different terminology. 
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 Morris (1972) details the rising individualism of the 12th century.  
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communication of the incommunicable, and the means available for such operations, that elusive, 
revelatory, and secretive qualities appeared. In the semantics of modern racism these re-appear in 
different guises but still can be seen to reflect the set of concepts and relationships which underpin 
chivalry.  
COURTESY AND CIVILITÉ 
In this section, we shall turn our attention to the semantics and self-descriptions which appeared in 
late-feudal and early-modern Europe. This is not an exacting historical study of the period that 
describes the development of particular institutions, or specific countries and regions. The aim is to 
exhibit how the long gestation of the socio-communicative scaffold for discrimination, which has not 
been adequately addressed, if addressed at all, by anti-discrimination scholarship, which relies 
heavily on a normative description, or draws solely upon the 20th century concern for equality, 
freedom, and human rights.  
The dissolution of chivalric culture coincided with a resurgence of royal power. The twin forces of 
the monarchical state and urbanization re-constituted the possibilities for communication. 
Consequently, the self-description of society in terms of the Three Orders became less tenable. The 
legitimacy of violence was gradually transferred from the military orders to the hand of the royal 
court. The nobility began to distinguish itself from ways of thinking and doing characterized by the 
marshal orders of the past.160  
Around such structures orbited a culture linked to the Royal Court and urban centre. New social 
roles emerged in the form of the gentilhomme, gentry, and courtier. The former indicated a man of 
good stock and lineage - rather than knightly virtue - with such membership criteria solidifying the 
nobility as a legal class transmitted by birth. The gentry arose as a uniquely English construction. In 
England, there was never the legal formalization of nobility (with its privileges, such as exemption 
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from public taxation) as occurred in France and Germany. The lesser nobility acquired the rank of 
gentry and the upper nobility became the peerage sitting in the House of Lords.  Gradually the 
gentry became composed of the non-labouring professions - lawyers, bureaucrats, administrators, 
and servants to magnates. Comparable to chivalry, gentility concerned a way of thinking and living: 
non-bestial work, a good conversationalist, virtuous discourse, good manners, elegant dress, 
engagement in the right sort of leisure activity such as hunting, and possible ownership of a country 
estate.161 All these markers conveyed informational value as to one's position in society and from 
this position esteem and deference were communicated. The informational value of gentility 
transcribes and abridges the sociality of micro-interactive events with macro-societal semantics: 
smooth hands indicate a non-labouring gentility, and the performativity of elegance speaks for one’s 
status. The world of the gentilhomme as the communication of the incommunicable provides in 
large part the operative conditions that allow this to take place.  
Only in the second feudal age in which self-consciousness seemed to appear did these rules take on 
a life of their own. Ideas of courtoisie (courtesy) and prudhomme served to describe the sum of 
noble qualities. These rules of conduct emerged from around the kingly and baronial assemblies. 
Emulation and social contact was required for social advancement;162 thus, a greater moral 
sensibility coincided with increased inter-communication and the consolidation of greater 
municipalities and monarchies. It was the ethos of the royal court which required emulation, rather 
than the exemplary archetypes of knightly virtue.  
The ability to emulate the virtuous life of the court requires explanation. The art of letter writing 
flourished in the early Italian Renaissance between the 13th and early 16th centuries. As a mode of 
communication it enabled the praise of virtue and condemnation of vice. The ethics of civilita were 
understood to be the ethics of the nobility - promoted by the courtly culture of Burgundy and in the 
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 It is the world as the emulation of action by action that enables one’s moral esteem to rise and fall (see 
Chapter. Greater communicative (and thus incommunicative) possibilities allow a more complex world.  
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transition from republics to principalities in Italy.163 Courtier literature emerged most prominently 
authored in the 16th century by Erasmus (On the Education of Children) and Baldassare Castiglione 
(Il Cortegiano). Both were incredibly popular and were some of the first books to be mass produced 
and distributed throughout Europe. 
The rituals of the courtier imported informational values in accordance with acceptable behaviour at 
court: table manners (spitting, blowing one's nose, use of utensils, turn taking), hygiene and 
ablutions, speech and language, interaction with one's friends and peers, sexual relations and 
marriage.164 Courtiers should have an effortless quality, holding their own in gallant company, 
refined and urbane, and even be sensual as lovers.165 Castiglione places chivalric values still at their 
core, but emphasizes also one’s social duties as well. An emerging theme in the manuals was that 
the basis of true nobility lay in virtue and wisdom acquired through a new education and applied to 
the service of the 'publicke weal' (Charlton, 1965: 83).  
The semantics of civilité provided a more self-aware moulding of the person than courtesy with less 
emphasis on self-advancement. In the courtly behaviour of the French aristocracy the acquisition of 
the science du monde involved: 'apply oneself to knowing men as they are in general, and then gain 
particular knowledge of those with whom we have to live ... of their inclinations and their good and 
bad opinions, of their virtues and their faults.166 In the train of Renaissance and humanist thought, 
civilised behaviour could be taught and learned once the rational mind was awakened to its 
possibilities: self-knowledge could be gained through revealing the world as an individual's untapped 
potential (Rothblatt, 1976:23). At the same time, however, there was a greater emphasis on surface 
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 Elias (2000: 52-60) provides a survey of courtoisie texts detailing late-medieval table manners and rules of 
hospitality. Such texts were often arranged into poetic form (drawing from the epic poems of knightly society) 
or in mnemonics for ease of recollection and emulation. These latter types were labelled Tischzuchten (table 
disciplines), a serendipitous arrow towards the discipline of Foucault as described in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
The question is how does memory in modern society operate now that emulation is not commonly 
transmitted through poetic metre, mnemonics, or rhyming couplets? 
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 For a review of courtesy literature in the civic humanist tradition, see Charlton (1965: 21 ff.) 
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 Elias (2000: 68). Note also the recurrent reference to monde (the world). 
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details such as individual comportment, eloquence, and clothing.167 As such these moral pedagogies 
dropped the moral fable in favour of attaching virtue directly to behaviour itself.168 Even Petrarch 
could see how there was a more direct alignment between informative value and moral esteem: 'for 
virtue only finds eternal fame'. 
The aesthetic influence varies throughout the semantics touched upon above. A greater 
appreciation towards form occurred in the literary modes that held together moral sensibilities and 
informativity. Rothblatt (1976: 53-55) maintains that under civilité, nature became more associated 
with feelings and emotions as opposed to idealizations. Artistic impressions (the sensual, the 
sublime) were accorded a far greater role in assessing the worth of art. If the form is more significant 
than the factual content, then there needs to be someone to designate taste: the critic. In a parallel 
fashion, Georgian education required everyone to become self-aware actors (Rothblatt, 1976: 80-
81). But this world provides the means for counter-accusations against the (i) art critic for offering 
useless knowledge and pedantry, and (ii) the social actor for affectation, inauthenticity, and 
hypocrisy (Rothblatt, 80-81). 
In terms of a self-description, the court represents the unity of society with the country (provinces, 
regional estates) as its parts.169 Courtly culture provided an intense site for the stringing together of 
interactions into a wider semantics of societal significance stretching from the late middle ages to 
the opening of modernity. Throughout this period there were many major communicative changes 
which heralded new possibilities of thought and action. The advent of the printing press was a 
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revolution.170 Education was transformed enabling self-learning - a student no longer had to travel to 
sit at the feet of the Parisian masters. The priesthood was weakened as soon as the laity could read 
the gospels for themselves and the Reformation followed. The world could be revealed through 
different mechanisms. The circulation of maps allowed a standardization of geography. The 
imaginary realms of distant lands so characteristic of the Middle Ages were filtered out.171  
The imagination of Renaissance Europe was also invoked by holding moderns as equals of the 
ancients. From such a position, Thomas More could conceive of a utopia as an education reformed 
society with good counsel.  An interest in historiography led to a categorization of the world into 
ages - Augustine, progress, enlightenment, dark ages (Rothblatt, 1976: 21). By the 18th century, 
courtesy and civility had moved away from influencing the court into wider public arenas occupied 
by the merchant, country gentleman, and public figures (Rothblatt, 1976: 59). 
Elias (2000: 88) proposes that courtoisie, civilité, and civilisation adumbrated the civilising process, 
but what is being claimed here is that this, in fact, traces the communicative and incommunicative 
capacities of society as exposed by the world. We can compare these communicative restrictions 
backward to the chivalric journeys of discovery or on the crusade, and forward to the drawing-rooms 
and balls of London Society. All such epochs share similar features. There is a combination of 
informational value, moral esteem, and artistic appreciation that was not universal in scope. The 
rustics and the common-folk were not included in such a world. It is the pivot towards a self-
description that is universal in scope and singular in focus, and that is characteristic of the modern 
world in which discrimination operates.  
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In this short section, I will sketch out the more recent semantics of etiquette which provided a 
means of orientating oneself in a world in which the strands of discrimination - informativity, 
morality, and aesthetics - were becoming disconnected. The gradual functional differentiation of 
society ensured that such system-references could no longer be bundled together and distributed 
through a stratified order. Etiquette is of particular interest because of how, at this point, such 
standards of social behaviour began to diminish in their societal significance.  
The rules of etiquette emerged in Georgian England organized around a societal description in which 
London Society was distinguished from provincial society.  The etiquette book came about because 
the connection between morals and manners dissipated. Good manner's improved one's chances in 
life; however, it began to be proclaimed that manners were only a pursuit of self-interest in a wicked 
world. Chesterfield in Letters to His Son lamented the self-conceit, cynicism and conscious 
manipulation of manners for one's own ends (Curtin: 1985: 404). Etiquette books were concerned 
with precise descriptions of the exact rules of interpersonal behaviour with relative disregard for 
moral thought. Instructions were directed at social interactions such as at dinners, balls, receptions, 
presentations at court, calls, promenades, introductions, salutations. As opposed to earlier 
semantics, etiquette only provided a short-lived hinge between the planes of interaction and society 
in response to the pressures of the early 19th century - industrialization, urbanization, increasing 
population, and a rising middle class. It seems to have offered a time-limited safeguard for the 
upper-classes against the labouring classes.  
London Society comprised of an elaborate calendar of events (the Season) which unified the private 
sphere of the family and the public sphere of politico-economic institutions; however, this 
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description could only operate for the upper echelons of the class-organized society and as such 
could hardly operate as a complete description of the world. The behaviour exhibited at social 
events was informative of one's position in society, but since there was only a loose connection to a 
broader idea of morality, these scenes could hardly serve as exemplars for others, in other social 
classes, to emulate.  
There was little concern with the individual virtues of self-control, grace, and fortitude. These older 
forms were translated into a veneration of life-styles. Acceptance into Society depended upon 
meeting the norms of gentility exemplified by the idealizations of the English Ladies and 
Gentlemen.172 The elaborate requirements of greeting, leaving cards, and hosting dinners was 
enabled through the improved transport infrastructure of Georgian and Victorian England.173 
Etiquette became a highly formalized institution through its concentration in urban areas and its 
activation in private homes that provided intensive opportunities for self-observation between 
individuals. This tendency to partition was mimicked in the isolation of gentility from the labouring 
classes through the separation of servants quarters from the household and the division of sitting 
rooms from the kitchen.174 On a wider scale there was a movement away from public events and the 
great pleasure gardens of Vauxhall, Hampstead Wells, and Ranelagh Gardens which enabled the 
commingling of classes in public games, entertainment, and drinking. Instead there was a 
proliferation of private gardens and invitation only events (banquets, dances, and hunts). Alongside 
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this we have an intensified concentration on separating the private and public in terms of the body - 
cleanliness, punctuality, church attendance, personal sobriety. 
Rules of etiquette had the tremendous ability to exaggerate small differences by assisting one to 
distinguish the upper from lower aristocracy, lower aristocracy from upper middle classes, and so 
on. They functioned so successfully because they were readily available to assist the individual to 
compare themselves to those nearby. As such etiquette was productive at unveiling the minute 
dissimilarities between similar persons. This increasing emphasis on petty vanities further 
differentiated manner from virtue; and the competition for social status was separated from the 
higher virtues of civilized life (Curtin, 1985). 
Etiquette also dictated the important rituals of gentility - rites of passage (marriage and childbirth), 
and the introduction of new members through the prescription of highly elaborate requirements for 
the behaviour in polite society of the unmarried, widows, and spinsters. A particularly influential 
example is the mourning period for the death of Prince Albert which became a national affair. 
The elevation of London Society as the unity of society was further exemplified with the triumph of 
Society pronunciation. The voice of London Society morphed into Received Standard English. With 
received speech being associated with the Capital, this threw into relief the distinctiveness of 
regional accents. Language became a means of social discrimination. Correct elocution indicated 
one's good upbringing, fashionableness and  membership in the 'beau monde'. Rhetoric was 
associated less with logic and more with a pleasant and graceful style. 
There were significant currents that ran against this self-description. As usual the impetus came 
from those who could place one foot in society and one foot outside. Bohemians formed the anti-
society within society, the other-worldly against the world. The term itself emanated from a 
derogatory term for an outsider group - the Roma people. Another group who defied the world of 
etiquette were the so-called 'demi-monde'.  These persons inhabited a twilight social world outside 
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the rules of etiquette: fallen women (those involved in sexual impropriety, who transgressed the 
code of respectability), prostitutes. This category included working and middle class women. Sexual 
respectability within the rules of etiquette was maintained by being identified with a home, a family 
status. When it came to women respectability and esteem seemed to depend on appearing in public 
– professional actresses could not be respectable or certainly struggled, but amateur dramatics was 
considered respectable.175  
The relevant self-description of High Society and Provincial Society was no doubt found wanting 
because it could not accurately capture two social trends - the emerging working class, and the 
broader movement towards democraticization and nationalism.176  The period inherited the 
communicative developments of the 18th century in which there was a flurry of linguistic theories, 
kinds of grammar, dictionaries, spelling books, and proposals for re-ordering pedagogy. There was a 
rise in prescriptivism (e.g. Jonathan Swift) in the English language and calls for standardization in 
response to population movements, technological change, and the expansion of global 
communications. This further placed a focus on the purity of language (Elfenbein, 2009: 30ff., 74). 
William Wordsworth sought to purify poetic diction from the common language of men. In the 
period 1780-1840 there was the appearance of mass education, the rise of children's literature, 
didactic popular fiction, a great rise in literacy, and a step-change in the circulation of news-papers, 
religious pamphlets, and political tracts (e.g. Thomas Paine's, Rights of Man).177 All these changes 
alter the communicative landscape and provide a basis for etiquette to successfully hold together 
interactive practices with societal significance.  
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This chapter began by highlighting a racial dilemma. Race seems to be both relevant and irrelevant. I 
have argued that this dilemma is linked to societal forms of self-description and the pathways in 
which social semantics unfold this paradox. This process schematizes the communicative structures 
between interactions and society by reference to the world concept. In this space unfolds the socio-
genetics of chivalry, courtesy, civility, and etiquette. These themes share communicative strands 
which currently provide the social basis for discrimination: informativity, moral esteem, and 
aesthetic meaning.  By reflecting on this long development discrimination has been re-described 
within a far broader and more theoretically astute context than has been afforded by other 
methodologies. This stretch into the past provides the tool-box for a re-description of discrimination 
in the present.  These examples from the past offer an equivalence for the essential components of 
discrimination which will be taken forward in the next chapter to explain how racism is 














CHAPTER 5 - THE MODERN SEMANTICS OF RACISM  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to illustrate why racism is an intensive topic of communication in contemporary 
society. Following on from the diachronic perspective of Chapter 4, this chapter presents a 
synchronic perspective on racism in modern society. It suggests that Romanticism prefigured the 
turn to a universal and specific self-description of modern society. From this point onwards the 
connection between manners and morality have collapsed and the strands of discrimination 
highlighted in Chapter 4 have become isolated in discrete social systems. I will argue that Deleuze's 
conception of repetition provides a pivot to connect these systems through reliance on a public 
medium. Within this medium identity discourses - such as race - operate to intensify irritability 
between social systems. 
Racism is a phenomenon that can only have arisen in the special circumstances of modern society. 
This implies, moreover, that racist formations that appeared prior to the functional differentiation of 
society are (a) short-lived and incidental, and (b) disconnected in theoretical terms from racism in a 
fuller meaningful sense. Within the previous chapter, I sought to set out the pre-adaptive advances 
for a semantics of racism located in humanist moral education, the history of manners, and the 
unfolding self-descriptions of society. This 'socio-genetics' of racism was excavated through a 
diachronic perspective fine-tuned to improbable sites - the social subsystems of art, the mass media, 
morality, and the self-descriptions of society. This chapter will now consider a more synchronic 
perspective in which racism has inherited the system-references and communicative dynamics 
identified in Chapter 4 but, however, in contrast to such topics covered therein, race is now 
communicated in a society that has become functionally differentiated into self-referential sub-
systems of communication.  
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The emulation of esteemable archetypes must operate in a different fashion than that which was 
possible in the hierarchical and stratified societies covered in Chapter 4. It must accomplish two 
feats: (i) it must operate heterarchically via capillaries that traverse sub-systems, and (ii) it must, at 
the same time, accommodate the self-referential closure of each system. This poses an immense 
difficulty for Luhmann’s theory.178 Fortunately, the versatility of Luhmann's approach attracts 
experimental combinatorics. Bearing in mind such an approach, this impediment will be handled by 
deploying Deleuze’s philosophy on pure difference and complex repetition alongside insights from 
Foucault’s work on discipline and power. By relying on this theoretical troika, I will argue that the 
social basis for racism in modern society involves the systemic-references (noted above) working 
together to produce a fractured emulation within scenes and plateaus that take place in the public 
medium. This type of emulation does not involve actions copying archetypes of actions, or the 
accurate reflection of factual circumstances. Racial emulation involves a complex and fractured 
repetition of time itself. Eigen-objects within the public medium provide a site formerly delivered by 
such distinctions as the Court and the Country. Objects such as Labour and Life provide a context in 
which interactive orders can be threaded together into a public scene from which racial semantics 
can bridge the gap between Labour and the rest of society. 
To comprehend the visibility of racism we must go beyond its obvious manifestations and unearth its 
foundations. Without doubt the visibility of different persons afforded by migration and 
multiculturalism are factors in energizing racist communications, and links between the nation-state 
and racism are certainly present; however this does not mean that these factors are constitutive of 
the reproduction of racism qua communication. Instead we look to the emergence of the public 
medium precisely because it communicates as visibility (the blatant, the near at hand, the 
transparent) and provides a purchase for the observation of the non-visible (the distant, withdrawn, 
and opaque). The fact that distinct trends – migration, changes to the racial make-up of a 
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population, alteration of normality in the work-place - are visualized as communication can only be 
accomplished in the public medium which provides an already present and assumed normality for 
other sub-systems. 
The notion that racism is a peculiarly present-day topic is not as outlandish as it might appear. For 
example, there is ample historical evidence that the idea of the child was effectively invented during 
the late 18th century. This coincided with the development of an education system uncoupled from 
religious decrees and familial necessities. The child was differentiated as a self-standing entity, no 
longer a precursor on the road to adulthood.179  As the previous chapter made clear, the relationship 
between communication and the world should be closely examined as a perspective for the 
disclosure of social evolution. The technical innovations in dissemination media (the printing press, 
the mass distribution of the paper-back books, and tele-technologies) contribute to the capacity to 
expand the communicable and to realize an expanded form of the incommunicable world in the 
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 The out-differentiation of the educational system is explained in Luhmann & Schorr (2000). For 
documentation on the emergence of the child see both the work of Philippe Ariès and the brief survey in 
Luhmann (2000: 38-41). Consider also how Foucault asked: why did medical knowledge transform completely 
in only a few decades in the 18th century? Looking to the heavens became a bygone approach to diagnosing 
and curing bodily aliments. Instead, medical knowledge was sought by looking inside the body. Stating that this 
was explicable in terms of British empiricism and the influence of Francis Bacon fails to note that the 
acceptance of new approaches to questions and the success of new communicational combinations, cannot be 
attributed to the overpowering authority of an author or the self-evidence of results. People do not have to 
accept communications.  
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THE UNIVERSALIZATION OF MORALITY AND THE MODERN SELF -DESCRIPTION 
 
Luhmann contends that morality underwent a universalization at the same time that the subjectivity 
of man became an accepted tenet in 18th century philosophy.180 As such moral expectations became 
increasingly orientated around self-regulation, personal freedom, and the allocation of respect made 
on the basis of a person’s intentions as well as their actual behaviour.181  The older distinctions 
between virtuous and vicious behaviour were supplemented by a distinction between intention and 
behaviour. The person was increasingly seen as universal in scope (homme universel) and singular 
through their pursuit of self-understanding and self-determination.182 Individualism in a stratified 
society was more concerned with being better than others, not by being different from others. 
Luhmann maintains that the new predilections for unrest and desire, interests and pleasure (plaisir), 
passion and self-love signified a turn in individualism's meaning. The older notion could not adapt to 
historical change. The new notion, however, permitted the individual to change through self-
cultivation, self-realization, their freedom and reason. Consequently expectations as to how moral 
communications could handle this self-development had to be formed by reference to 
normalizations and its counterpart in deviation – shocking normality, avant-gardism, and 
revolution.183 Moral communications could not reliably produce such accumulations for themselves; 
as such moral communications have to rely on their structural coupling with the mass media in the 
form of scandal. For it is within the realms of the mass media that the public medium is generated. 
In the same period, the direct connection between morality and manners collapsed. This was 
triggered in part by changes in the possibilities for societal communication - heightened literacy, 
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181
 Luhmann labels this as the ‘specification of accountability’ is held up as a condition for qualifying an action 
as moral. The morality of an action is meaningful by reference to the inner consent and self-motivation of the 
individual (Luhmann, 2012: 148-149, 240). See also Luhmann (1992b: 1001) 
182
 Luhmann (2013: 277-8) 
183
 Luhmann (1995: 257-262, 267) 
119 
 
greater travel, dissolution of social ties through socio-economic transformation, population 
migration, colonialism, the first waves of globalization, and the inevitability of meeting strangers. 
How can moral expectations be formed on the basis of social behaviour in which neither side is 
aware of the other? How can this opacity be handled and made transparent? Ethical reflection on 
good reasons for good behaviour left the salons and coffee houses for the university. The doctrine of 
civility could no longer internally regulate the conduct within societal strata, caste, and locality. It no 
longer made sense to differentiate moral demands by reference to a person’s status as a peasant or 
a member of the nobility.184 Universalized morality instead needed to produce concrete instances 
for moral concern such as the plight of the hungry and oppressed, or the victims of human rights 
abuses. A further instance noted by Luhmann is the capacity for code sabotage to attract moral 
concern.185  
This combination of the universal and singular establishes, at least in part, that the 'moral restricts 
itself to the criterion of the ridiculous'.186 Increasingly, moral communication takes on a 
polemegenous form in which it is generated from strife and in turn generates strife.187 Morality 
serves as an alarm function and 'society clearly recruits moral communication for serious problems 
caused by its own structures and above all by its differentiation form'. It has free rein to bring to 
attention social problems like: the social question in the 19th century, stark world-wide differences 
in globalized wealth, ecological catastrophes.188 It is this increasing concern for salience and special 
cases which was a theme I emphasized in Chapter 2. In Chapter 4 we detailed the exemplary 
archetypes of the virtuous knight and courteous courtier, amongst other examples, as providing a 
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 Luhmann (1992b: 1003). The scandalous and the graphically packaged information generated in the mass 
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 See Luhmann (2012: 242). The social question of the 19th century weighed the industrial advances of 
technology against the costs to human dignity and alienation afforded by the labour-process. 
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series of actions which should be emulated. For in modern society, I have suggested that this type of 
emulation relevant to race is now fractured and constitutes perturbations between social systems. 
Morality's concern with the ridiculous is aptly suited to a contemporary self-description of modern 
society which seeks to combine the universal and the specific.  We will turn to this theme in the next 
section. 
Isaiah Berlin maintains that this moral transformation was encapsulated by Romanticism in the 
period 1760-1830. The literature of Victor Hugo, Byron, Coleridge, the Schlegel brothers, and Goethe 
best reflected the universalization of morality. In their works it was not particular virtues, vices, or 
values that was held in high esteem. What was valued was the dedication to values themselves. This 
was assessed through judgments on a person's sincerity, authenticity, purity, and integrity. How 
dedicated was that person to their ideals? How ready were they to sacrifice themselves for those 
values? Previously, no Christian knight or Protestant of the religious wars could admire and respect 
another person simply for their absolute belief in itself. In contrast, what mattered was the factual 
makeup of their beliefs or the social position of the believer.  With Romanticism, however, 
martyrdom could be admired because of its sacrifice towards an eternal truth and having trenchant 
beliefs that one is willing to die for became a morally estimable quality in itself.189 Motive matters 
more than consequences because motives are products of the will which can be controlled, unlike 
consequences.  This freedom in relation to ourselves is that of authenticity and sincerity. This means 
that we can respect different opinions and different cultures because they are authentic to 
themselves.190  
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 Berlin traces the roots of Romanticism to the obscure German poet, Johan Georg Harmann, who went onto 
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Richardson (2004) posits that the historicity of the individual emerged in the 17th century, which can 
be seen in the educational advice for the proper upbringing of the child. The most common 
paradigm in the Romantic period was the extension of John Locke’s philosophical reliance on 
experience into the associationist psychology of Harley and Godwin. The child had a developmental 
structure akin to a growing plant and a young sapling. Children’s primitive condition was gradually 
lost as they became more cultured through learning of the world. The literary portrayal of the self 
also reflected this emergent and self-distinguishing individual through observations on anecdotes 
that revealed the self, and epiphanic moments that punctuated the life of the self. 
Romanticism was governed by a sense of the inadequate fit between the real and the apparent, 
heaven and earth. It concerns a struggle (between soul and body, content and form) and a desire 
(for something always still to come).191 In order to grasp these gaps and inadequacies of fit, 
Romanticism called for the heightening of perceptions and an intensification of sensations so that 
that the ordinary and normal could be invested with new tones, implications, and connections. That 
said, there was an aversion to didacticism in art and a mechanical conception of man. The ethics of 
Romanticism praises a commitment to the unknowable.192 It is this impetus which signifies a dual 
transformation: (i) morality operates under an interdiction on self-exemption, and (ii) the re-entry of 
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SELF-DESCRIPTION OF MODERN SOCIETY: UNIVERSAL  AND SINGULAR 
 
'Concrete idiosyncrasies arise, "identity discourses", which assert their meaning against the 
unmarked space of all other possible meanings and at the same time throw acute light on certain 
oppositions in specifically rejecting global features of modern society.'  
(Luhmann, 2013: 209) 
 
The semantics of racism, and discrimination, communicate as 'identity discourses' that assert 
themselves against the 'unmarked space of all possible meanings'. This unmarked space has already 
been indicated within the concept of the world as the realization of the incommunicable in 
communication. The singularity of identity discourses throws into relief the universal and specific 
aspects of modern society.  
Under the conditions of modernity the communicative landscape for identity discourses differs from 
that available to the anterior semantics of manner and courtesy. The functional differentiation of 
sub-systems means that the strands of discrimination are no longer unified and distributed through 
a hierarchical society. In such situations, the world was found by observing the distinctions that unify 
a stratified society. It appeared as the secret lines that separated behaviour at court from the 
provinces, or the seclusion generated by the knightly journey. Observations arose on this basis 
focused through stratifications in which the informative value of behaviour called for a positive or 
negative moral estimation - a citizen of the world, or a demi-monde - by reference to how far a 
person's behaviour emulated the idealized behaviour of the time. The communicative potentiality in 
terms of technology and the possibilities of dissemination intensified the lines between the 
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semantics that unfolded the self-description of society - Three Orders, the Court and Country, and so 
forth. 
In modern society all social systems (including society as a social system) assert claims to universality 
but only within their respective domains.  Universality and specificity operate on at least two levels. 
Society is universal and each system is specific. Each sub-system is universal and its operations are 
specific. The question is how are these two sides of the equation held together? How is the universal 
(the most indeterminate and distant) held together with the specific (the most determinate and 
near-at-hand)? It is the world that re-appears as the connection between sub-systems. In the same 
way that it had managed to hold together interactions at court and a wider societal ideology it now 
de-paradoxicalizes the societal self-description through emergence in the public medium, which is 
presupposed as a 'common present' by all sub-systems. Race as an intensive type of communication 
operates between the systems of the mass media, morals (to the extent that, in the modern world, 
morals can be thought of as a system), and art, to channel irritability.  
A problem remains, however. Luhmann's functionally differentiated society does not, at least in a 
substantive way, provide for such a relationship between these three systems. Therefore, we will 
turn to Deleuze's triadic theory of repetition to provide a plateau upon which these social systems 








DELEUZE ON REPETITION 
'Repetition as universality of the singular'  
(Deleuze, 1994: 2) 
Deleuze (1994) explores whether repetition can be understood as a creative process operating in 
respect to difference, rather than similarity.193 How can we grasp the repetition of unique events? 
Does this not formulate a paradox i.e. the repetition of the unrepeatable?  Deleuze asserts that 
repetition should be understood as a creative process distinct from conceptions of resemblance, 
equivalence, and substitution. A repetition of difference consolidates to produce identities. Deleuze 
presents an example in which the French national holiday, Federation Day, does not annually 
commemorate or represent the fall of the Bastille, but in fact the fall of the Bastille celebrates and 
repeats in advance all the Federation Days. Equally, Monet's first water lily repeats in advance all the 
others. A secret vibration resonates within the singular event extending it to the universal. This may 
seem to be counter-intuitive and so to properly grasp the argument we need to unpack his theory a 
little more deeply.194 
Deleuze contends that metaphysics has failed to realise that similarity and generality are not 
constitutive operations. Drawing productively on the work of Bergson, he explains that repetition 
and difference underpin the identity of matter. Things, such as a chair, acquire their identity through 
repetition. Parallel to the actual plane where identities like the chair-thing consolidate there is a 
virtual plane. On this latter band effects play out in a complicated variety of series with intensities 
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overlapping and coming into contention: the chair is becoming hard, becoming shiny, becoming 
comfortable. The boundaries of the thing are marked out through repetition as an animal marks out 
its territory by iteratively patrolling the perimeter of its territory. The retention of repetitions in 
habit and the reproduction of repetitions in memory lead us to the fixed representation of things.  
The identity of the chair is given by a secret repetition that occurs as both passive and static 
syntheses in the mind: living present produced by habit, pure past produced by memory, and the 
'royal repetition' concerned with the future. Underscoring this representation of the same territory 
is an infinite series of repetitions that the prowling animal and particular territory abstracts from: 
repeated paths of other animals, changing cycles of weather, the ebb and flow of the tides, the cycle 
of aging, the encroachment of civilization that beats to the rhythms of man and techno-industrial 
mechanisation. Even the more mundane matter of the chair is given through repetitions: the 
repetitive approximations that the body makes to the chair (shifting for comfort, standing up and 
sitting down, tiny variations made in its position in respect of the floor and desk), the cycle of hours 
and daylight. Some might object that these are not repetitions - for the same day is not being 
repeated, the same movement between body and desk is not being repeated. Could it not be argued 
that we are imagining connections and a continuum where there none is available? To resolve this 
issue, we must turn to an explanation of how repetition can occur between different items.  
The production of difference between each repetition is inserted into the virtual plane as 'pure 
differences'. These differences are not held between similar things, but as differences in a 
relationship to differences without recourse to generality. For instance, when we commute to work 
each day there are a number of pure differences in the virtual plane which make this quotidian 
routine rather unique - becoming wealthier, becoming older, bumping into people we'll never see 
again at points in their lives which are singular. Thus, the unrepeatable - the unique - holds down a 
close proximity to the universality of repetition. A second example can highlight how the virtual 
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bends towards the infinite while representation proceeds in finite stages. Many paintings by Mark 
Rothko operate as gradients of colour becoming lighter and becoming darker; however, this band 
cannot be compartmentalized into segments. It is very difficult to say when we perceive differences 
occurring in the paintings. 
The incapacity of a finite and representational medium to portray an infinitesimal series is common 
knowledge. Sorites paradox throws into relief this affliction: if we have a heap of sand and we 
remove a grain at what point does it no longer constitute a heap? We cannot say. Philosophically 
this paradox can be avoided by finding the term 'heap' inadmissible due to the fact it is a vague 
predicate; however, equally, we suggest that we are witnessing the interaction between the actual 
and virtual planes. Some ideas cannot be measured or quantified; they must be felt. In sum, we can 
perceive the work of 'pure differences' in actual things, but we cannot identify them except through 
recourse to representational language.195 Thus linguistic signs cannot sufficiently give voice to the 
variations of intensity, but can only separate them into identifiable and concrete differences 
between similar things.196 We can thus see that, in a truncated manner, there is a similarity between 
Deleuze's distinction between representational sign/virtual intensity and Luhmann's distinction 
between the mediums of language/perception from which communicative forms are abstracted.197 
A repetition must be linked to the concept of difference otherwise we would not re-peat - the 
moment lives on resonating from the fall of the Bastille in each Federation Day, but our intense 
reactions and perceptions are very different at each repetition. We have also seen how repetition 
can produce singular moments. The everyday walk, the commute to work, and the schedule of the 
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working day, is distinct each time it is repeated because it involves variations in the virtual intensities 
with respect to earlier cycles and later cycles, and thus changing relations in wider series. We change 
with the walk - I'm getting tired, I'm becoming cold. Will the path and cycle of a local dog-walker 
intersect with mine, will the cycle of the seasons impact my walk making it too cold and dark to go 
outside at this hour in the morning? Even the most regular and universal of tasks can be 
imperceptibly imbued with a unique and singular quality. If we reflect on Durkheim's work, this 
might be re-assembled as the emergence of the sacred in the profane and daily grind of life. 
In what has been set out above, we have begun to see how Deleuze's theory of repetition can link 
with the following concepts already highlighted in this thesis: the production of intensity, the 
universal and singular, and a notion of the secret and the public. In order to delve more thoroughly 
into these analyses I will now explain how repetition comes about through passive and static 
syntheses. Once explained I will then suggest that the system references pertinent to racism can be 
associated with Deleuze's syntheses - the passing present in the mass media, the pure past in moral 
communications, and open future in the sub-system of art. Each system reference is further 
connected by structural couplings that maintain the cycle between these references, namely: 
scandalization between mediated communications and morality, judgment between morality and 
artistic communications, mainstreaming/re-normalization between artistic communications and 
mediated communications.  
PASSIVE SYNTHESIS OF HABIT AND THE FUNCTION OF THE M ASS MEDIA 
The repetitive quality of habit comes about through a passive, non-reflective synthesis. Our idea of a 
chair consolidates through passively synthesizing prior experiences and prior encounters with this 
chair-thing. Habit cannot be understood in terms of generality, but must be understood in terms of a 
constantly altering scene where an action has to change in order to reinforce the habit in the same 
context (this time do it as if you mean it, the position of the desk remains the same but our way of 
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sitting must adjust), or the action remains the same but is activated in a different context (we cycle 
the same route to work in bad weather and fair weather).  
Repetition of the sequence (AB, AB, AB) elicits a response in the mind. Nothing changes in the object 
(AB), but the mind registers a difference: something new appears in the mind. The imagination 
contracts such that it retains the first AB when the second AB appears, thus an expectation of AB is 
formed. Out of this contracting process a living present emerges. The past is produced in the living 
present as the contraction of previous instants. The future is extended from the living present by an 
expectation produced in this contracting process. Particular past instants are contracted to produce 
a generality which is an expectation of the future. The mind registers the AB and comes to expect a 
repetition of the AB.198  
To confirm the dynamism of the above passage: the imagination makes that which contracts appear 
as a repetition of an element or case (respectively: A, A, A; AB, AB, AB). The appearance of a 
difference between each repetition allows a difference to appear between other series (of 
repetition): the nods of a chicken's head accompany the repeated pulsations of the heart; the cycles 
of the season accompany the daily commute to work - even going so far as to solicit alterations in 
that repetitive route: public transport in winter, bicycle in summer. 
So this first synthesis of habit produces the idea of a living present. A present on the move passing 
away from but also into the past while heading towards a future. How might this conception of 
repetition be relevant to this thesis?  
Firstly, a living present accords with the function guaranteed by the system of the mass media. As 
Luhmann (2000b: 1) epigrammatically proclaims: 'Whatever we know about our society, or indeed 
about the world in which we live, we know through the mass media'. Knowledge of the familiar is 
generated by the mass media for the benefit of other sub-systems of society.  One of the successes 
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of the mass media is the production of a common present that all other systems can take as a given.  
In providing a necessary or universal anchor the mass media mirrors Deleuze's dialogue with Kant in 
which Deleuze seeks to provide non-empirical grounds for a lived reality. Thus, in producing an 
observed reality the mass media construct a ‘transcendental illusion’.199 
This ‘transcendental illusion’ involves is a pre-given time for all. A profane space which all 
communication can assume exists.200 This does not undermine the hypothesis that social systems 
construct their own temporal horizons. The mass media does not provide an operational 
synchronicity between systems. Instead the mass media provides the illusion of a common reality for 
the benefit of communication. Increased complexity can be managed intra-systemically because 
society no longer has to check that each communication connects with each other communication, 
nor do systems need to check that there are adequate environmental conditions for this to take 
place, 'amongst other things, about whether the participants are still alive'.201 This commonality of 
the present operates as a quasi-transcendental anchor for the benefit of other social systems in 
society producing eigen-objects through its recursive performance.202   
Luhmann states that the mass media ‘includes all those institutions of society which make use of 
copying technologies to disseminate communication. This means principally books, magazines and 
newspapers manufactured by the printing press, but also all kinds of photographic or electronic 
copying procedures, provided that they generate large quantities of products whose target groups 
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are as yet undetermined.’203 Dissemination by broadcasting is also included provided that it aims for 
general accessibility. The inter-position of technology as the copying medium crucially prevents co-
presence and interaction between individuals. What is of importance is the fact that this 
communication is mass communication. Ceremonial and theatrical encounters are not a product of 
the mass media, nor are telephone conversations. 
To summarize: the mass media enables a 'widespread dissemination and the possibility of 
anonymous uptake' alongside a 'constant re-actualization of the self-description of society and its 
cognitive world horizons'.204 
A common present is guaranteed as familiar to all individuals. A system can take advantage of this 
presumption. With the production  of further information future expectations can be set out  and 
the system can then adapt itself to the past reference of this future anticipation. When the mass 
media disseminates news about the stock market which would impact the economy then the 
economy can adapt itself to these projections for companies and markets. The past and the future 
can be re-assembled according to this intervention of an updated present provided by the mass 
media. The memory contained within the mass media and the reality effect that this generates can 
initiate changes in the memory of other sub-systems.205 
Returning to Deleuze, this function of the mass media operates in a similar fashion to the passive 
synthesis of habit. The mass media generates information about the world as a common present. 
This information is processed into non-information by an application of the media code which 
creates non-information i.e. redundancy. The double-helix of social redundancy and information is 
presumed by society and its sub-systems. The repetitive application of the code (information/non-
information) contracts past instants through a present moment and generates expectations of a 
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future. From this medium, other sub-systems can receive information about a present which re-
configures future expectations and then generates a re-configuration of the systems’ past.  
 An important quality of the living-present is the project of future expectations by the contraction of 
the past. Through repetition of experience things attain a degree of consistency. So the animal 
gradually draws out its territory by patrolling. With the appreciation of consistency comes the 
capacity to appreciate errors. The unveiling of errors is a hallmark of ritualistic communication. Small 
deviations are thrown into relief by the normalizing effect of rituals. The small singularities of each 
morning walk are exposed because the walk produces consistency via a repetitive action.206  
To be clear, the mass media does not specialize in increasing knowledge or educating persons in 
conformity to norms.207 The system is not concerned with the production of normality, or even 
exemplary models indicating appropriate behaviour. A more complex phenomena is underway, 
when compared to some of the earlier doctrines on manners, courtesy, and taste. This is 
understandable if we reflect on the hyper-complex state of modern society. Descriptions of society 
and normative orientations arise as a factual effect from the constant generation of information and 
its processing into non-information. The mass media enables the adaptation of systems to their 
environment. It is this assurance of a common presence which confirms adequate adaptation of 
each system to its environment to enable autopoiesis.  
THE MASS MEDIA AND THE GROUNDS FOR THE RACIAL SCENE  
In what has been summarized above, we have established how repetition can be provided through 
the functioning of the mass media system.  
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The offerings of the mass media allows social communication to be furnished with an ongoing 
reference to ‘individuals’ without having to consider the specificities of other functional systems.208 
The mass media provides on one hand, as mentioned earlier, a space for individualizing motives and 
reflection on their possibilities, and on the other hand provides generalities and standardizations for 
individuality. This latter operation can be glimpsed in the contribution of statistics to the operations 
of the mass media. Statistical forms manage to combine specificity and generality for the purpose of 
communicating informativity. For example, through the generation of averages and means, 
deviations 'stand out' as informative. Both anti-racist and racist movements make use of statistics to 
reveal a world and expose a reality. The informativity given by such mechanisms is then susceptible 
to moral assessment, for instance: it is unjust that unemployment disproportionately effects racial 
minorities; and, alternatively, the disproportionate levels of unemployment reflects the different 
work ethic of racial minorities.   
A general effect produced by the mass media on society is to increase its capacity for irritation and 
thus the ability to produce information. To be irritated comes about through the setting of 
expectations, and it is specifically the mass media that produces a plethora of expectations of 
normality which can be increasingly shattered by irritations.209 Luhmann suggests that the mass 
media's focus on individuality has certainly contributed towards a position in which the mode of 
second-order observation has settled, such that 'everything that is uttered is deciphered in terms of 
the one who utters it'210. Consequently, a culture of suspicion and paranoia arises in which motives 
can be questioned and self-observation is encouraged. The secondary effect in particular solidifies a 
growing pre-occupation with the self.211 The mass media has attained functional differentiation on 
account of its ability to solve a societal problem. 'The mass media guarantee all function systems a 
present which is accepted throughout society and is familiar to individuals, and which they can take 
                                                                
208
 Luhmann (2000b: 74) 
209
 Luhmann (2000b: 82) 
210
 Luhmann (2000b: 84) 
211
 Luhmann refers to this phenomenon as the 'self-psychiatrization of communication' (Luhmann, 2000b: 93).  
133 
 
as given when it is a matter of selecting a system-specific past and establishing decisions about 
future expectations important to the system.' 
The mass media manage to operate as the memory of society. The system produces social 
redundancy and maintains the eigen-objects upon which societal memory is closely dependent. 
These eigen-objects are dynamically-stable entities that emerge through the recursive process of 
communication. Although valued highly as an innovative contribution by Luhmanns to his theory of 
society, unfortunately there are only a few fully worked out examples from which we can develop 
our application to racism. Significantly, Luhmann considered these eigen-objects as a far more likely 
'foundation' for continued societal communication than consensus, or a social contract.212 A number 
of other theorists have a similar, but less theoretically attuned concept. George Herbert Mead 
considers 'objects' as symbols of orientation. They operate as a principle of social co-ordination upon 
which behaviour can adapt; however, for Mead these are material objects and are not products of 
communication itself. Mead gives the example of a car as an object that symbolically orientates two 
persons on either side of the street. The car is a fulcrum anchoring the line of sight between the two 
persons, drawing them into a timeless instance despite their divergent spatio-temporal planes.213 
There are many eigen-objects pertinent to the communication of racial difference. Our concern will 
be with how Labour is produced and irritated by racial connotations found in the incommunicability 
of the world. Race is an intensive factor that separates categories of acceptable and rejectable 
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PASSIVE SYNTHESIS OF THE PURE PAST: MORALITY  
Deleuze reasons that his innovative interpretation of repetition first occurs via habit in which a living 
present passes away into the past. This first passive synthesis suggests a second synthesis. For we 
can see how instants contract into a present from the past and create structures for a future, but 
this does not explain how the present falls away into the past. This first synthesis we have explored 
with reference to Luhmann's system of the mass media. This second synthesis can be associated 
with Luhmann's observations on morality. These provide further conditions for a racial scene of light. 
To approach this, I will first turn my attention to explaining what Deleuze means by a passive 
synthesis of the pure past.214  
The notion of a pure past must provide an argument for why the present passes away into the past. 
This archive is absolutely necessary if the present is to be experienced as enduring, continuing, and 
falling behind into a past. It needs to operate as the mediator between two reference points: the 
present which the past was, and the present to which it is the past. This pure past exists, but it has 
never become present. We glimpse it through representations of nostalgia and reminiscence. The 
involuntary memories summoned by a madeleine that point towards Proust’s idealised Combray, 
the imaginative lands of Albion, or any other purified and transparent past which never reached 
actuality.215  
The pure past operates as a configuration of potentiality and variability. By definition, it cannot be 
realised, however it still manages to arrange variation such that the selection of information can 
occur. In reference to the continuing present it provides a variety of options between each 
contraction of successive (repeated) instants. Successive refers to a causal chain that is not 
objective, but determined by the interlacing of these two passive syntheses. These causal chains can 
be represented, but they are conditioned by more fundamental processes engendered through 
                                                                
214
 Deleuze (1994: 102-108) 
215
 For a discussion in terms of Proust, see Deleuze (2000: 52-67) 
135 
 
repetition. We are moving towards another pre-condition of the racial scene. The imagination of a 
pure past as represented through nostalgia. Moreover, using imaginative themes also enables the 
observer to occlude the paradoxical state of societal self-descriptions.216 
How does this pure past relate to Luhmann's lexicon? It embeds the succession of moment to 
moment. It modulates that which is retained and reproduced, and that which is remembered and 
forgotten. We can see how this notion of the pure past relates to Luhmann's conception of memory. 
In communications there must be a way to understand why some connections between operations 
are remembered and some are forgotten. The memory function describes this process. Plainly, how 
memory functions is specific to each system. Legal memory explains how communications in terms 
of decisions, arguments, reasons, advice, and norms interlink. In modern society, the memory is 
heavily influenced by the operations of the mass media and the eigen-objects produced therein; 
however, we are concerning ourselves with a racial scene that comes about through the nexus 
between systems. Its memory must be distinctive from its formation.  
To comprehend how expectations are memorized in communication we need to locate a destructive 
and restorative force.  Furthermore, particular communications must be constitutive and patently 
relevant to racial communication. What communications irritate other communications compelling 
changes in expectation structures? These would be a set of communications that are triggered by 
conflict and in turn generate further conflict. Moral communications can undertake this role. It is a 
figure such as race that can intensify and guide the influence of moral communications on the 
mediated normality associated with Labour. It is the figure of race which can support or destroy the 
historicality and the lived experience of the workplace. We know that race must support normalized 
practices in the workplace because once race is revealed to be a factor then a whole set of variations 
are re-set.  
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For example, communication in the workplace often takes place at a distance or in the abstract.217 
We receive a job application and then talk to the candidate over the phone. We meet up with a 
person face-to-face whom we have only ever spoken to over the phone or via email. When race 
becomes a factor in communication it does so through a revelation in which the already present but 
unaddressed assumptions are re-distributed.  The fact that the candidate is black or speaks with a 
foreign accent causes a re-appreciation of our previous actions and relations. Did I accidently 
disrespect that person? What is the best way to proceed? Should I admit my mistake, should I re-
appreciate my interview questions and responses? Does the race of the person re-calibrate all the 
exchanges of information in our email correspondence? Race appears as a visualization (a 
communication of the incommunicable) of irritability connecting morality and mediated 
communications. It is a singularity that holds these two universalized systems together. Of course, it 
may not be picked up by communication, but this does not discount the effects that follow when 
race does perturb and luxate the relationship between morality and mediated communications. The 
fact that moral communications can re-calibrate, destroy, and restore the meaningful structures of 
the mass media is evidence that the relationship correlates with that between the pure past and the 
passing present.  
We have turned to moral communications for two reasons: firstly, morality is heavily interlinked 
with racism and its academic commentary as was shown in Chapter 2 of this thesis; secondly, I have 
detailed in an earlier chapter how the history of manners provides exemplars for respectful 
behaviour. In the provision of this guidance the conditions for esteem and disrespect are 
communicated. I have made the argument that due to the entanglement between self-descriptions 
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and these models of appropriate behavior, these forms are the precursor to racism proper, or at 
least provide a perspective for racism to be more fully understood. 
 
STATIC SYNTHESIS OF THE OPEN FUTURE: ART  
So far we have discussed how Deleuze’s understanding of the continuous present and the pure past 
corresponds to Luhmann’s conceptions of the mass media, social memory, and moral 
communications. The last step to consider is whether Deleuze’s third synthesis of time explains how 
remembering and forgetting are modulated. Does the final synthesis correspond to what Luhmann 
has labeled oscillation, and is memory oscillated by the influence of the artistic sub-system? I will 
argue that it indeed does, sufficiently at least for the purposes of this thesis.  
Monet's famous water lilies are copies of the very first lily. In a similar fashion, each Bastille Day 
commemorates the revolutionary storming of the Bastille by the sans-culottes of Paris; and the 
festivities on these days mark another grand turning in the cycle (199, 200, 201 ... ) that extends 
from the momentous event itself. In either instance, repetition is predicated on similitude. The same 
event is repeated with a level of similarity as measured by likeness or distance. The intriguing 
question posed by Deleuze is whether this idea of repetition can be more fundamentally grasped as 
a figuration that works through and with differential relations. How can the fall of the Bastille 'repeat 
in advance' all the Bastille Days? Firstly, the phrase 'in advance' must be considered in terms of the 
future. Next, repetition must be configured in terms of the future. What is repetition for the future? 
It certainly cannot be understood as predestination or eschatology. Neither Luhmann's nor Deleuze's 
philosophical enterprise would permit such an interpretation.  
As outlined in the discussion above, the present repeats as a synthesis of habit. This is a contractive 
process that transforms earlier series. On the other hand, the past repeats through a continual 
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transformation of the dynamic relations in the past. The future repeats, however, by allowing the 
past to return as different: 'the third repetition, this time by excess, the repetition of the future as 
eternal return' (Deleuze, 1994: 113). This is Deleuze's profound re-interpretation of Nietzsche's 
doctrine of eternal return. The radical openness of the future is the condition for the ‘new’ which 
appears in both present and past syntheses as a transformative component.218 For example, if an 
effort is made to replicate a behaviour from the past (let us live as our ancestors once did; let us 
march on Parliament like the Suffrage movements once did) then we can only do so by changing the 
series which underpin this past event. The action has to be plucked out of its context and re-cited 
within contemporary conditions. There is an essential element of innovation contained within this 
extraction and re-inscription. Repetition in advance is the third synthesis of time; it is the condition 
for genuine novelty and only that which is genuinely different can return.  
In order to be authentically novel the past must return in such a way that the new present is free of 
all determination. It must be pure. Accordingly, the return of the past caused by the future does not 
follow a determinable orbit such as the Earth follows around the Sun. Instead, the rotations are de-
centred and fractured; and with each revolution the past passes into these forged fault lines as a 
'new' living present. It turns out that Marx was correct. History repeats itself as farce and as 
tragedy.219 Those repetitions based on similitude and its connotations in the modes of resemblance, 
analogy, opposition, and identity will be eliminated because they fail the test of eternal return.220 
The only constancy permitted by this formulation is the return of difference that is pure, 
transparent, and unadulterated; for that which is similar can never return.221  
                                                                
218
 This emphasis on an open future compares favourably with Luhmann's insistence that time was 
fundamentally re-orientated when society underwent functional differentiation.  
219
 And this component is particularly important for the communicative aspect of repetition. Both farce and 
tragedy are recursively communicable on the basis of contradiction - a doubling as tautology, plus negation.  
220
 Deleuze (1994: 381 ff.) 
221
 It is repetition of the future that ‘constitutes the independence of the work’ (Deleuze, 1994: 113). Deleuze 
(1990) in Logic of Sense extends his analysis of temporal structures in a more figurative direction closer to 
recognizing the aesthetic quality of such a movement. 
139 
 
The only return permissible is through an action that wipes the slate clean and forces a new 
beginning - a caesura is asserted that distributes a before and an after. In terms of the employment 
context I would suggest that a racial intensity in the form of a judgment disrupts the on-going 
narrative at work. The exercise of judgments asserts a before and after because it provides a 
punctuation in the on-going story of an employee. For example, a judgment to offer an employment 
or refuse a promotion denotes a before and after the event. It is race as a specialization within 
identity discourses that channels such dislocations. Time is thrown ‘out of joint’ as the assertoric 
process internally splinters the on-going narrative in the workplace, such that each new phase in the 
relationship forges ahead into the lines of fracture. 
A judgment has to be made and it is through this avenue that we can see the structural coupling 
between morality and art. It is a judgment that is meaningful both as a moral communication and an 
artistic communication.222 Judgments similarly combine heterogeneous qualities harmonizing such 
elements. Such aesthetic judgments that establish a caesura are also an integral component of 
Foucault's notion of power. Discipline and Punish is heavily concerned with setting out an aesthetics 
of life.223 In noting the epistemic changes to punishment Foucault frequently invokes aesthetic 
qualities. The old jurisprudence exhibited 'an entire poetics' (Foucault, 1977: 45, quoting 
Giambattista Vico) with its mimesis of the original crime in the punishment spectacle (a hanging 
should take place at the site of the crime, the same gestures and instruments should be employed), 
and symbolic performance and restitution in terms of the nature of the crime (the tongues of 
blasphemes should be pierced, the impure burnt). Through atrocity the invisible was made visible 
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and the whole (sovereign) is brought in line with the parts (status, ranks, persons). What is required 
is a 'relation that is immediately intelligible to the senses on which a simple calculation may be 
based: a sort of reasonable aesthetics of punishment'.224 
Foucault’s thinking also follows the change in emulation highlighted within Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
of this thesis. Foucault emphasizes the informative, moral, and aesthetic components of power.225 
When discussing the transition from a pre-modern to a modern society he notes that the fabulous 
narrative of the nobles with their exemplary conduct warranting respect and esteem is dislodged in 
favour of the obscure, anonymous, lives of the masses.226 Foucault presents this as a transition from 
fabulous communication that operates on the basis of a distinction between the true world and the 
false to literary communication that 'puts itself forward as artifice' disregarding claims of imitating 
the natural world in order to construct fictional worlds.227 
In a later work, Foucault examines the Exempla offered by the lives of infamous men; not great 
villains, but those persons who through their perceived idiosyncrasies and maladjustment to their 
environs were interned in prison and asylum. He designates these examples as 'nouvelle' for two 
reasons which are pertinent to this thesis. Firstly, as communicating a piece of news. Secondly, by 
reference to the literary form of the short story, the novella. These Exempla combine in a diagram 
that channels information, narration, and morality.228 For Foucault the few lines that detail the 
traces left behind of a sodomite friar, a fantastic usurer, or a deserting soldier are 'lightning-
existences' and 'life-poems'.229 Each such description communicates a scene in which the narrative 
quality of reality is made perceptible. These scenes are not simply distilled from the real world and 
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then prepared into a memoir or recollection. Instead, these scenes operate as a 'dramaturgy of the 
real' in which the relationship between the communication of artistic invention and the reality effect 
in communication is made transparent and amenable to the senses - as an episode in a battle, as a 
weapon of hatred, and as a gesticulation of despair.230 
The reason that I have reference Foucault in the above paragraphs is that his line of thought bears a 
number of similarities to the thesis advanced in this chapter; moreover, the notion of judgment 
appears in many of his scenes and exemplas precisely because it signals a punctuating point in an on-
going and abstract narrative. The communication of judgments in the context of employment 
occupy a comparable position to that suggested by Foucault in the workings of the prison and 
hospital. Labour can be argued to be an eigen-object generated within the recursivity of the mass 
media. Akin to the judgments denoted by Foucault, judgments occur in the workplace that perform 
a fractured mimesis that is driven by the racial intensity between morals and art: (i) a person of 
Asian ethnicity may be refused a job at a car dealership in a predominately white area because it is 
felt they would not be a good fit for that workplace; (ii) the judgment that the limited representation 
of black people in the work-place makes a single black employee the voice of all black people; (iii) 
the generalized judgment that an individual should conform to racial stereotypes. In such instances, 
the expectations of normality and life in the workplace are punctuated by such judgments that 
create a new phase in the employment context. In each example detailed there is a gap, which 
judgment fills.  
This before and after quality is a central component to Luhmann's theorization of art. The 
detachment of the work from the artist evidences the manner in which the caesura disconnects past 
from future. The individuation of the work of art, which doubles reality for the purpose of observing 
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reality, reflects this distancing from the original author.231 What more, through this individuation an 
imagined world comes into being which pushes the idea of copy-original into irrelevance.232 For it is 
not a repetition of the same, but a repetition of an intangible (read: incommunicable) distinction 
that takes place within the perceptual plane.  
In the section above we have argued that Deleuze's third repetition of the open future can be 
considered to be aesthetic in nature. The structural coupling between morals and art is 
accomplished through the communication of judgment. Through this channel racial intensities serve 
to irritate and perturb, such that a fractured emulation occurs between the relevant social systems. 
A judgment is able to combine two dissonant elements into an equation allowing moral 
communications to be translated into artistic communications. Within Deleuze's philosophy this 
allows the past to return as a different future.  
THE PUBLIC MEDIUM 
 
From the above argument we can conclude that repetition can be understood through a triad of 
temporal syntheses that relate to the eternal return of difference. Repetition need not be defined 
along the standard lines of repeated movement in which the same action is repeated in instance 
one, two, and three. Each singular moment can be connected to a universal plane through a 
repetition of difference. This brings together our concern with perception/communication and the 
self-description universal/singular. We have also surmised that this secret vibration does not need to 
be contained in a tumultuous event - the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the 9/11 attacks. With this we can 
look for less essential and dramatic sources for societal change. Racism need not be related to a 
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spectacular and cataclysmic event, or even a prominent sequence of events. It can be involved in the 
daily sleights in the work-place, and even the everyday decisions to promote and dismiss employees.  
Once this background is understood, a scene of light can be isolated as a confluence upon which 
repetition occurs. It is here that the various systemic references are located (the mass media, 
morality, art) that contribute to racially intensive communications. How can these forms be brought 
together? How can these systemic communications be tied down within a site? We need to find 
another medium to accompany these forms and from which new forms can propagate? That 
medium is the public. This is the successor to the secret vibration. This is the public vibration, the 
public scene of repetition.  
Each synthesis constitutes a fold in the next, as each bends suggestively towards the next synthesis. 
As an image a spiral-shell appears.233 The first synthesis: in order for the present to pass into a past, 
there must be a reference point which is the past. Otherwise, why is the present not the only 
dimension of time? What are the conditions of this contracting each present instant into a habit that 
produces expectations? The second synthesis: in order to maintain a pure past, an archive is 
needed.234 The third synthesis constitutes a caesura that dislocates a past from running into a future. 
The caesura is the ‘image of a unique and tremendous event’ operating as a ‘symbol’, which 
manages to ‘throw time out of joint’.235 Through this luxation the caesura constitutes a sequence of 
repetition that consolidate into a temporal series.  
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Throughout the preceding sections I have been placing certain terms in italics - imagination, 
perception, set apart, close at hand, familiar, secret, poetics, invisible, visible, and artifice. The aim of 
this practice has been to serve as a vehicle for better signposting various abstract affinities 
contained within theoretical works and the development of manners in Western Europe. These are 
meant to serve as indicators of the diachronic and synchronic semantics of discrimination which 
have been highlighted in Chapter 4 and this Chapter. 
I have been italicizing the term secret as a means to more clearly signpost later developments of this 
thesis that take place in this section. Secrecy, Luhmann notes, provided a functional comparator to 
an idea of the public in contemporary society. At first glance this may seem to be contradictory. 
Therefore, when I referenced a secret repetition I have been trying to point towards the notion that 
this repetitive communication takes place in a locus of the public.236 That which is visible/invisible 
intersects with this.237  
The mass media reproduces a public space in which all the internal environments of society can be 
attributed. A public-facing, a front-end, a public profile, a public spokesman, which can be created by 
an organization or safeguarded of a functional sub-system. Communications that are directed 
towards this idea of the public can see that the environment is affecting their system, but the system 
cannot identify or concretise the author. The idea of the public - of the mass - comes in here.  
If the system 'reflects that it is being observed from outside, without it being established how and by 
whom, it conceives itself as observable in the medium of the public'. This often leads to the 
generation of generalisable and publicly defensible points of view. This concept precedes the idea of 
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public opinion and a constitutionalised concept of public life that demands freedom of expression. 
As a social medium it inspires and spurs on the specialisation of second-order observations within 
sub-systems: public opinion within politics, the market within economics, scientific publications 
within science.  It is within this public medium that the racial scene takes hold. This will be examined 
more closely in Chapter 6. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has provided a synchronic description of racism from the perspective of systems theory, 
Deleuzian repetition, and Foucauldian themes. I have argued that the strands of discrimination - 
informativity, moral esteem, and an artistic component - have become locked within their respective 
functionally differentiated social systems. Moreover, the self-description of modern society now 
operates in trying to balance the universal and the singular. The relationship between these social 
systems has been theorized to involve a Deleuzian triad of repetitions providing an anchor through 
which racial intensities irritate and perturb each social system. The world concept identified in 
Chapter 4 - the secret vibration that separated Country and Court, or London Society and the 
provinces - has re-emerged within the public medium of modern society.  In this medium race 
generates communications that are elusive, inconsistent, and above all, involved in making the 
invisible visible for modern society. This will be made clearer in Chapter 6 where a more in-depth 
illustration is presented in terms of the employment context. All of this analysis contributes to re-
describing the social basis for discrimination from a systems theory perspective. The diagrams set 


















Chapters 4 and 5 sought to express the social basis of discrimination from a systems theory 
perspective by a review of the multiple communicative strands and societal narratives that 
anticipated the semantics of discrimination in pre-modern society. The socio-genetics of esteem and 
manners were sketched to accomplish this goal. In Chapter 5 this systems approach was extended 
through reference to what can be described as the archaeological work of Foucault and Deleuze’s 
theory of repetition. The present chapter combines these insights and continues the story of Chapter 
4 by providing an illustration of race and racism in modern society. The strands of discrimination are 
brought to prominence within the idea of Labour and Work such that racial forms of communication 
can be understood.238 This is accomplished through the insertion of Deleuze’s triad of repetitions as 
a holding pattern between divergent social systems. Consequently, racism is explained not as an 
instance of repeated action and thought, or as a way to divide space, but as a repetition in time that 
affects the predominant self-description of modern society in terms of the universal and singular. 
 
SYSTEM FORMATION AND DELEUZIAN REPETITION 
What are the eigen-objects which circulate in the mass media? What folds are formed through the 
programmatic streams of news, advertisement, and entertainment?  Since we are concerned with 
eigen-behaviours the worlds upon which we can focus our efforts are not particular advertisements 
or specific entertainment shows, but rather the formal operative conditions which are consolidated 
through the continuous repetition of these processes.  
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Certainly, there are many entertainment shows which offer an opportunity to observe on the core of 
race through trading in racial stereotypes, or by offering a more general commentary on racial 
themes; however, what we are seeking to grasp is (i) the objects that constitute a memory for 
society situated within a public world anticipated and relied upon by other sub-systems, and (ii) that 
these objects must establish a 'living present' through which habitual contractions occur establishing 
a particular past and a general future. These contracted states must give the feeling of movement to 
the present from the past and towards the future. This notion of the 'living present' corresponds to 
Deleuze's first synthesis of time. I will attempt to situate this first synthesis as operating in 
accordance with Luhmann's argument for the production of eigen-objects within the mass media. 
The most profitable departure point would be to proceed from the notion of life and bio-power; not 
least because Foucault (1970: 250 ff.), I would submit, offers the figures of life, grammar, and labour 
as eigen-behaviours produced through the self-application of the biological, linguistic, and economic 
discourses of the 17th and 18th centuries. Furthermore, Foucault's interest in bio-power offers a 
fertile field with similar concerns to our project. Broadly stated, modern power operates between 
two polarities - the anatomy of the body and the life of the population - and thus stretches between 
the utmost singular and the utmost universal. For example, for a notion such as life, or some 
comparable entity, to operate, it must bring together the practice of repetition, the universal-
specific distinction prevalent in societal self-description, eigen-objects, and the mass media.239 My 
argument is that these objects, as with life, form an integral part of the communication of race in 
modern society. In this chapter we will focus on Labour. 
Each programmatic stream of the mass media doubles the world and by virtue of this gesture 
provides a platform for the observation of reality – from distinctions between the real and ideal, 
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 Life is described within natural history in terms which are increasingly similar to eigen-behaviours i.e. as the 
repeated re-channelling of a system's outputs to its inputs within the same transformative process: 'Organic 
structure is becoming an abstract being . . . capable of assuming numerous forms' (Foucault, 1970: 263 quoting 
Saint-Hilaire).      
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mundane and fantastical, latent and manifest. This doubling distinction carves out a sphere in which 
a present moment generates past and future dimensions whilst initiating a movement from a 
particular past to a general future. For Deleuze this would be phrased as the contraction of 
differential variations that integrate various intensities- such as, to give a naturalistic analogy, all the 
cycles that contract to synthesize the becoming of a pebble lying on a beach - tide, moisture, air. The 
life or 'contemplative soul' of the pebble absorbs past variations and draws expectations of future 
variations.  
Returning to Luhmann's nomenclature, in the mass media these duplications bracket time in a 
similar fashion. There is a beginning and an end to each world that is both signaled to the viewer and 
articulated within the terminology of a narrative. The meaningfulness of topics is organized in 
accordance with and within the internal walls of the world. The maintenance of such momentary 
individuations operates in a similar fashion to events in interaction systems. For it is in a 
conversation, meeting, or party, that meaningful communications are bracketed by the 
requirements of this momentary system which begins and ends, often without leaving a lasting 
trace. For example: the meeting is opened, the chair convenes, first speaker, second speaker, 
refreshments, cross-discussion, and so on, concluding remarks, the meeting is closed. Steps and 
strategies within a game are marshaled with a view to the beginning and end of the interaction. It is 
from the million-fold iterations of such programmes that a public world can emerge. 
The broadcasting of news operates in cycles in which a narrative runs telling a story by conveying 
information for an imagined audience. Such cycles run in sync (not in terms of synchronicity, but as 
another contraction between a news-cycle and an audience cycle) with the inception and 
termination of an audience's imagined attention-span and life-style.240 Advertisements grab a 
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 Note that one's attention-span and lifestyle are the culmination of habits i.e. contractions and repetitions of 
the Deleuzian first synthesis. A person's attention only lasts so long until it moves on - I scan a page for 
meaning, I am distracted by the internet, I hear a door slam. In each instance, my attention-span begins and 
ends, and then repeats the motion. In terms of life-style, 24/7 news 'co-ordinates' with a 24/7 life-style. 
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person's interest, entice a viewer to cross the threshold into a fictional landscape through the 
assertion of captivating forms, and delay meaningful resolution so that 'understanding' only comes 
about through the engagement of the viewer. Entertainment communicates time-signals so that the 
audience is given a sign that the fictional world is beginning and ending (opening credits to a film, 
'once upon a time', epilogue) and events are meaningful within the narrative arc of the film 
(characters, relationships, plots, hero-villain).  
It is not the content of such worlds which is of interest, but rather the formal conditions for their 
generation. How do these bubbles rise to the surface so that other sub-systems can consider them 
as a public environment? How exactly does this public world-environment establish a common 
present to be presumed by other societal sub-systems and what eigen-objects does it present as 
indicative of this common present? To consider this question we must return to Deleuze. In 
explaining repetition, he suggests that imagination holds together two discrete instances so that 
repetition can occur. This is not imagination in a psychological sense, but as a notion far closer to 
Luhmann's references to how paradoxes are often unfolded through imaginative resolutions. In fact, 
Deleuze discards imagination for the term 'contemplative soul' which is more in tune with his almost 
vitalist metaphysics. It is a figure such as a soul, in the sense noted above, that operates as an eigen-
behaviour. It denotes a construction that combines dynamic and static qualities produced through 
repetitive contractions. Other figures which perform in a similar fashion are the Hegelian concept of 
Spirit, History, Life, Grammar, and Labour.241 All of these exhibit features of eigen-behaviour in which 
they appear to operate as system-limited control mechanisms that offer guidance to a system. 
The effect of moral communications on mass media communications replicates the relationship that 
exists between the pure past and the living present. The aggregated syntheses of the living present 
fall away through becoming excessive or saturated. They pass on. The morality of the pure past 
allows this to take place. We know that moral communications structurally couple with the mass 
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 Luhmann (2000a: 10) refers to the Hegelian notion of Spirit as a 'circum-locution of communication'. 
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media through the disruptive influence of scandals and the like. The question is how the artificial, 
synthetic, and public quality of communications is dissolved by the impact of morally coded 
communications? How do communications that re-programme the moral code dislocate trends, 
moods, and climates. They do so through influence exercised via a structural coupling between 
morality and the mass media in the forms of - scandal, infamy, public embarrassment, depreciation, 
controversy, cause célèbre, delinquency, deviation, vilification, corruption, debasement, 
opprobrium; and their opposite - commendation, appreciation, approval, acclaim, honour, 
sensibility, etc.  
These forms advance the notion of the synthetic and the artificial. In broad strokes, the constitution 
of communication becomes a topic of communication such that a concern arises around the 
synthetic and prosthetic qualities of the voice, image, and text. Communication is being constituted 
through observing how informative utterances are understood. The public aspect of communication 
is this notion of artificiality. What is the public except an acknowledgement of mediation and a 
generalized media apparatus? Within the public space diverse interests overlap and are then 
successfully mediated. Historically, this public space appears with the arrival of tele-technology. Such 
a change creates, for communication, a situation in which recipients are far more passive. Mass-
copying technologies disconnect the active and passive modes of communication. Prior to such 
inventions as the printing press, the fact one could read probably indicated that one could also 
write. One could both listen and speak. However, the formalization and technicalization of 
dissemination technologies separates these modes. This disconnection is further exacerbated from 
the 19th century onwards in which increasingly the passive and active modes of communication 
become specialized and centralized. The fact that we can receive a communication via television, 
radio, or the internet does not require any knowledge of its production or the ability to 
communicate in return. Consequently, there arises a common suspicion that actuality is actively 
constructed.  The reality on offer is produced via a pre-selection, filtering, and pre-ordering. 
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Actuality is grasped only in a partial fashion through a mediation. Actuality is thus, ‘actually’ 
observed through the framework of the fictional, virtual, fantastical landscape. 
These synthetic, mediated communications need to be comprehended by reference to transparency. 
They need to be de-coded, de-ciphered, and de-programmed. And yet we must remember that if 
something is made transparent then other items are, in consequences, made more opaque. One’s 
frame of reference telescopes and in the same gesture other subjects of interest lose focus and 
become de-framed. Accordingly, the production of both transparency and opacity emerges in the 
same action. De-ciphering communications communicate in turn through reliance on an artificial and 
synthetic quality. Public communications recursively connect to other public communications. 
It is within the contradictory and artificial aspect of these communications that race is configured. 
Significantly, as I stated at the beginning of Chapter 4, and as realized by both James Baldwin and 
Margaret Mead, race demands to be both ignored and recognized, appreciated and disavowed.  
 
COMMUNICATIVE THEMES: LABOUR AND WORK 
 
In terms of labour and work what signals a doubling of our view on the world? A novel manages this 
through a phrase such as 'once upon a time'. From then on the observer knows that the world has 
been split into the actual and the fantastical. The reality of the world in which we live is exposed by 
the novel. The text provides this viewpoint for such a second-order observation. We are concerned, 
however, with a wider occurrence in the mass media, particularly how trends, fashions, and 
normalities are exposed within the broad context of work and labour. What allows us to realize that 
there are normal or expected ways of working? It is the influence of the abstract conception of the 
world via the public medium that allows these second-order observations to take place. In the same 
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manner that silence punctuates words and throws them into various degrees of focus, the public 
medium indicates a common present available to all systems. Through consideration of commonality 
we can see how overlapping concerns have been already negotiated, or how there is a presumed set 
of expectations that underpin our navigation of social relations. Forms are extracted from this 
medium which allow an observation on reality and as such normality can be conceptualized, or the 
presumptions and interests that underpin our world can be thrown into view.  
In the work-place, generated within the concatenations of the mass media, this doubling occurs in 
many situations such that a 'reality' is revealed and an observational position on this 'reality' is 
constructed.242 Expectations are negotiated in the work place.243 The consensuality of relationships is 
also an issue: average rates of pay are revealed; an employment decision needs to be made to 
employ or promote. From here, a consideration of presumed expectations arises and the question is 
posed: what is acceptable? It is in the revelation of this normality and the articulation of formerly 
unarticulated expectations that certain visibilities arise. For example - the differences of 
informativity relevant to the workplace can include the following: formal/informal, 
charisma/seduction, teamwork/jocular, company emails/gossip, confident/aggressive. 
These examples cannot be easily classified. It is not the case that one side of the distinction 
represents formality, and the other side informality. It can be a formal requirement that one is 
assertive or aggressive (in sales, in requesting a promotion), and being labeled confident may be an 
informal estimation. Additionally, being unable to appear relaxed or attend informal events can be 
an impediment in the workplace. These are not classifications that map onto racial and ethnic 
distinctions. Being charismatic or indulging in gossip are not reliable grounds for differentiating on 
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 Notions of work, employment, and labour are constructed in the mass media. However, as eigen-objects, I 
am extending their meaning from that intended by Luhmann. I refer to a public medium which is a far more 
discursive space than Luhmann seems to envisage. His examinations of the mass media are more directed to 
the communications that are generated through institutions at the centre of that system. 
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 Their negotiated quality indicates a mediated quality, which is indicative of how I have described the public 
medium above.  
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the basis of race, or any other characteristic for that matter. It is however the impact of moral 
communications in the allocation of esteem and value that grants one side greater prominence and 
reduces the other side of the distinction to a lesser prominence. Prominence can be either negative 
or positive: good/bad, respectful/disrespectful. The force of race is the differential that translates 
across these systems as an intensity tightening and loosening distinctions, granting prominence and 
depreciating certain states of the system. Race is one differential that regulates the irritations 
between morals and the employment context. Since it is a pure and virtual difference it operates as 
a distinguishing force between the distinctions noted above. It channels the impact of moral 
estimations to cause the passing present of normality to break-down. Unlike the history of manners 
and courtesy moral esteem cannot be allocated on the basis of copying actions, for example: acting 
with honour or being chivalrous. Emulation is fractured in time and occurs as the irritability between 
systems.  
Race is often the hidden distinction that is the difference between such distinctions in the work-
place. It attracts moral appreciation to such other distinctions, in that whether a person is 
considered confident or aggressive may come down to race as the unspoken factor. Whether a 
person is doing the right thing at work or going about the task in the right way is distinguished on 
the basis of race. Whether one is respectful or disrespectful by gossiping, or making a joke, may be a 
distinction motivated by race as the hidden factor. Whether one is charismatic or sleazy, doing well 
or doing worse, laid-back or lazy are all distinctions which can be intensified by race.244  
This is why racism is so elusive. It operates as an intensity between social systems. It can only be 
observed through a semantics of revelation in which it is revealed or exposed. The invisible is made 
visible. It does so through world and public lines which delineate the work-place. In a similar manner 
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as to how the doctrine of manners bisected the Court from the Country and High Society from the 
masses, identities like race secretly beat within the eigen-objects of modern society. 245 
Observations on race that conceptualize anti-racism and racism also operate through revelation and 
exposé: average pay rates are revealed, the institutional racism of the police force is exposed, the 
unconscious racism of the employer is highlighted, 'stop and search' tactics are uncovered as a 
potential hidden punishment for black youths, neutral conditions of employment are unveiled to 
have a disproportionate impact on certain racial and ethnic groups, security assessments turn out to 
involve racial profiling. And conversely racism is communicated through visibilization: the 
uncommunicated assumption is communicated that a Muslim woman will stop working after she has 
a child, saying what the silent majority is really thinking;246 anti-Semitic conspiracies  unveil the 
exercise of power from a distance;247 the description of black criminals as displaying a savagery 
incommunicable in the modern world; monitoring black youths instead of white youths because in 
reality their future actions (unknown as yet) are likely to be criminal. 
Turning back to the employment context. How does this moral estimation of employment transform 
into an artistic judgment? If we recall that an artistic judgment provides a structural coupling 
between morals and art then race can also intensify such a relationship. An artistic judgment must 
produce a caesura between the before and after, a revelatory and epiphantic moment in the life-
cycle, a disconnection between the old normal and the new normal. Luhmann's vision of art 
registers these qualities in the combination of recognition and astonishment, the derivative and the 
                                                                
245
 Luhmann is not unaware of this modern predicament. When discussing sociology in modern society, he 
notes a similar phenomenon. For, after all, if everything we know about the world comes from the mass media 
then the eigen-objects it produces must create the grounds for the visible and invisible: 'Precisely this highly 
modern mixture of knowledge and agitation supports our thesis of double invisibilization. In the unmarked 
space of what can be described only with fictitious “scenarios” and in terms of interest- driven assumptions 
about probabilities and improbabilities, a description of society establishes itself that reacts with self-
invisibilization' (Luhmann, 2013: 325). 
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 For example, the recent comments of Donald Trump in questioning whether it is a good immigration policy 
to allow immigrants from 'shit-hole' countries is justified by other commentators as suggesting that this is 
what we are all really thinking.  
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 The appraisal of George Soros' educational enterprises often take this form.  
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innovative, that which it fits and does not fit. We have already touched upon employment situations 
which encounter these characteristics. Employment decisions often involve a jump between what is 
known about a candidate from their CV and interview into what is unknown i.e. their future 
performance, or where a person's expertise at work may be recognized and rewarded by a 
preferential decision. Such judgments can construct a new living history for the employee populated 
by achievements or dismissals, failures and successes, sleights and moments of ingenuity. Many of 
the observations made by racists and anti-racists, illustrated above, are likely to obey this 
judgmental structure.   
A situation noted above, also follows this judgmental structure. This situation involves moments of 
revelation in which the jolting observation of race re-patterns the dimensions of meaning available 
to communications: their historicality, former and future correspondence, the allocation of social 
roles in which we find ourselves, facts of importance and insignificance. For example, we meet a 
person to whom we have always communicated by email. In person it turns out that they are black. 
We realize that there is an unarticulated assumption that presupposed them to be white. So how 
should we act now and how does this innovate the history of our relationship?248 Alternatively, 
perhaps we have only ever been with a colleague in formal surroundings. But then we interact with 
them in informal surroundings - share a joke, have lunch, grab a drink - and the hidden intensity of 
race recasts the situation anew. Was that joke actually racist? Should I act differently because 
her/his skin colour and nationality makes her/him stand out in a crowd?  
The re-emergence of these artistic combinations into normality and a common present is 
accomplished through the structural coupling of art and the mass media, namely through the 
processes of mainstreaming, of appropriation, of de-radicalization. In the mediated world of work 
this involves the re-institutionalization of normality. This occurs through an eternal return of 
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our knowledge or cognition.  
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difference contained within the intensity of communications about race. This engages a fractured 
emulation between social systems. Unlike courtesy and civility it involves the emulation in time and 
not the emulation of esteemable behaviour. Through all these systematic encounters and 
transformations it is the figure of race that moves as a differential between these systems. 
 
DESTINY AND FREEDOM 
 
Luhmann's theory of society, and in particular his description of morals, precludes an easy finding 
that discrimination can be explained in terms of autonomy, equality, or deliberative freedom.249 The 
complexity and elusiveness of discrimination is not easily contained within a set of prescriptive 
elements; moreover, the complex interplay between social systems does not accord moral values a 
central position. Deleuze, however, offers a possible reprieve. 
Destiny and freedom involve the relationship between the pure past and passing present. I have 
argued that these syntheses can be placed within moral communications and mass mediated 
communications, respectively. The contraction which surfaces on the public screen of the mass 
media is one in which the common present is the most contracted state of the successive, 
independent elements from which it is drawn; for morality the present is the most contracted 
degree of an entire past which coexists as a totality.  
Labour as an eigen-value is the most contracted state of all the rituals of employment and the 
workplace. Destiny is the sense in which each instance of work plays out the same idea of Labour; 
each working moment whistles the same tune. Destiny is not deterministic but is the manner in 
which 'non-localisable connections, actions at a distance, systems of reply ... transcend spatial 
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locations and temporal successions.' (Deleuze, 1994: 105) The emergence of an eigen-object is the 
line which each interactive event invisibly threads into a common and public present available for all.  
It is the same tune even if each moment is comprised of a different intensity, programmatic 
informativity, and irritable context. Destiny is therefore the complex relationship between all the 
information that is mediated in the workplace and the eigen-object of labour, produced through the 
recursive linking of such communications to like-minded communications. 
Freedom lies in choosing the levels for a focus on the basis of a past which was never present i.e. 
choosing the instance that re-writes its own history and offers its own chronology through irritation 
by a moral allocation of appreciation or respect. One moment may play another moment at a 
different level because of the variable differential intensities that thread them together. These 
histories, for Deleuze, are constructed with references to orders of similitude - succession, 
simultaneity, contiguity, causality, resemblance and opposition. Freedom resides in re-writing the 
history and chronology of the workplace. We can see how this is pursued by equality-focused 
scholarship when the world of work is re-told from a feminist perspective; however, in practice this 
freedom to choose is constrained by race because it is such an unacknowledged influence that 
conditions histories and time-lines, success and failures that move towards producing the idea of 
Labour and the workplace.      
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have presented an illustration of the social basis for discrimination. I have focused 
on the impact of race in the field of employment. Out of necessity this has taken place at an abstract 
level. In Chapter 5 I made the case that Deleuze's triadic form of repetition could provide a crux 
connecting the social systems of the mass media, morality, and art. The public medium vibrates in 
the space between these systems with race operating to channel the irritability between such 
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systems and contribute towards the continuing reproduction of eigen-objects such as Labour. This 
chapter contributes to providing a re-description of the social basis for discrimination which has not 
been adequately acknowledged in current scholarship. To articulate this social basis is a central aim 
of this thesis.  
Over the first half of this thesis I have attempted to re-describe discrimination via the prism of race. 
This focus was chosen for reasons of economy. At the inception of Chapter 4 a discussion between 
James Baldwin and Margaret Mead was quoted in order to highlight the elusive and indelible aspects 
of race. It is the intention of this thesis to suggest that this elusive indelibility, and the same 
framework constructed in Chapters 4-6, may be equally applicable to gender. These diachronic and 
synchronic descriptions of discrimination are meant to indicate a re-description that is not confined 
to race, gender, or any other such 'identities'. The formal structures and evolutionary dynamics - 
self-description, societal/interaction, society/world, complex repetition, and so forth -  supporting 
these analyses form the constitutive communicative context in which such figurations, like race, are 
unveiled and occluded as intensities. I have taken great pains not to refer to race and gender in 
terms of identity. Firstly, because any systems theory use of the term would be very different than 
that supposed by a more conventional philosophical position underpinning the literature surveyed in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. Secondly, the framework deployed in the preceding chapters attempts to 
grasp the inconsistent, elusive, and paradoxical qualities of racially infused communications and 
communications about race. As a consequence, relying on identity as a basal concept might be 
misleading. For it might encourage the reader to suppose that once the destination has been 
reached then, following Wittgenstein's advice, we can discard the ladder that has assisted our 
journey. This is not the case. In fact, race and discrimination may very well be an epiphenomenon of 
publicly mediated communications that make visible a complex infinity of irritations. Gender, 
therefore, could have formed the main focus of analysis in the first half of this thesis and as such 
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when we turn in the upcoming chapters to discuss unequal pay and sex discrimination we remain 
dedicated to responding to the same object of study.   
On a broader level we can see how the public transmission of discrimination is a very complex 
problem for the law to address. There are no easy solutions. Furthermore, we should not lightly 
dismiss the suspicion that while the law may seek to eradicate discrimination it may be entangled in 
its revelatory structure set out in the preceding chapters.  How can the law address that which is 
becoming visible and opaque through the mediated communication of scandal and moral 
appreciation? How can the law address the aesthetic judgment and re-normalization which plays a 
role in this fractured cycle? How does the law impact on this confluence, particularly when having 
the law on one's side may be indicative of respect and esteem? Does the background projection of 
legal norms contribute to the scandalization of normality? These are all profound, complex, and, 
perhaps, intractable questions. They are beyond the scope of this thesis to address adequately; 
however, I would hope that some of the points raised above can contribute to its comprehension.  
A broader conception of law, hinted at in Chapter 4's survey of manners and courtesy, involves 
understanding anti-discrimination law as a modern emanation of a certain type of social regulation 
concerned with delimiting the boundaries of esteem and respect. This reorientation would move the 
discipline away from the internal legal picture that associates the field with employment law. Anti-
discrimination law could then be aligned with a long tradition in which a person's reputation and 
social status are protected by the law with reference to communicative limitations. For example, 
Nicola Lacey (2008) has argued that the English criminal law of the 19th century was primarily 
focused on identifying bad character and protecting reputation. Re-describing anti-discrimination 
law within these optics may provide a more revealing and accurate understanding of the law. 
In the second half of this thesis  we turn to consider the distinctly legal constructions of anti-
discrimination with a focus on argumentation and decision. The recursive limitations of both 
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argument and decision are not guided at a constitutive level by the choice of a characteristic – 
whether it be gender, race, disability, or any other. The analysis in these forthcoming chapters on 
corrective/distributive justice, the concept/interest dynamic, and the limitative principle of equality 
need not be solely focused on race. As such the operative limitations of anti-discrimination law can 
be outlined by reference to a whole plethora of cases normally caught under the umbrella of anti-
discrimination. Therefore, we are able to make use of cases concerned with equal pay and sex 

















CHAPTER 7 – LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: EXPLANATION AND APPLICATION TO JUSTICE 
 
'Arguments cannot achieve what they do not cause ... : to alter the symbol of validity of law.' 




This chapter engages the research question by outlining the operative limitations on the production 
of legal arguments. It aims to re-describe the restrictions on a claim for direct and indirect 
discrimination whereby less emphasis is placed on the statutory framework while more emphasis is 
placed on how finding discrimination involves the pursuit of reasons which can allow and preclude 
differences of opinion. To this end, Luhmann's theory of argumentation is set out and then deployed 
to enhance the discussion of which form of justice best encapsulates direct and indirect 
discrimination. Following this, Luhmann's theory of argumentation will be applied to a development 
in equal pay law to illustrate the operative limitations on discrimination claims by, in particular, 
emphasizing the redundancy and variety components of legal argumentation.  
A great deal of scholarship has been expended on how anti-discrimination law can be justified. This 
question of justification is approached from a range of perspectives - moral philosophy, liberal 
political philosophy, academic excursions that seek to rationalize the law, or jurisprudential 
approaches which strive to understand the grounds of rationality for each sub-division of anti-
discrimination law. Often the most difficult aspect of surveying such scholarship is disentangling 
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each strand in order to come to understand what precisely is being proposed.250 Systems theory 
offers an austere approach to this question because of its focuse on the recursive limitations of legal 
argument. As a consequence, enquiries that seek to establish the morality of discrimination (for 
example, how is it wrong?) and anti-discrimination law (does the present law correct the wrong?) 
are sidelined; so too are approaches which consider whether and how the law can legitimately be 
used, in a free and liberal society, to eliminate forms of discrimination and, for example, promote 
affirmative action. Instead, our enquiry into the justifications for anti-discrimination law focuses on 
the recursive limits of legal argumentation in order to demonstrate how arguments arrange 
themselves into clusters and, further, how the argumentative arrangements can provide a vision of 
justice internal to the legal system.   
Our first port of call will be to explain Luhmann's theory of legal argumentation. Special emphasis 
will be placed on how such arguments and justifications relate to decisions. The meaning of legal 
decisions for anti-discrimination law is explored in Chapters 9 and 10 of this thesis. This chapter 
forms a complement to such analysis in order to construct a rounded view of anti-discrimination law 
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 John Gardner (1996: 364-5) makes a number of pointed remarks as to this tendency in the work of others 
such as Morris (1995), but also in his own earlier writing on this area: Gardner (1989). Systems theory, for all 
its infelicities, offers a reprieve in this respect because of its absolute insistence on the operative closure of the 
legal system. In fact, as I will discuss below, the tendency for perspectives upon the law and for headings 
within the law to become fuzzy may be indicative of how argumentation is recursively established in the 
context of anti-discrimination law. 
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LUHMANN’S THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 
Argumentation, deliberation, and the generation of reasons for action forms a necessary prelude to 
a legally valid decision. In this respect, Luhmann intends to differentiate legal argument from legal 
reasoning because the former is constructed with a view to the making of a decision.251 To think and 
communicate like a lawyer – reasoning from precedent, for example – does not compel a participant 
to prepare the grounds for a decision. Legal argument however does. Although operatively distinct 
from the validity of a decision, argument is still preconditioned by the execution of such decisions. 
Texts recognized by the legal system allow a structural coupling between argumentation and valid 
decisions that is internal to this sub-system.252  
Argumentation involves enquiring 'how the text can be handled in communication' (Luhmann, 2004: 
307). A participant observes how they themselves observe the text and how others observe the text. 
From this position, second-order observations are generated such that the textual implication of a 
valid decision is interpreted through a vast panoply of argumentative topoi. The distinctive 
application of the legal code made by the legal decision is brought to life by its text for the benefit of 
potential argument. The clarity of a legal decision is put to the question by communications that 
offer confirmation, interpretation, disputation, contestation, and so many other argumentative 
topoi. The clarity of a decision may, for example, be deemed doubtful. Justifications are attached to 
it and then advanced, potentially placing a decision in a different light. The differing interpretations 
offered, however, must move towards – one might say, gravitate to - the making of a further valid 
decision.253 Even if the participant agrees with the decision, they still need to observe that decision 
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 For an examination of how Luhmann's theory of legal argumentation can be understood by reference to 
more general jurisprudence, and especially to Ronald Dworkin’s jurisprudence, consider Nobles and Schiff 
(2017). 
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 'Unlike statutes or valid judicial decisions or contracts or wills, arguments cannot change the law, or 
implement new rights or duties and thereby create conditions, which in turn can be changed.' (Luhmann, 
2004: 305) 
253
 The admonishment of an advocate by a judge to get to the point indicates one way in which argument must 
construct itself with a view to producing a position and an alternative decision. The practices of distinguishing 
ratio decidendi and obiter dicta also provide an in-built mechanism in which argument both finds a decision 
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and present reasons for agreeing or not with it. Although it is true that this will not need to be 
communicated until another decision is on the horizon: such as in an appeal, or a further case.254 
Theorizing argumentation involves evaluating the 'arguments in relation to their persuasive powers 
in the process of communication and in relation to their impact on communication' (Luhmann, 2004: 
307). The justifications for discrimination law can be outlined from this angle. In doing so, I stress 
that this is not from the perspectives of moral philosophy and political legitimacy, or with a view 
concerning legal coherence, but from a quasi-empirical perspective in which we can reflect upon 
how argumentative justifications orient themselves to key junctures by way of recursion. What are 
the good and bad reasons, the better and worse reasons for interpreting a text in a particular 
fashion? The gravitational pull that attracts reasons to cluster together occurs on the terms of the 
internal limits of legal argument and its relationship to a decision.255 These will be outlined below.  
Legal argumentation feeds off the variety of cases enabling an 'elaboration of differences in each 
specific case' (Luhmann, 2004: 311).256 Argument must be able to offer 'seemingly compelling 
reasons for decisions' that can be repeatedly used - such as the general terms of liability, offence, 
defence, fault, contract, fiduciary, etc. - to elaborate differences in the case at hand by relying on a 
'recursive web of ancillary considerations at their inception' (Luhmann, 2004: 313).257 These reasons 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
and anticipates a further decision, particularly important for the common law in which the doctrines under 
deliberation are stretched throughout a profundity of texts and not collected together as they are under, for 
example, a civil code. 
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 To agree with a decision still requires an observation on the application of the code, for example that this 
decision is correct because it conforms with a long-established doctrine, or interpretive practice. 
255
 Plainly this account differs from Dworkin’s theory of interpretation. The development of legal doctrine does 
not proceed by ensuring that good reasons be replaced by better reasons with the latter providing a superior 
fit with other legally accepted propositions, than the former. The invisible hand of political-morality is not 
exerting a gravitational pull on legal interpretation to pull good reasons to better to best reasons. Nobles and 
Schiff (2017: 75 ff.) provide a productive comparison of Dworkin’s and Luhmann’s theory. Furthermore, unlike 
Hart’s approach, the meaning of a rule is not defined by reference to the invisible hand of socio-linguistic 
convention. 
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 In contrast, legal decision-making forges a unity from a variety of cases such that the differences between 
cases are made to stand out as the background to a decision. See Chapter 9 and 10 for an explanation and 
illustration of this phenomenon. 
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 Such general terms are great reservoirs for academic commentary. In reality, their multi-faceted nature 
may be indicative of their actual significance for the legal system. The inability to pin-down an exact meaning 
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for seeing a text in a particular way allow argument to move de parte de partem whereby there is no 
need for an inductive unification by reference to a defining principle or a general norm. 
Consequently, the generation of legal arguments and justifications for discrimination law do not in a 
unified way reside in a straightforward principle of non-discrimination or in norm of equality.258 Not 
if we give credence to the internal restraints of law. Terms such as defence and fault serve to 
connect reasons that elaborate differences; they are not discrete components of a formula for 
corrective or distributive justice. To understand better the functioning of discrimination law in 
respect of legal argument requires an examination of the reasons, terminology, and exemplifications 
that predominate this branch of law. Before this can take place, however, a few more key 
characteristics of Luhmann’s theory of argumentation must be spelt out. 
Legal argumentation is generated through a reaction to 'past and/or anticipated differences of 
opinion about the attribution of the code values legal and illegal' (Luhmann, 2004: 315). It can only 
work through the recognition of different perspectives on the execution of valid legal decisions. If an 
adopted topic of argument fails to elaborate differences in each case then it is unlikely to be 
retained for long. Argument proceeds on a generative platform of divergent perspectives and 
contestation. For example, it is not a persuasive argument simply to make a declaration of law, or 
give a pure reading of a text, until a reason is communicated for such assertions. As such one must 
make a declaration of law with reference to precedent or the status of the court, and one must 
justify a pure reading by reference to a literal doctrine of interpretation, or upon the looser notions 
of the ordinary meaning of words and the general approach of the court in such cases. How is the 
text (that stands in for a decision) to be understood? We interpret the text in its ‘ordinary meaning’. 
The notion of ordinary - the practice of the interpreter, court, linguistic usage - elaborates the 
differences that are available in the text by, for example, separating out clauses and distinguishing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
of liability, fault, or contract is indicative of the great internal complexity of these concepts.  They enable the 
‘elaboration of differences in each specific case’ and in the form of arguments prepare the ground for a 
decision to be made.   
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 In Chapter 8 of this thesis, I have outlined the argumentative fall-out for when this does occur. 
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the ordinary meaning from specialist or over-extended interpretations. At the same time this 
elaboration must work towards a future decision by asking, for example: what are the consequences 
of applying this line of reasoning? Alternatively, arguments can be presented in such a fashion that 
there are central aspects and more peripheral concerns. As should be clear, none of this coincides 
with how doctrine or claims for anti-discrimination are normally analyzed. 
There are deeper formations to argumentation generated through the recursivity of 
communications. This can be labeled as redundancy and variety. At a formal level these structures 
foreclose the variability and invariability of connections between communications. Argumentative 
components such as reasons, rules, principles, and other general terms operate through reliance on 
various degrees and combinations of redundancy and variety. Redundancies establish indifference. 
They enable a focus which can channel relevant information and disregard irrelevant information. A 
practical example would be the manner in which the road network delimits the possibilities for 
driving. It is true that we cannot always drive anywhere by the most direct route, but by using the 
road network we avoid many impediments that would occur if it was not available. We can plan 
ahead with a clear view as to how the journey will progress. We can assume that others also use the 
network and follow the same customs – driving on the left, stopping at red lights, not driving across 
fields, etc.  
Variety is the ‘number and the diversity of the operations which a system can identify as its own’ 
(Luhmann, 2004: 35). It signifies the number and range of possible selections which can be made by 
argumentation. As a structure it is does not have the capacity to establish consistency which is 
within the remit of redundancy. Open-textured terms and principles of law maintain a higher degree 
of variety than other argumentative topoi. Maxims in equity for example can be cited repeatedly, 
not only historically but also in the modern era, over a whole range of instances. In terms of anti-
discrimination law, the presence of a protected characteristic (race, gender) is highly variable across 
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different contexts. Within systems theory redundancy and variety are the highly technical concepts 
developed to understand the relevant recursive communications. To grasp their significance for legal 
argumentation we need to translate their concerns into the generative conditions of legal argument.  
‘Reasons produce differences and refer to themselves by what they exclude’ (Luhmann, 2004: 327). 
Reasons combine levels of redundancy and variety in order to elaborate differences in each case and 
to prepare the ground for a future decision. Although general terms such as liability may not always 
be invoked explicitly, that does not mean that there are not common practices in play which 
circumscribe and vitalize the connection of argumentative communication to communication. We 
know that reasoning towards a decision is taking place if (i) differences are indexed in an item or 
case, and (ii) if the recognition of this practice is revealed by considering what was excluded from 
consideration. Reasons are not ‘points of view which can be defined simply. They are complex 
processes of thought, which justify both the inclusive and exclusive effects that they have’ 
(Luhmann, 2004: 328). Principles follow the same route such that the operation of the principle can 
be understood by its exclusive effects rather than by reference to a definition of the principle’s form. 
Reasons couple with the exclusive effect of the principle's redundancy to produce a greater variety 
of possible connections.  
As such when a legal issue (point of law, consideration of fact, etc.) arises it must be presented as 
potentially decidable with good reasons presented as consistent with valid law. Argumentation 
appears as ‘cluster formations around certain texts, but without any hierarchies and without 
teleology’ (Luhmann, 2004: 333).  Reasons are sequences of argumentation condensed into 
perspectives for decision-making in the process of their reuse, or in anticipation of their reuse. 
Argumentation justifies itself by reference to the different consequences and outcomes (for a 
decision) which would arise if different perspectives were followed (different rules and reasons 
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applied). Reference must be made to system-internal and system-external consequences – for 
conceptual and notional outcomes, and for interests.  
Luhmann however also identifies more refined structural formations with reference to concepts and 
interests. Concepts enable access to already proven distinctions and organize the generation of new 
distinctions at this level: a difference between contesting or interpreting a contract has internal 
consequences in respect of further distinctions such as intent and negligence, possession and 
property, etc. The perspectives one can have on the terms of a statute are delimited by 
compounded information held together in especially legal concepts and notions. Identifying such 
notions in argument, however, depends on an observation that a familiar understanding of this 
concept or notion is not quite correct and that a better one can be found.  
The protection of interests ‘refers to catalysts for the self-organization of references to the relevant 
environment’ (Luhmann, 2004: 347). More generally it is involved with managing law’s responsivity 
to the changing states in its environment; to do this it has recourse to substantive argumentation. 
Concepts are directed at the refinement of the quaestio juris and the limitation of analogical 
reasoning. The appearance of interests, however, comes about through formulating the difference 
between legally protected and legally unprotected interest – thus, in acknowledging the interests of 
the accused or the victim, possibilities for seeing the interests are made available (Luhmann 2004: 
248). Consideration of the interests of defendants provide scope for consideration of the interests of 
claimants. This theoretical distinction between concepts and interests will be further considered in 






JUSTICE AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 
 
Unsurprisingly anti-discrimination law is concerned with justice. Not least because this branch of law 
understands itself as genuinely transformative of social relations and as such finds itself working in a 
highly political and morally volatile field. Anti-discrimination law bears the responsibility to explain 
why discrimination is wrong and why the legal framework to address this problem rights this wrong. 
The great schisms of jurisprudence cannot compete with the environment in which anti-
discrimination law finds itself. Discrimination and anti-discrimination are objects of fascination for 
the political and moral arenas, and the mass media, and are frequent pivots in the according of 
esteem and disrespect in all the many quotidian areas of life to which a person finds themselves in 
attendance – at work, on the street, in the home, and between friends. Consequently, articulating 
the normative foundations of discrimination law is more than just a legitimate academic exercise; it 
is a necessity. 
This investigation can take place at different analytical levels. The path taken in this section will be to 
analyze how scholars have comprehended the law by reference to forms of justice. The level of 
analysis in this section will consider justice as it pertains to legal argumentation.  
This section is concerned with some of the classifications of justice proposed in anti-discrimination 
scholarship. These classifications model a discrimination claim by reference to Aristotelian 
conceptions of corrective justice and distributive justice. Evidently other formulations of justice are 
available, such as that developed by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin; however, these Aristotelian 
models seem to have attracted academic interest for three reasons: (i) the distinction between the 
models corresponds to a type of justice directed both at individual parties and at social groups; (ii) 
the difference suggests a divergence between those claims which seek justice on the basis of past 
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wrongs and those which seek justice in order to achieve future goals; (iii) and the models provide an 
opportunity to compare a discrimination claim to a tortious claim. 
Andrew Morris (1995), for example, considers the basic distinctions between corrective justice and 
distributive justice to be the following. Corrective justice is concerned with giving reasons for 
restoring the relative position of each individual to the position which existed before or would have 
been attained if not for an action or decision. This calculation is agent-relative because it is 
concerned with the history, context, and predicament of the individual or the individuals involved. 
Distributive justice, on the other hand, is concerned with the supplying of reasons unconcerned with 
restoring a past position or providing status, and instead involves reasons for everyone to act in a 
certain way or to secure a certain result. On this basis, Andrew Morris (1995) argues that indirect 
discrimination involves corrective justice. Under a standard interpretation of the law this is not the 
case. Under the relevant statutes (even as they have changed over time) direct discrimination is set 
up to find wrong-doing by the defendant and correct this through a legal remedy - corrective justice. 
Indirect discrimination, on the other hand, involves a neutral condition that creates a 
disproportionate impact that cannot be justified.259 Hence, it is concerned with the distribution of 
goods flowing from the decision, and not the actor's mentality in making their choices. 
On the other hand, Gardner (1996a: 357) is quite correct in his estimation that such distinctions do 
not map onto the statutory structure of anti-discrimination law, nor do they reflect the manner in 
which such decisions are made. Gardner summarizes the essential distinction between such forms of 
justice as: (a) ‘reasons of corrective justice are reasons for or against restoring people's relative 
positions to what they were before, or would have been apart from, some action or series of actions 
performed by one or other of them’. 'Reasons of distributive justice are reasons for or against 
changing people's relative positions other than by way of such restoration' (Gardner, 1996a: 356-
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under the Equality Act 2010.  
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357). The persuasiveness of this distinction lies with its reflection of the arithmetic (what was added 
must be subtracted) and the geometric (what there is must be divided up in such-and-such a way) 
Gardner (1996a: 353) states that ‘reasons of justice are reasons for or against altering someone’s 
relative position’. In the context of a judicial decision this can be understood as the reasons for or 
against granting a judgment to one party at the expense of another party. The person’s relative 
position is wrong and justice demands that the wrong be made right. Gardner, along with many 
commentators, understands these duties in a concrete sense and not only as productive of 
argument itself. As such he claims that the primary duties of discrimination established by statute 
conform to this idea of justice. The law establishes duties for the employer and shopkeeper, 
amongst others, to treat people in a certain way relative to how others are treated.  
Justice is normally aimed at grander ideals of political philosophy concerning the distribution of 
goods in line with desert, merit, and equality. However the overall justice of a judicial decision 
amounts to a secondary concern. John Gardner (1996a: 355) expresses it thus: ‘The primary question 
of justice is always (in one form or another): how are some people treated in comparison with 
others? But only if there is an (arguable) disparity here does the secondary question of justice arise 
at the point of adjudication, which is: how can judges and adjudicators do justice now in view of the 
(arguable) injustice that has been done by this defendant?’.  
Gardner notes that much of this discussion depends on what we mean by the law of indirect 
discrimination or direct discrimination. He surmises that the law first imposes primary duties on the 
employer not to discriminate indirectly, and ancillary to these duties is a framework of 
administration upon which the law considers the possibilities of an arguable breach of such duties. 
From this perspective, indirect discrimination appears to be a form of corrective justice since the 
remedy for a breach involves compensation for the individual or reinstatement. According to 
Gardner, Andrew Morris over-extends this formulation so as to encompass the primary duties too.  
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Andrew Morris (1995) contends that indirect discrimination involves corrective justice. He suggests 
that the presentation of disparate impact evidence in an indirect discrimination claim provides an 
opportunity for the court to look more closely at the wrong which has occurred.260 This establishes 
the wrongful action and intentions of the defendant as a crucial element in an anti-discrimination 
claim. According to Morris, a finding of indirect discrimination corresponds to identifying and 
correcting the wrong-doing of the defendant. Gardner (1996a: 364-5) suggests that Morris is 
confusing the definition of discrimination with the proving of discrimination. This is an interesting 
distinction to make between finding and defining the law. In the section below we will consider this 
in terms of legal argumentation. I will contend that any confusion by Morris is actually reflective of 
the operative limits of how legal arguments, and thus claims under anti-discrimination law, are 
constituted. 
THE CONFUSION BETWEEN DEFINING/CLAIMING AND DIRECT/INDIRECT 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
The practices of defining discrimination and claiming discrimination are often confused. John 
Gardner (1996a, 1996b) concludes that this occurs because of a misunderstanding of prima facie 
findings. Such prima facie findings signify that a wrong or a breach of a duty has been admitted, but 
this can be rebutted, defended, or justified. From Gardner's perspective, Morris is making the 
mistake of according a definitional role to disparate impact assessments. Gardner (1996b: 107) 
explains that prima facie findings are ‘partial justifications’ that operate as claims acknowledging 
both reasons for and reasons against an action. Complete justifications, on the other hand, progress 
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 Under section 19 of the Equality Act 2010 indirect discrimination is established where a neutral practice or 
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the members of a comparable group. This replicates a standard formula contained in earlier anti-
discrimination statutes such as the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. For example, if an employer alters the shift 
pattern then this may have a disproportionate impact on those employees who are likely to have child-care 
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174 
 
on the basis that ‘all things considered’ the reasons asserted prevail over any other reasons 
available. In essence, complete justifications have reached the point of their conclusion.   
Partial justifications involve claims that can be rebutted or defended. Such justifications circulate in 
the domain of legal argumentation because, as explained above, these elaborate differences and 
connect to other communications on the basis of a difference of opinion. Claiming calls out for a 
counter-claim. Prima facie findings are particularly meaningful through their relationship to a 
potential rebuttal. Thus, a breach is meaningful in terms of a possible defence. The modus operandi 
of argumentation is to draw from fixed legal positions to produce differences of opinion at various 
levels of abstraction (reasons, rules, principles, etc.) and in respect of an internal or external 
orientation (concept, interest). Systems theory would assert that defining discrimination in terms of 
the distribution of rights and duties corresponds to the production of legal positions by legal 
decisions. Claiming discrimination, however, involves the relationships (in the production of 
different opinions) between such limits established by legal positions (rights and duties). 
Argumentation communicates under a double horizon: it dissolves decisions in order to produce 
legal positions from which future decisions can be abstracted.  
This is not simply an academic criticism. Morris' confusion reflects a constitutive paradox of legal 
argumentation.261 Argument is caught in a double horizon in which it dissolves past decisions to 
prepare the ground for future decisions.262 It is in the unobservable present that argument 
distinguishes between past and future. These two horizons are reflected in Gardner's distinction 
between partial and complete justifications and the difference between argument and decision. The 
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case of James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990]1 Q.B. 61 seems to blur the boundaries between direct and 
indirect discrimination by interpreting direct discrimination in a more purposive and victim-orientated vein. 
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discrimination. 
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 Although this is explained in terms of a temporal meaning it can presumably be articulated in terms of both 
the factual dimension (this decision and that decision) and the social dimension (a participant's decision and 
another participant's decision). 
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distinction between argument and decision re-enters argumentation. A decision (the assignment of 
a right or duty, for example) is made open to argument by reference to partial justifications. A legal 
position, deposited by a decision, is broken upon by a difference of opinion located in a whole 
panoply of differential schemes: claim/counter-claim, claimant/defendant, offence/defence, 
liability/justification. These contentions are meaningful in respect of the opinion to which they 
differ: reasons for liability call out for a consideration of reasons for non-liability. After this stage 
argument moves towards producing a further decision through the provision of complete 
justifications. Legal positions are produced that unify the differences of opinion such that rights and 
duties (as an example of a legal position) are re-allocated by reference to the preceding differential 
schemes.263 For example, an employer is found to have breached a duty owed to the employee (who 
has a right to a remedy) because the employer committed an offence under the relevant statute. 
In general, it can be suggested that these two argumentative stages (movements) correspond to the 
models of Aristotelian justice. First, the whole decision is divided into parts through the elaboration 
of differences.  John Gardner (1996a: 357) defined distributive justice as 'reasons for or against 
changing people's relative positions other than by way of such restoration'. As a model of justice it 
dissolves legal positions seeking a different re-constitution through supplying partial justifications. 
This first stage corresponds to distributive justice because it involves a geometric disposition that 
divides a whole: the legal position is broken open by partial justifications. 
Second, argument moves towards producing the grounds for a decision through complete 
justifications that point towards a decisional-horizon. This corresponds to corrective justice because 
the specialization of argumentative terms (liability, defence) narrows down the range of options 
available for selection. John Gardner (1996a: 356) summarizes corrective justice as involving 'reasons 
for or against restoring people's relative positions to what they were before, or would have been 
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apart from, some action or series of actions performed by one or other of them.’  The second stage 
of argumentation involves a specializing effect in which liability, for example, narrows the focus 
through its redundancy as it moves towards providing a legal position from which a legal decision 
can be made. This movement corresponds to the arithmetic of corrective justice because it involves 
a narrowing of focus (adding certain connections, subtracting other connections) as it seeks to 
restore 'people's relative positions to what they were before, or would have been.'  
The difference between these two movements - partial justifications/complete justifications, 
distributive/corrective justice -  is normally unobserved. Once argument is turned towards this 
difference then finding and defining discrimination are likely to become confused because it is 
precisely this distinction which is in question when the court considers the non-legal meaning of a 
term such as when the law attempts to consider its environment.264 This is an operative limitation on 
how anti-discrimination is communicated in legal argument. Statutory frameworks and philosophical 
models that distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of corrective and 
distributive justice, or on the basis of perpetrator -focused and victim-focused, fail to reflect the 
actuality of legal argumentation.  
 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNEQUAL PAY  
 
The following section argues that a broadening interpretation of a legal provision may, counter-
intuitively, result in a more restrictive interpretation. This occurs when an interpretation adopts a 
form which is open to a wide variety of information; however, the form is unable to process complex 
events because there is insufficient redundancy to counter-balance the variety of possible 
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information. If there is only a low level of redundancy to counterbalance this high level of variety, 
then firstly it is likely that errors and inconsistencies will not be registered, and secondly the lack of 
redundancy will mean that capacity to process complex environmental events will be reduced. In 
effect this argument seeks to indicate that cognitive openness can only occur if there is sufficient 
normative closure. Legal structures carry with them basic 'indifferences' towards law's environment. 
Without such indifferences the reasons deployed as 'symbols of redundancy' (Luhmann 2004:323) 
will struggle to separate the relevant information from the irrelevant. Such an examination is 
pertinent to the overall thesis because it reveals an operative limitation on the processing of anti-
discrimination law.  
The following example traces the evolving interpretation of Article 157 of the TFEU (formerly Article 
119 of the Treaty of Rome and Article 141 of the EC Treaty) by the UK courts and the CJEU. 
Specifically, what is of interest is the extent to which Article 157 limits the range of possible 
comparators available to the claimant. One of the greatest challenges to equal pay is the 
decentralization and fragmentation of the workforce. The reason for this is that equal pay legislation 
requires some type of nexus of responsibility between the claimant and their chosen comparator. In 
the absence of such a commonality unequal treatment cannot be proved because there is no 
benchmark or 'normal' rate of remuneration which can be deployed as a metric from which 
inequality can be established. The court does not have the expertise at its disposal to calculate the 
appropriate market price.  
This analysis may indicate that anti-discrimination law has experienced some of the effects noted by 
juridification scholarship: the legal capture of a political conflict, the insertion of abstract values and 
'vague standards' into legal discourse which are overly reliant on environmental definitions,265 and 
the increased focus on the particularities of each case at the expense of maintaining generalized 
standards. This latter effect symbolises the movement from normative expectations to cognitive 
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expectations in which the legal system learns and responds far more actively to changing states in its 
environment. This responsiveness can be a worthwhile change - for law must learn from its 
environment, but the question this anticipated is: how much - however the drawbacks to such a 
transformation should not be overlooked. From the perspective of recursive rule development this 
means that the operations of condensation and confirmation will tend to give way to those of 
cancellation and compensation.266  
Cancellation, for example, occurs when an activity previously considered legal becomes illegal - for 
example, the CJEU in the landmark case of Barber, which famously stated that occupational pension 
schemes were no longer outside the ambit of equal pay legislation.267 In such a significant judgment 
a whole range of legal arguments are rejected and economic expectations predicated on legal 
sources dislodged. These operations of cancellation and compensation have such a dynamic effect 
because of their all-or-nothing character and their penchant for variety, rather than redundancy.  
To make an equal pay claim, such a claim must establish that a person in a comparable position was 
paid more. The court can then conclude that the only difference is the gender of each employee.  
That said, in cases of direct discrimination the construction of a hypothetical comparator is a 
relatively common occurrence. On the other hand, courts will be extremely wary in drawing 
inferences as to the market value of a position or the normal level of remuneration for a particular 
job. Even the CJEU adopts a high level of scrutiny in such cases and only allows deviations in limited 
circumstances - such as where a woman is hired at a lower rate than a man who previously held her 
position.268 To decide whether contractual rights - such as pay - have been allocated on the basis of 
sex the court relies upon an independent assessment, such as a job evaluation scheme. Without 
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 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group (C-262/88) [1991] 1 Q.B. 344 
268
 MacCarthys v Smith [1976] E.C.R. 455; [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 98. Here the court rejected the hypothetical 
worker test for pay disputes because the court could not decide what the right pay is or what the appropriate 
contractual terms are for a worker. 
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some form of common legal nexus even this comparison cannot occur. We will now consider how 
Luhmann's theory of argumentation can explain the fall-out from interpreting this common legal 
nexus in an expansive fashion. 
The Equality Act 2010 and its predecessor the Equal Pay Act 1970 define 'same employment' in both 
a restrictive and a detailed manner. Since the case of Defrenne [II] the CJEU has accepted that Article 
157 is directly effective and bestows rights on individuals against both private and public entities. 269 
Therefore, claimants can rely upon Article 157 directly. In the case of Lawrence the CJEU, following 
the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, appeared to broaden its definition of common 
employment by explaining that the test was whether the responsibility for differences in contractual 
terms and remuneration for both the claimant and comparator can be traced to a 'single source of 
authority'. 270 The reason provided for this interpretation is that the equal pay principle requires the 
clear identification of the responsible body who could then rectify the wrong committed.  
 On the facts of Lawrence a single source of authority could not be identified, and the comparator 
suggested was not suitable to form the basis of an equal pay claim. The case involved a number of 
cleaning and catering staff at a local school whose contracts had undergone a transfer of 
undertaking on account of the competitive tendering process of the local authority. The staff were 
then re-employed by a temping company at a lower rate of pay than they previously enjoyed. The 
CJEU in applying this 'single source test' were unable to allow a comparison between the claimants 
who had been contracted-out and those male comparators still retained doing similar work for the 
local authority. When the Court applied the test to the facts of the case it was decided that there 
was no common nexus between the claimant and their comparator. A single source of authority 
could not be observed because the council was no longer responsible for the terms and conditions 
of employment of the claimant. The contracting company was now responsible. 
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The Lawrence decision was followed in the case of Allonby and no common connection between 
claimant and comparator was established in its circumstances either. 271 In Allonby the local 
education authority sought to reduce costs by re-hiring part-time lecturers on an hourly basis 
through an agency. As a result the re-hired lecturers received lower wages and lost access to a 
statutory pension scheme. The claimants attempted to compare themselves to male teachers who 
were still directly employed by the local education authority. The Court applied the 'single source 
test' and it was found that because there was no common authority with the power to vary terms 
and conditions of employment for both the claimants and their comparators then there was no 
single authority who could be held responsible for the inequality. Even the patent influence between 
the college and pay from the agency was not sufficient to satisfy the test in Lawrence. 
Both the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal considered the decision of Lawrence 
in the case of Robertson.272 At the EAT hearing, what became clear were the lines of argument which 
the decision in Lawrence had deselected. The tribunal noted that the commonality required under 
Article 157 needed the identification of a single body to which the differences in pay and conditions 
of the workers could be attributed, but this could not be proven in the case at hand. Robertson, a 
civil servant, attempted to compare his rate of pay with civil servants who worked in a different 
governmental department. The tribunal stated there was no common source of authority. There 
were separate collective bargaining processes for each department and it was irrelevant that the 
Crown retained legal powers to revoke the delegated authority of each department. The point being 
is that the tribunal was unable to apply the standard established in Lawrence to a de-centralised 
governmental structure despite the fact there was clearly a number of legal forms which could be 
traced back to the Crown. On appeal, the same arguments for a finding of common employment 
were rejected again. Mummery LJ admitted that the Lawrence formula was a 'rather imprecise 
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approach' and that to find the body responsible was a 'pure question of fact' regarding the body who 
was responsible for making the decisions on the level of pay, rather than considering the 
appropriate legal source of the decision-making power.  
The Court of Appeal reaffirmed the approach adopted in Robertson in the case of Armstrong.273 
Arden LJ made it clear that the single source test was not a 'brightline test' of the kind in which any 
involvement by an employer in the negotiations of terms and conditions at departmental level 
would result in an assumption of responsibility for this negotiation. In this instance the question was 
whether the local hospital was responsible for the setting of terms and conditions or whether the 
hospital trust which oversaw several hospitals in the local area could be held responsible. Arden LJ 
explained that responsibility would turn on the facts of the case  
This motif of focusing on the factual circumstances to establish fault and responsibility continues in 
the Edward Jones v Rawlinson and Dolphin v Hartlepool cases.274 In both cases the restrictive nature 
of the Lawrence test was made apparent. In Edward Jones the claimant was employed as an 
administrative officer at a secondary school. Her pay was fixed by the secondary school which took 
account of national pay scales. Her chosen comparator was a bursar employed at a different school 
under the same local authority; however, his wage was set in line with national pay scales. Ms. 
Rawlinson, the claimant, was unable to establish a sufficient commonality between herself and her 
comparator because although there was an influential connection between the national pay scale 
and the setting of her wage, in the end the local school was responsible for setting her wage and not 
the local education authority. Almost an identical situation occurred in Dolphin. In both cases the 
EAT applied the restrictive standard established in Lawrence and consequently, even though there 
was certainly a considerable legal connection between the local authority and the schools in 
question, this was not sufficient. The tribunal focused on the factual operation of the local schools as 
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autonomous from the local authority and responsible for hiring their own staff on the conditions 
which they chose to negotiate. In each case it did not matter that the terms and conditions applied 
to claimant and comparator were effectively derived from the umbrella organization or from 
national pay scales. The tribunal was unwilling to see past this impediment.  
The cases discussed above are certainly not exhaustive but they do show the difficulty in establishing 
responsibility for unequal pay in a decentralised and fragmented labour force. In many of these 
cases there was actually a common employer - the Crown, the hospital trust, the local education 
authority - and yet it was not thought to be sufficient to ground liability. Instead the 'single source 
test' has focused on factual responsibility as opposed to legal responsibility. This is particularly 
surprising because it was adopted in Lawrence as a more expansive test, that has thereafter resulted 
in a more restrictive approach. This rather restrictive interpretation of the Lawrence ruling has come 
about because of the lack of redundancy retained in its concept of responsibility. Redundancy in this 
instance is the retention of mechanisms to check for errors and to ensure consistency. Specifically, 
the Lawrence decision followed on from reasoning in Defrenne [II] in which a range of typical 
examples were set out . The Lawrence decision, however, sought to abstract and explain the shared 
facets in three categories by absorbing them under a more general test. 
'The first [category] covers cases in which statutory rules apply to the working and pay conditions in 
more than one undertaking, establishment or service. By way of example, one may think of the 
salaries of the nursing staff working for a service such as the National Health Service. Secondly, there 
are cases in which several undertakings or establishments are covered by a collective works 
agreement or regulations governing the terms and conditions of employment. Finally, the third 
category concerns those cases in which the terms and conditions of employment are laid down 
centrally for more than one organisation or business within a holding company or conglomerate.'275 
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Prior to the ruling in Lawrence the interpretation of 'common employment' under Article 157 was 
more flexible and expansive in line with the three categories outlined above. These categorizations 
functioned as redundancies from which difficult and complex scenarios could be processed by the 
court. Firstly, in the case of Hasley an office administrator employed by the Fair Employment Agency 
compared herself to a male comparator doing similar work at the Equal Opportunities 
Commission.276 Although not successful on the facts of the case, Article 157 was considered 
applicable nonetheless because the claimant and her comparator were in public service of the same 
kind, holding posts which are graded by the same officers and on the same principles of job 
evaluation. The important point is that the court was willing to be guided by the statutory 
underpinning and the functional similarity between the two agencies to allow a comparison to take 
place. 
Secondly, in the case of South Ayrshire v Morton a primary school head teacher wished to compare 
herself against a male head teacher employed by another educational authority.277 A commonality 
was established in this case by considering a number of factors: the statutory nature of the collective 
bargaining process which indirectly calculated their respective salaries, the sufficient community of 
interest shared by education authorities due to their common statutory underpinning, and lastly the 
need to approach the problem in a loose and non-technical manner. Arguments were rejected that 
sought to draw distinctions on the basis of factual dissimilarities such as different professional 
training, local conditions and the size of the school. The significance being that the decision drew 
upon Defrenne's categorization of collective work agreement as an indicator of common 
employment in order to decipher a complex statutory arrangement. 
This brief set of examples has illustrated that the capacity for argumentation to grasp complex 
scenarios is dependent upon retaining sufficient redundancy to process such information. By 
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referring to the indexing of factual circumstances into condensed categorizations, tribunals and 
courts under Defrenne's arguments were able order the information in each case in line with these 
categorizations. When Lawrence attempted to adopt a more purposive standard then these indexes 
were cancelled in favour of the more expansive 'single source' test. The unintended consequences of 
this change was to discard helpful redundancies in favour of a more varied approach; however, this 
approach at the operative level of argument was more restrictive than supposed. This proposition 
mirrors the fact that cognitive openness can only come about through normative closure. What we 
have re-described here are the limitations on arguments and claims brought under anti-
discrimination law. Such an outcome is particularly important because of the urge by many 
commentators to adopt a more flexible approach to the law, or to align the law around and toward 
more substantive ideas of equality and dignity.278 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has sought to re-describe the limits of anti-discrimination law by deploying Luhmann's 
theory of legal argumentation. The models of justice often ascribed to anti-discrimination law were 
re-cast as reflecting significant components of how legal argumentation dissolves and prepares for 
further legal decisions. This suggested that models that rely on moral philosophy fail to reflect the 
recursive generation of actual discrimination claims. From this point a preliminary study was made 
on equal pay law to show how the limits of doctrinal development can be, and are in practice re-
drawn by reference to redundancy and variety. 
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CHAPTER 8: LEGAL ARGUMENTATION - THE FORM OF DIRECT DISCRIMINATION; 
CONCEPTS AND INTERESTS 
 
The following chapter analyses the development of direct discrimination as it has been interpreted 
by the courts and tribunals of the UK legal system. The scope of the chapter ranges from a discussion 
of early cases concerned with the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to more recent cases brought under 
the Equality Act 2010. Luhmann's theory of legal argumentation is deployed to highlight the tensions 
and motivating factors behind claims of direct discrimination. This chapter will re-describe the limits 
of anti-discrimination law by illustrating how Luhmann's distinctions between concept and interest 
can support, in part, an explanation of the law which recognizes the innate tensions at the heart of 
discrimination law in its effort to transform social relations while relying on legal concepts of liability. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The portrait painted below will highlight the relationship between the legal concept of liability and 
the legally protected interest of non-discrimination and equal treatment. A legally protected interest 
is normally understood as a protection from some harm or wrong. As explained in Chapter 7, this 
distinction has congregated into bundles of legal arguments predicated on either self-reference (a 
legal concept of, for example, liability or possession) or external-reference (a legally protected 
interest which may be private or public in nature).  
These bundles are condensed interconnections between reasons and grounds for the allocation of 
the legal code. Over time these interpretations of legal texts congregate into legal rules that 
distribute forms of informational-redundancy. Such legal rules can then be abstracted further 
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through linkages with other legal rules until principles and more generalized notions emerge. Finally, 
abstraction can occur further into the domain of legal concepts that allow disparate reasons, rules, 
principles and notions to be brought under a common heading for the processing of similarity and 
dissimilarity, consistency and inconsistency between these various elements.279 Liability operates as 
a radial concept through which disparate rules in various branches of law - such as tort and statutory 
regimes like anti-discrimination law - can be generalized under a more abstract scheme. The radial 
quality of liability allows comparisons to be made across diverse rules of law. We will now consider 
how this legal concept of liability is a key component in the dynamics of anti-discrimination law.280 
Denise Réaume (2001) examines a thought-provoking contradiction at the heart of anti-
discrimination law. The tension involved lends itself to the explanatory strength of systems theory. 
Réaume explains that the contradiction resides in the intangibility of the normative value that guides 
the law - variously phrased as dignity, self-determination, autonomy, or equality.281  For Réaume 
these values point towards the presence of a legal interest which should be protected. If its value is 
violated, then corrective justice should be exercised. The intangibility of such values, however, 
means that the problem which anti-discrimination aims to solve is not clearly established. Such 
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values are mercurial.282 Consequently, the sheer variety of possible meanings applicable to those 
values can create a complex and indeterminate situation.283  
The protection of an interest, such as dignity, from harm seems complicated, since it is apparently 
less concrete than other interests.284 For example, we can compare how law deals with other types 
of harm such as economic loss or bodily injury. In each situation law relies upon knowledge from its 
environment as a means to conceptualize such loss - expert evidence provided by economists and 
the medical profession. Systems in the environment of law pre-structure complexity making 
information more predictable and allowing law to stabilize expectations towards its environment. Is 
there a similar pre-structuring of complexity in relation to values or moral norms? Probably not. This 
is then an issue if courts are required to maintain normative expectations of non-discrimination by 
reference to such values as indignity or inequality. 
A similar pattern has occurred in cases where the law has been required to quantify psychological 
damage in either civil actions or the criminal law. Initial attempts to quantify such damage were 
prone to indeterminacy and a lack of coherence until it became clear that medically recognized 
psychiatric damage may form the most appropriate reference point for law. Thus, complexity in the 
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environment was reduced through medical expertise and legal reasoning was then able to form 
reliable expectations in relation to this topic. Such trust in the environment has allowed law to 
construct a complex configuration of legal rules that identify different types of damage and attach 
varying scales of legal blameworthiness.285 These rules are concatenated 'symbols of redundancy' 
(Luhmann 2004: 331) that allow specialization to be produced in the legal system engendering the 
reconstruction of complexity within the system.286  
 The central difficulty averred to earlier emerges when another tenet of the discrimination law 
discourse is brought into play. Anti-Discrimination law attempts to provoke social transformation in 
a number of areas of society, for example: in the manner individuals are treated in the work-place or 
how decisions are made regarding access and success within organizations - employment, 
educational access, the provision of services to the public. In the UK context this socially 
transformative agenda was made clear by the five year advance warning given to employers before 
the Equal Pay Act 1970 came into force in 1975. Furthermore, the CJEU ruled in the landmark case of 
Barber that the Equal Pay Directive covered occupational pension schemes. As such an enormous 
number of pension schemes were then in breach of the law.287 Extraordinarily, the court allowed a 
period of five years to elapse before the judgment came into force because of the recognition that a 
significant number of economic structures were aligned to this now unlawful model. In a similar 
fashion, discrimination scholars have begun to discuss the law in terms of 'transformation' and 
under the epithet 'equality law' (Hepple, 2011; Fredman 2010). Moreover, there is a call for 
realignment of discrimination law alongside human rights and constitutional law, as opposed to a 
sub-specialty of employment law.  
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The interest which grounds the law is intangible. Nonetheless, if we relied on received wisdom to 
determine the limits of this protected interest, then disadvantaged groups would be forever at the 
mercy of the prejudices and misconceptions of the majority. To the extent that law seeks to react to 
a protected interest constructed in response to mediated scandal (explained in Chapters 5 and 6), a 
systems theory perspective supports Réaume's (2001: 368) argument that the diffusive quality of 
dignity further makes it more likely that discrimination law will confirm social change, rather than 
provoke social change.  
This tension in anti-discrimination law indicates the potentially destabilizing force of legal interests 
on legal concepts.  Any interest which the law seeks to protect can only be conditioned through legal 
concepts because any external-reference must be predicated on self-reference. Therefore, the 
possibilities of liability condition the potential for the recognition of legal interests - not the other 
way round. Later on in this Chapter an illustration is provided to support this claim. 
On a broader level, this tension might be re-shaped as an aporia that disrupts legal communications 
within this branch of law. The intangibility of this projected value-horizon has to be processed by the 
resources currently available to the system.  Hence, the variety of information available to legal 
communications has to be processed by reference to the redundancies already available. The 
complexity of the system can only be reduced and re-constructed by the well-worn tools available to 
the legal system in the particular channels of legal argument reserved for such environmental 
complexity. Re-expressed temporally, the tension may be a reflection of the inability to process the 
projections of the present-future without recourse to the recursively constructed past.288  
In contrast to Réaume, the strict separation imposed between the system and its environment 
within Luhmann's systems theory means that dignity, or any other moral value for that matter, may 
provide a useful normative justification of doctrinal development, but it cannot describe doctrinal 
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development. Such moral values do not enter unhindered into judicial discourse. Such values are 
given meaning by their recursive relationships with other leal communications. The meaning 
accorded to such values in moral communications, however, is different to the meaning accorded to 
such values when they are translated into legal communications. For systems theory, morality is 
distinct from law. Social communications coded by the moral code or orientated by ethical 
reflections creatively perturb legal communications into transition and re-orientation, but they do 
not displace or colonize such communications.289 
Furthermore, when moral values or political goals are translated into the legal systems they are not 
processed as goal-orientated programmes. As Michael King explains (2000) it is not possible for the 
legal system to construct programmes which are not conditional programmes for activating the legal 
code. Even consequentialist reasoning or purposive interpretation does not follow a goal-orientated 
route. The meaning of a legal position cannot be questioned by the fact that events did not turn out 
as planned. A new legal decision may be needed but that does not invalidate the old decision. King 
gives a telling example of this: that even when the cardinal principle of 'the welfare of the child' is 
interpreted under the Children Act 1989, which requires a legal examination of the future welfare of 
the child, the fact that this may turn out to have been an incorrect assessment of this future, does 
not invalidate the original legal decision.   
In the next section I will provide a succinct overview of direct discrimination law in the UK. After this 
I will then show how Luhmann's theory of argumentation and his concept/interest distinction can be 
deployed to illustrate the dynamics of legal doctrine in this area.  
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LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
 
Direct discrimination concerns unequal treatment of an individual on the grounds of a protected 
characteristic; indirect discrimination describes inequality resulting from the application of a 
provision, criterion or practice which is apparently neutral, but which has a disadvantageous effect 
upon persons sharing a protected characteristic. Commentators maintain that the distinction 
between direct and indirect discrimination is the conceptual core of equality law.  
A key legal development has been the changing interpretation of a component of a direct 
discrimination claim. Direct discrimination occurs 'on the grounds of' or 'on the basis of' a protected 
characteristic. Under section 1(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (hereinafter SDA 1975) 'a 
person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any 
provision of this Act if ... on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or 
would treat a man'. The court when interpreting this provision has had to decide which factors 
would be relevant in ascertaining whether a given actor had made a decision or performed an action 
'on the ground of her sex'. It has formed an opinion on which factors of mental processing are 
necessary for establishing a claim of direct discrimination.  
The SDA 1975 was replaced by the Equality Act 2010. A major piece of codifying legislation, the 
Equality Act brought the manifold legislative enactments of discrimination law under one roof. 
Section 13 of the Equality Act defines direct discrimination as: 'A person (A) discriminates against 
another person (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats 
or would treat others.' When the court's interpret the phrase 'because of a protected characteristic' 
they will encounter the same problem as experienced under the old legislation.290 Namely, the 
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abstract nature of the provision enables differing constructions of how a protected characteristic is 
linked to a relevant action.291 
Should we understand this provision as primarily concerned with the impact on the victim or the 
culpability of the defendant? Evelyn Ellis (1994) argues that discrimination law is, and should be, 
focused on the victim's perspective. This is because the primary objective of discrimination law is to 
provide a remedy to those perceived injustices or disadvantages suffered by marginalized groups. 
Drawing evidence from the preambles to equality directives, various statements of the Council and 
Commission, and remarks made by the Court of Justice of the European Union, Ellis contends that 
the logic underpinning both direct and indirect discrimination is the connection between adverse 
consequences for the victim and a protected characteristic. Therefore, according to Ellis, the 
purpose of the law is to provide a remedy and compensate victims for the wrong committed against 
them, as opposed to the purpose being to punish and hold blameworthy people to account.  
In contrast to Ellis, other scholars consider the law as primarily concerned with holding the 
blameworthy to account for their egregious actions. Both John Finnis (2011b) and John Gardner 
(1998) emphasize this role for discrimination law and so construct their evaluation of legal cases by 
reference to whether the court has adequately considered the practical reasoning and deliberative 
processes of the discriminator which underpin legal responsibility. Liability can only accrue to those 
who have acted with a discriminatory purpose or have incorporated a discriminatory ground into 
their reasons for action. This disagreement between perpetrator-orientated and victim-orientated is 
reflected in the vacillating interpretation of the provision 'on the ground of sex' by the courts. Those 
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arguments more responsive towards the victim's perspective emphasize the legally protected 
interest of equal treatment (or non-discrimination) and those arguments that wish to emphasize 
legal responsibility seek to limit liability by reference to established principles for analyzing the 
mental processes of the defendant.  
Systems theory offers a descriptive methodology. It does not provide a normative framework to 
indicate what the role of discrimination law must be, nor does it indicate the elements which must 
be located within legal doctrine to accord with a normative theory of justice. Systems theory does 
not provide an interpretative perspective with the capacity to render the law as intelligible and 
coherent through reliance on an evaluative examination of the non-trivial components of the law.292 
On the contrary, systems theory adopts a scientific and descriptive analytic highlighting the elements 
and relations which are essential to law as a self-referential, sub-system of society. In particular, 
emphasis is placed upon the generation of the difference between self-observation and external 
observation in legal argumentation. As such we see the relationship between concepts and interests 
in direct discrimination as an angle amenable to a systems theory approach. 
Before we consider the relationship between concepts and interests within sex discrimination law, it 
would be useful to explain what specifically reasons, rules and notions mean in relation to liability. 
Reasons refer to arguments advanced in at least two situations. Firstly, reasons allow the facts of the 
case to be considered from a lawful or unlawful perspective. The facts can be analyzed from a 
number of different perspectives using a variety of different methods to discern the relevant and 
salient facts of the case in its reference to other legal communications. This variety allows reasons to 
argue that a factual scenario can be legal or illegal by reference to a legal norm. Secondly, reasons 
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develop grounds for considering an alternative interpretation of a legislative provision or legal 
precedent as either lawful or unlawful.  
Rules operate so as to provide observational distinctions to guide the application of the code. 
Therefore in relation to the provision under inquiry (on the ground of a prohibited characteristic) 
such rules are deployed for deciding whether an employer has, for example, refused promotion on 
the grounds of sex by considering what their 'real' reason is as opposed to their apparent reason is, 
or by considering their covert reasons for action as opposed to their overt reasons, or the difference 
between conscious and sub-conscious reasons, and so on. In contrast to reasons, rules combine a 
certain level of closure through indifference along with openness to a variety of information. They 
enable specialization by maintaining connections to certain reasons and a lack of connection to 
other reasons. Such formations crystallize into an 'emergent order' which enables one to recall 
former occasions on which these rules were applied and to project future occasions on which these 
rules will be applied. The specialization and indifference which rules carry as symbols for redundancy 
allow for errors in reasoning to be highlighted. For example, if a rule is formulated in which the 
proper interpretation of s 1(1) of the SDA 1975 is that one must ask what the 'real', 'substantial' or 
'overt' motivations of the employer were in overlooking a candidate for promotion then these rules 
block operations which consider information that cannot be covered by such terms; furthermore, 
the deployment of such rules allows flaws to be observed in other applications of the legal code to 
particular factual scenarios or interpretations of the law. When Luhmann (2004: 322-334) claims 
that rules, through their iterative use and redundancy conservation, can isolate legal errors this is 
what he seems to have in mind. 
Notions develop in the 'manifold repetitions in situations of decision-making' (Luhmann, 2004: 340). 
They operate as guiding principles allowing arguments to be separated and grouped. The most 
obvious such notions in direct discrimination are the lines drawn by jurists between subjective and 
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objective notions of fault. Subjectivity as a notion is mobilized to separate reasons and rules for 
analyzing the mental processes and culpability of the defendant or claimant. Objectivity as a notion 
is a standard deployed to concentrate on causal factors distinguishable from the state of mind of the 
employer. Such a standard is also summoned to isolate phenomena as innately sexist and 
discriminatory; thereby, blocking any such legal operations which seek to question and draw 
distinctions from the mental processes which lie behind such actions.  
Reasons, rules and notions can also be orientated around a legally protected interest. Their 
identifying mark is the fact such observations operate as a distinction that responds to changes in 
the environment.293 Purposive interpretation of legislation operates in this fashion. Arguments that 
develop by reference to policy and the administration of justice operate in a similar manner. For 
instance, what seems key in the interpretation of direct discrimination are two opposing interests: (i) 
firstly an interest in providing a remedy to the victim; (ii) secondly an interest in the administration 
of justice, in which the court considers the consequences of its judgment by observing itself in its 
environment. This latter interest plays a prominent role in the oscillation at the heart of direct 
discrimination because it is concerned with the need to hold only persons accountable for what they 
are legally responsible for by reference to their intentions and deliberations. The point is that the 
court recognizes that individuals normatively expect to be considered in this manner when they are 
alleged to have been a discriminator - this is particularly evident when the court takes great pains to 
explain that finding a school or council as responsible for direct race or sex discrimination is not 
declaring that they have acted in a racist or sexist manner.294  
To be clear, the relationship between concepts and interests explained above is not meant to imply 
that Luhmann's systems theory is a re-fashioning of legal formalism in the clothes of continental 
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philosophy, although there are certainly parallels with more recent incantations of legal formalism 
which emphasize dynamic-formalism.295 Nor do I wish to reify these relationships to such an extent 
that they appear to be suggesting a deterministic formula. By suggesting that the concept-interest 
scheme is a significant component of direct discrimination claims, this chapter contributes to the 
substantive aim of the thesis: to re-describe the operative limitations of anti-discrimination law from 
a systems theory perspective. 
We will now consider how the oscillation in the concept-interest relationship operates to delimit the 
arguments available to direct discrimination claims. 
[A] MALICE AND MOTIVE 
 
Early cases restricted the potential for liability by focusing on the mental culpability of the 
defendant. The phrase 'on the grounds of sex' in s. 1(1) of the SDA 1975 was determined by 
ascertaining whether a prejudicial motive provoked the defendant's actions. The initial limitation of 
direct discrimination to cases of sexist and racist attitudes was a trend mirrored across many 
jurisdictions, possibly through an initial judicial association of discrimination law with the criminal 
law. At the time this seemed to be the most appropriate approach to the relevant provisions 
because the SDA 1975, along with the Race Relations Act 1976 (hereinafter RRA 1976) and the Equal 
Pay Act 1970 (hereinafter EPA 1970), formed major legislative interventions into the conduct of the 
labour market and social life more generally. The SDA 1975 and EPA 1970 were the first legislative 
enactments to tackle the problem of discrimination in the employment sphere, so it would seem 
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only natural that the primary aim of such legislation would be understood as prohibiting instances of 
outright bigotry and sexism.296   
In several early cases the courts and industrial tribunals (now employment tribunals) interpreted the 
legislation so as to require a malign motive on the basis of sex or race. According to Luhmann's 
theoretical scheme, this determination operates as an observational distinction in the form of a legal 
reason or rule (Luhmann 2004: 330-334). The specific reasons were argued in each case for 
determining the lawfulness of the employer's actions, and then processed by reference to the 
motive of the defendant. Such an apparent rule opens up the possibility of presenting a good motive 
as sufficient evidence to dislodge liability. In the case of Peake v. Automotive Products Ltd297 Lord 
Denning allowed chivalry as a sufficient reason which would suggest that the employer was not 
treating a person less favourably 'on the ground of sex'. On the facts, female employees were 
allowed to leave work five minutes earlier than their male colleagues. The Court of Appeal held that 
this was not discrimination on the grounds of sex against their male colleagues because such an 
arrangement ensured that female colleagues would not get caught in the hustle and bustle of 
leaving the factory.298 
The decision in Peake has led to a slightly incongruous interpretation of the detriment provision. 
Less favorable treatment is a component of unlawful discrimination by virtue of section 1(1)(a) of 
the SDA 1975 and also under the successor statute by virtue of section 13 of the Equality Act 2010. 
Since the Peake decision permitted a consideration of the defendant's motive in ascertaining liability 
then this looser level of scrutiny made space for a looser interpretation also to prevail upon of the 
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'less favourable' section. Space was made by indicating that a looser interpretation was consistent 
with notions that underpinned the rule in Peake. Namely, that a pragmatic approach should be 
adopted in which the tribunal would not focus excessively on each detail of the employment 
arrangement by making comparisons between the treatment of each sex, but should take a wider 
view of the matter. Therefore, less favourable treatment is not considered synonymous with 
differential treatment - with the exception of racial segregation.  
The rule enunciated in Peake was applied in the case of Schmidt v Austicks Bookshops Ltd. Philips J. 
at the Employment Appeal Tribunal relied on the approach adopted in Peake to state: 
'it is quite clear that following the tenor of those judgments [in Peake] the word “detriment” has to 
be given a meaning more in line with the other words used in the section, and that something is only 
to be said to constitute a detriment when there is something serious or important about it.'299 
In Schmidt the complaint concerned the clothing restrictions exercised by the employer. Women 
were compelled to wear skirts and overalls, whereas men were not. The tribunal made it clear that a 
wide discretion for the employer to dictate the apparel of its employees would be allowed; 
furthermore, a sensible approach would be to acknowledge mutual restrictions on clothing for both 
sexes, and so there was no need for a garment by garment comparison between the sexes. 
In Smith v. Safeway Plc300 the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the dismissal of a male 
delicatessen assistant for a violation of the employer's dress code for male staff constituted unlawful 
discrimination. The male member of staff wished to wear his hair long down to the collar and 
contended that since female staff were permitted to have longer hair then to prohibit him from 
doing so amounted to less favourable treatment contrary to the SDA 1975. The rule extracted from 
Schmidt stated that differential treatment would be lawful if a common principle of smartness and 
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conventionality was enforced in regard to both sexes, despite the fact that the content of such a 
standard may differ between men and women. It was also confirmed that the most sensible 
approach was to consider the code of appearance and compare its effect on each sex as a whole. 
The argument that the SDA's purpose was to disrupt the conventional assumptions about the sexes 
was rejected at the Court of Appeal even though such an argument found favour at the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal.301 
The point which I wish to emphasize is that even though the good motive ruling in Peake has been 
overturned by subsequent decisions the more abstract argument from principle that generated such 
a rule also generated other rules which have not been dislodged. The principle enables 
observational-distinctions (qua rules) that pursue a lower level of scrutiny and a higher level of 
respect to the needs of the employer. It supports judgments that are made out of common sense 
and pragmatism. However, this represents a position that is overly-redundant and unresponsive to 
the purpose of equality legislation; it implicitly accepts the current state of affairs and refuses to 




After several early cases which allowed motive and purpose to define 'on the ground of sex' the legal 
position changed so that it was considered that the provision now obliged the tribunal to establish 
the reasons for the employer's decision or action. Was the accused actor able to offer an alternative 
reason for their decision which was not connected with race or sex? In the case of Grieg v. 
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Community Industry302 an organization was seeking to employ young people, particularly those who 
were considered to be socially and educationally disadvantaged. Arrangements were made for the 
claimant to begin work in the painting and decorating team, starting alongside another female 
employee; however, the other female employee was unable to commence employment with the 
company and so the claimant would be the only female in an all-male team. The personnel officer 
felt that it was inappropriate to have only one female member of such a team - from past experience 
such an arrangement had not worked well - and therefore retracted the offer of employment. It was 
said that the decision was in the interests of good management. The employer claimed that they had 
reached this decision on the best motives and with the interests of the claimant and the business in 
mind. Slynn J. explained that the motives were not relevant and what should be asked is whether 
with respect to the grounds for the decision the outcome would have been different if the claimant 
was not a woman. The court made clear that the reasons for action and the deliberations of the 
employer was the correct interpretation of the provision (‘on the ground of sex’).  
In the case of Seide v. Gillette Industries Ltd303 the complainant was a Jewish toolmaker who suffered 
anti-Semitic harassment from a colleague. To resolve the situation the company moved the 
complainant onto another shift pattern which offered Mr. Seide a lower level of pay. The company 
maintained that they took this action in the interests of good industrial relations in the running of 
their business and considered it the most practical solution to the problem.304 The complainant 
claimed that this transfer to an alternate shift with lower pay amounted to less favorably treatment 
on racial grounds constituting unlawful discrimination. The EAT emphasized that the question was 
"whether the activating cause of what happens is that the employer has treated a person less 
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favourably than others on racial grounds." The EAT concluded that the industrial tribunal was 
entitled to infer from evidence, with regard to the thought-process and feelings of the employer, 
that the employer’s reasons for action were not concerned with race, but with the management of 
the industrial situation and employee relations. In the case of Owen & Briggs v. James305 a non-white 
woman applied for a position as a short-hand typist at a litigation solicitors. She was told that she 
was too inexperienced; however, the firm then proceeded to hire a white woman with less 
experience. The senior partner at the firm explicitly stated to another interviewee, after enquiring as 
to her family history, that an English employer should hire English people first. Stephenson L.J 
explained that the tribunal was to consider the 'substantial reason for what has happened to the 
candidate' and whether the refusal was because of her race. On the facts the tribunal concluded that 
a substantial reason for the firm’s refusal to employ the claimant was the company’s attitude 
towards her race. The Court of Appeal found that the industrial tribunal had applied this standard 
without error to the case at hand. 
In a similar fashion in R v Commission for Racial Equality306 a trade union official hired a non-white 
man with the good motive of seeking to change the prejudicial attitudes of the other employees. The 
Court confirmed that when more than one reason for an action is offered then one must ask (i) what 
is the most substantial and effective cause for the action, (ii) and was this reason connected to a 
protected characteristic? Lastly, Sir Nicolas Brown-Wilkinson V.C in the case of James v Eastleigh307 
at the Court of Appeal (overturned on appeal) argued that the statute limits the tribunal to consider 
only the reasons for the action. Therefore, enquiries should be made as to the overt basis for the 
action and whether this was related to sex. If the overt basis was deemed to be false, then further 
enquiries should be made as to the covert reason for actions and then a consideration should be 
made as to whether this is connected to sex or a desire to treat a person less favorably on that basis. 
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The point I wish to make about the above cases, is that, for a number of years it was without dispute 
that the provisions 'on the ground of sex' or 'on racial grounds' invited the court to consider the 
mental-processes of the decision-maker, firstly in terms of malicious motives, and later in terms of 
the substantial reasons for action. The above cases are indicative of this approach and the 
advantages in doing so. Here liability as a legal concept motivated notions of subjectivity and 
principles of deliberation that in turn generated rules. These rules operated as observational 
perspectives for the court obliging the tribunal at first instance to look for signs of the substantial 
and operative cause, the real reason, and also the covert reason for action. This approach has a 
number of advantages in that the courts are well versed in interpreting the varied differences 
between motive, intention and purpose.308 These rules enable an intricate web of redundancy to be 
carried along with the interpretation. Alongside this redundancy a higher level of openness and 
variety can also be supported with this interpretation. 
A variety of factual stimuli can serve as information for these rules. The court can consider the level 
of knowledge of employers and the alternative explanations presented by employers for their 
decisions. The court may draw inferences that these explanations are a sham to conceal the real or 
covert reason for the employer's actions. The consideration by the court of the employer's 
responsibility may not be in the form of Aristotelian deliberation, but it is constructed with the 
experience of elaborating and distinguishing rules in regard to the liability and culpability of the 
defendant.309 This is not to suggest that there are no significant draw-backs with such a focus, 
particularly with the need to connect the culpability of the defendant and the act itself. The problem 
with such a position is that it fails to (i) consider institutional reasons for discrimination, (ii) proving 
that discrimination - except in the most egregious instances - has taken place is difficult for the 
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claimant because quite often discrimination occurs by virtue of unacknowledged stereotypes and 
sub-conscious predispositions held by the respondent; (iii) relying on conscious and deliberative 
reasons for action runs the risk of not challenging the status quo and accepting the easy answers 
given by employers.  
In sum the model of direct discrimination at this stage is orientated towards the culpability of the 
defendant, rather than the harm caused to the claimant. This enables the court to generate a 
number of rules for observing such a phenomenon through iterative interpretation of the following 
provisions - 'on the ground of sex', 'on racial grounds', 'by reason of', and 'because of'. 
[C] THE 'BUT FOR' TEST AND CAUSATION 
 
Following a number of high profile decisions at the Supreme Court there was a 'gestalt' shift in the 
legal interpretation of direct discrimination.310 Liability edged away from a consideration of the 
subjective and mental processes of the defendant towards an objective standard of culpability which 
was responsive to the effect of the discrimination on the victim. A test began to be formulated 
labeled the 'but for test' that inquired whether the decision would have been different but for the 
sex or race of the claimant. This moved the reasoning process away from the intentions and motives 
of the respondent to an examination of factual causation.  
The court stated that the basis for altering the interpretation was the requirement to consider the 
purpose of the legislation. In the EOC case the issue was whether it constituted sex discrimination 
for a local education authority to set a higher admission standard for girls to the local grammar 
schools than it imposed for boys. 311 There were substantially fewer places for girls than boys in the 
area and therefore higher standards had to be imposed. Did this constitute discrimination on the 
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'grounds of sex' even when it was a long-standing problem? The authority argued that there was no 
motive or intention to discriminate on the grounds of sex; however the reasoning by the House of 
Lords made it clear that the provision 'on grounds of sex' did not allow a consideration of intention 
or motive because to allow such a consideration opens up space for arguments  to claim 'customer 
preference, or to save money, or even to avoid controversy' as alternative justifications. For Lord 
Goff 'such a conclusion seems to me to be consistent with the policy of the Act, which is the active 
promotion of equal treatment of men and women.’312 Crucially, the court emphasized that the 
provision embraced cases in which the action, instrument, or decision was intrinsically gender-
related. This activates a movement from legal notions of subjective fault to objective fault as a 
support for the legal concept of liability. 
This standard of culpability is not readily concerned with the intentions or motives of the defendant. 
It was labeled the 'but for' test and was confirmed by the 3:2 majority in the landmark case of James 
v Eastleigh.313 The facts of the case were that a local authority wished to subsidize swimming for 
older residents in order to alleviate pensioner poverty. To achieve this goal, the Council stated that 
all pensioners would be able to use the swimming pool free of charge. Unfortunately this was a time 
when the state pension ages differed between the sexes with the result that men were not eligible 
for a pension until 65 and women were eligible upon reaching the age of 60. Consequently, because 
of the claimant's sex, and the fact that he was below the pensionable age for men, he was compelled 
to pay an admission fee; in contrast, his wife was 60, above the pensionable age for women, and so 
gained entry free of charge. The issue was whether the Council's actions were 'on the grounds of 
sex' and therefore directly discriminatory. Lord Bridge for the majority concurred with the purposive 
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examination made by Lord Goff in the EOC case. His Lordship highlighted that in this case the metric 
used was intrinsically linked to differential treatment on the basis of gender.314 Lord Bridge re-
iterated that the motive and intentions of the defendant were not relevant. Cases of direct 
discrimination under section 1(1)(a) of the SDA can be considered by asking the simple question: 
'would the complainant have received the same treatment from the defendant but for his or her 
sex?'. 
This switch in interpretation from intention-focused to result-focused is what Luhmann calls a 
'crossing' of the boundary from one side of the form to the other. In this instance the crossing is 
caused by the operation of justice as a formula for contingency; it has the effect of realigning the 
recursive structures in this area to reflect the legal interest which requires protection - non-
discrimination, equality, dignity - on behalf of the claimant. The prominence of liability as a legal 
concept is thus diminished in favour of a legal interest which is more responsive to the needs of the 
environment (the claimant), and any changes which may take place in that environment (any signals 
of purposive change or possibly even consequential failures experienced by discrimination law). This 
'gestalt' shift signals (i) a new reliance on cognitive expectations and learning as opposed to 
normative expectations and non-learning, and (ii) an increase in the variety of information which can 
be processed by the model of direct discrimination, but with an attendant loss of redundancy.  
There was a notable level of criticism of this new test. Firstly, it was contended that the test elided 
the basic distinction between direct and indirect discrimination at the heart of equality law. By 
interpreting direct discrimination in terms of the impact on the victim, this encroached upon the 
territory circumscribed for indirect discrimination. One of the important conceptual distinctions is 
that direct discrimination cannot be justified by reliance on a defense, for example of economic 
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efficiency, administrative expedience or proportionality.315 Secondly, there is a more fundamental 
critique of the practical reasoning adopted by the court. It was argued that the majority failed to 
understand the difference between an operative premise and an auxiliary premise for action with 
the consequence of broadening liability to such an extent that it was uncertain who would be 
punished and held to be discriminatory.316 Moreover, John Finnis has contended that the practical 
reasoning employed by the court is fallacious because it separates deliberation and the mental-
processes of the defendant from the action, by claiming that an instrument or decision can be 
intrinsically or inherently wrong i.e. discriminatory.317 Interestingly, he aligns this objection alongside 
an old refutation of Peter Lombard and Abelard in the twelfth century by Thomas Aquinas. The 
contention made by Aquinas is that acts are not wrong in themselves (mala in se) but only in 
connection to the purpose, will, intention or motivation of the person who does the act.318 
Therefore, for the court to simply focus on the causal-effect relationship is to observe the person's 
action externally; if the intentionality of the person is observed, Finnis contends, then the court is 
adopting the internal perspective of the actor. This distinction can be translated into the terms of 
systems theory if we state that this internal-perspective relates to internal legal semantics signified 
by the concept of liability. The external-perspective criticized by Finnis for objectifying acts into 
intrinsically wrong acts relates to the legal semantics indicative of legal interests which are more 
responsive to the environment, and in this circumstance the perspective of the victim.     
An additional issue with the 'but for' test is that it may appear to be overly inclusive. Weinrib notes 
that this is a problem commonly experienced by tests that aim to determine factual causation. Such 
tests are able to exclude liability but they are unable to establish the criteria for inclusion of 
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liability.319 We are left with an almost tautologous situation in which either (i) a defendant directly 
discriminates or (ii) they do not, but there are no criteria to establish whether it has or has not 
occurred. Liability has been inflated at the expense of generating rules for assigning fault; or put 
differently, the variety of possible information has increased but at the expense of legal rules which 
enable specialized legal observations.320   
In summation, the change from a subjective consideration of liability to an objective consideration 
came about because of a purposive interpretation of the legislation. This generated a test for liability 
far more influenced by a legal interest in preventing harm to the claimant; however, according to 
Luhmann's theory (i) all interests need to be processed by a counter-balancing concept because all 
external-reference can only come about through a prior self-reference, (ii) interests allow greater 
openness and variety, (iii) there is still the oscillation at the heart of discrimination law to contend 
with, namely that the 'harm' is by no means clear while, at the same time the law cannot rely on 
received wisdom to conceptualize that harm. 
[D] FORM - INTENTIONALITY AND ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES 
 
The sections above have sought to explain that the change in direct discrimination from a meaning 
centered on liability and culpability to a meaning generated by reference to the harm caused to the 
victim is also a change from auto-reference to hetero-reference, or from a focus on concepts to a 
focus on interests. In this next section I analyze the more recent pull back of the interpretation of 
discrimination towards liability and an assessment of culpability. There are two points I would like to 
emphasize. Firstly, this is not surprising because the interest-based test of 'but for' causation must 
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be processed through a legal concept of liability.321 Systems theory insists that any external-
reference will be channeled through a prior self-reference. Secondly, in opening up the 
interpretation to a legal interest that focuses on the victim, or the purpose of the legislation, what 
this also encourages are other arguments which are interest-based. These arguments relate to policy 
directions and observations on how the legal system affects the environment (the effects of the 
administration of justice). However, because of the nature of legal interests in which few rules are 
maintained to check for errors and inconsistency (redundancy maintenance), there is no mechanism 
to resist the emergence of legal interests which are actually in conflict with non-discrimination. 
Finally, I would argue that this dynamic between concept and interest is likely to continue because it 
reflects the underlying tension at the heart of discrimination law. 
In Nagarajan the meaning of the same statutory term (‘on the grounds of sex’) was again 
interpreted by the Supreme Court. Lord Nicholls came to the conclusion that save for the obvious 
cases in which the 'but for' test would be sufficient, there would need to be some consideration of 
the mental processes of the alleged discriminator.322 Lord Browne-Wilkinson concurred indicating 
that the 'but for' test is not a rule of law, but a rule of convenience depending on the circumstances 
of the case.  Lord Nicholls explained that most employment decisions came about for a variety of 
reasons which may be quite complex and that the 'but for' standard is unable to properly process 
these cases. This is certainly a fair point.323 Lord Nicholls also explained that discrimination which 
requires racial grounds (or on the grounds of sex) to be the following: a cause, an activating cause, a 
substantial or effective cause, a substantial reason or an important factor in the reasoning processes 
of the defendant. In addition, he suggests that an additional distinction between conscious and 
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subconscious reasons may be used to widen the scope of enquiry and capture quasi-institutional 
reasons for discrimination. What we see is that the rules that can be generated under the auspices 
of the subjective liability are far more complex than those which can be generated under a legal 
interest.324 The interest-orientated test captures a great variety of possible circumstances but it 
cannot easily create ways to process and compartmentalize these circumstances. Secondly, we can 
see that any factual examination or external-reference must be predicated on a legal concept of 
responsibility as a self-reference.  
In the recent case of Amnesty International v Ahmed325 the claimant, who was of northern Sudanese 
ethnic origin, was refused promotion to the post of researcher for Sudan by the respondent 
employer, a human rights charity, on the grounds that, being from the north and having an “Arab” 
appearance, due to political and ethnic tensions she could be perceived to present a conflict of 
interest, and if she visited the region she and her colleagues would be exposed to an increased 
safety risk. Underhill J. the President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal broadly applied the 
reasoning of Lord Nicholls in the case of Khan in which a distinction is drawn between 'but for' cases 
as examples of obvious discrimination and Nagarajan type cases in which the mental-processes are 
relevant.326 The reason given for preferring Lord Nicholl's interpretation was that it can never have 
been intended for the 'but for' test was to replace the words of the statute. It was meant as a gloss 
or guidance rather than a definitive interpretation. Space was made for this type of argument 
because of the loosening of interpretation adopted in cases such as those of EOC and James. Once 
the purpose of the legislation or the purpose of a test is scrutinized then it can always be re-
scrutinized. 
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As mentioned earlier, there is an awareness by the judges that unlawful discrimination could be 
construed as labeling the defendant as racist or sexist. Hence, there is a significant attempt to evade 
such a condemnation. In essence, this can be understood as the internalization of an external 
observation in which the legal system considers how it operates in its environment and the 
consequences which flow from this observation re-enters as a factor in its decision-making 
processes. More recently in Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Griffiths-Henry, the EAT stated: ‘Plainly 
there cannot be a finding of sex or race discrimination every time an employer carries out a selection 
process unfairly to the detriment of somebody who is black or female.'327 How the law appears in its 
environment has slowly come to play a role in the determination of discrimination. 
I would suggest that this oscillation over the provision is likely to continue because underlying 
discrimination law is the tension that the interest which it seeks to protect, or the harm it seeks to 
prevent, is indeterminate because it is defined in terms of moral values. Therefore, once purposive 
interpretation turns to consider this interest there are insufficient rules that can be generated to 
stabilize the operating perspective. In turn this will cause a reversion to the legal concept of liability 
and an analysis of the mental culpability of the defendant; however, the fact that the law is not 
challenging social norms, but confirming social norms will become apparent and the whole process 
will begin again. This oscillation relates to the form of direct discrimination in which a boundary is 
drawn between the defendant and the victim by applying the distinction between intentionality and 
adverse consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has illustrated that a systems theory analysis can explain the innate tensions within 
anti-discrimination law by drawing attention to the following: the oscillation between intention-
based tests and consequence-based tests, the dynamic between the concept of liability and the 
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interest in non-discrimination, and the tension between punishing the defendant and providing a 
remedy for the victim. By outlining Luhmann's theory of argumentation we have been able to re-
describe certain limits that have occurred in the development of interpretative frameworks within 
anti-discrimination law. These limits cannot be illuminated by traditional approaches to this area. 
We will now turn our attention to explaining how systems theory grasps the communication of a 

















CHAPTER 9: VALID DECISIONS, RULES, AND THE LIMITS OF DISCRIMINATION 
 
'The system can avail itself of its symbol for validity only in this mysterious form of decision-making.' 
(Luhmann. 2004: 284) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal validity is not a topic richly discussed in Luhmann's many works on law; however, it is a topic 
with a deep jurisprudential history. In this chapter, the symbolic medium of validity will be 
explicated by combining Luhmann’s insights into decision communications alongside his sociology of 
law. A Luhmannian understanding of a valid decision resembles a number of approaches in analytical 
jurisprudence, namely: (i) Joseph Raz's description of legal authority, particularly in his reliance on 
the executive quality of a legal directive; (ii) H.L.A. Hart’s notable division between the nature of 
habits and the nature of rules. These reflections will be brought to bear on anti-discrimination law to 
highlight a number of features that are significant for understanding the limitations of the field. The 
implications of these reflections for this thesis are twofold. Firstly, the analysis will show how the 
insights of analytical jurisprudence can be extended through absorption into Luhmann’s theoretical 
understanding of law. Secondly, the focus on the recursivity of valid decisions militates against giving 
prominence to either a central norm, or a set of cohesive principles, as an adequate theorization of 
anti-discrimination law as explored in Chapter 2. Instead, the legal understanding of anti-
discrimination law can be re-described as the ‘qualitative duality’ between decisions and 
argumentation (Luhmann, 1995: 289). Chapters 7 and 8 explained how argumentation limits claims 
for discrimination. This chapter will explain the operation of a valid legal decision, with Chapter 11 
providing an illustration pertinent to anti-discrimination law. 
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SYMBOLICALLY GENERALIZED MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION – LEGAL VALIDITY 
The main evolutionary pressure for the emergence of symbolic media is the need to overcome the 
improbability of acceptance. This is brought about through a number of factors particular to 
communication in modern society: the increased distance between sender and recipient, the likely 
anonymity of the eventual audience (even if they can be thematized as the "public"), the 
individualization of motives for both sides of the communication, and the tying of increasingly 
complex structural conditions to motivations (Luhmann, 2012: 190-238). The fact that law has to be 
successful under such difficult conditions is, at best, an infrequent concern in analytical 
jurisprudential. 
So how does law succeed under such limitations? How does law exert pressure and bind actors?328 
The answer lies in the circulation of symbolically generalized media. Other sub-systems have also 
availed themselves of such abstracted media: money for the economy, power for politics, truth for 
science. Legal rules do not appear ex nihilo for the contemplation of the actor. They must be 
communicated via a medium, but their reception cannot be closely observed as is possible in a 
physical interaction. As a consequence, the popular thought experiments of much jurisprudential 
literature fail to appreciate reality. 
A motorist is approaching a red light. They have a clear view of the crossing and there are no 
motorists or pedestrians in sight. There are no other persons present to observe the motorist’s 
behaviour. Why does the motorist stop? Do they accept that they are under an obligation to stop? 
Do they accept that there is an authoritative rule which creates a reason to act in this manner? Both 
Hart and Raz can offer their own answers to this question, but both fail to respond to the empirical 
conditions faced by law in modern society. Hart, for example, adopts an approach indebted to the 
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 Luhmann (2012: 191) explicitly states that the examination of symbolically generalized media by Parsons 
and himself is an alternative to classical social theories which explain social order by reference to a social 
contract, natural law, or moral consensus. 
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advances of the linguistic philosophy of J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The quietism of 
ordinary language philosophy enables Hart to construct a concept of law by a close analysis of how 
terms and phrases are used in everyday and specialist parlance. His distinction between 'being 
obliged' and 'having an obligation' as representing external and internal statements of law emanates 
from this careful reasoning. Language is certainly a medium through which law must travel to reach 
its audience. Nevertheless, it is not the only medium integral to the performance of law.329 Medias of 
dissemination, such as writing and tele-techologies, must be significant not only for the historical 
development of law, but also for its moment to moment self-reproduction. There must also be a 
media specialized in securing the acceptance of legal communications in a highly complex and 
volatile world. The symbolically generalized medium of validity is differentiated for this very 
purpose.330 
Raz’s thought experiment assumes that legal authority, whatever it may be, is comparable to the 
authority exercised by a parent over a child, or by a teacher over a student. However, most legal 
circumstances do not involve the hovering presence of the State demanding compliance, or a 
charismatic figure calling for allegiance. The perpetuation of modern law occurs on only a minority 
of occasions via personal interaction between actors who are present and capable of mutual 
observation. We turn to the generalized symbolic aspect of law to overcome the improbability of 
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 Recent research into the ‘normativity’ of spatiality and materiality convincingly show that legal phenomena 
are not only tied to textual or linguistic mediums. See for example, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s 
(2014) examination of spatial justice and the lawscape  
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 Even John Searle (1996: 25) struggles to conceptualize ‘collective intentionality’ and social relations as a 
discrete medium of meaning. At best Searle punts for a vaguely Hegelian notion of the 'We' as an 
epiphenomenon affixed to the cogitations of the mind. Gerald Postema (2008), however, does acknowledge 
that modern law must contend with an inevitable distance and alienation between its officials and the general 
populace. Postema proposes that for a legal system to exist it must effectively resolve this alienation, 
therefore there must be a congruence between the norms produced by legal officials and those of the general 
public. This is a congruence which is not admitted, or sufficiently explored, by either Kelsen or Hart. 
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communication when the proximity of actors, shared knowledge and moral values, and possibilities 
for quick adaption are negligible.331  
Generalized symbolic media ensure that improbable communications have a chance of success. In 
this context success signifies a ‘heightening receptivity to the communication in such a way that it 
can be attempted, rather than abandoned at the outset’ (Luhmann, 1986: 18). The media prepares 
the audience and acts as a compère before the arrival of the communication. The demands placed 
on media increases in the course of social evolution. If society increases in its complexity, then 
selectivity within each system increases in turn. The communication of particular topics thus finds a 
world which offers a wide range of possible selections. With such a surplus of options, a co-
ordinating mechanism has to be established if motivation is to be receptive to certain selections. 
Symbolic media have been differentiated to make such improbable communications more likely. 
This is completed by co-ordinating specialized topics (selective conditioning) with a motivation to 
accept such communications.  
Like other symbolic media, legal validity manages to effect this co-ordination by making the 
conditioning of selection into a motivating factor. We are more likely to accept a communication if 
we can assume that the proffered information has been already organized in accordance with 
certain conditions. At this point, it may seem that Luhmann has left open a gap in which these 
conditions can be specified. Is it to be a moral consensus around political-morality, or do these 
conditions require only a moral minima to be successful? Such as when Hart (1994:87) alludes to 
that which is ‘necessary to the maintenance of social life'? The answer is in the negative. The 
resolution of double contingency between participants does not require a substantive alignment of 
ideals. If this was necessary, then the problem would never be solved.  
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 The closest discrimination scholars have come to this symbolic quality is through reference to the 
expressive dimension of law. Khaitan (2012) analyzes dignity in this regard. And yet, scant mention is made of 
sociological research which can systematize and complicate this approach. 
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The resolution of double contingency requires that Ego anticipate that Alter-Ego has its own 
expectations, and that Ego pre-structures its anticipations reliant upon the fact that Alter-Ego has its 
own expectations. In essence, there is a mutualistic constitution emergent between the participants 
which recognizes that both sides are self-referential actors. Both sides have the freedom to act as 
they choose and these selections cannot be predicted beforehand; however, this intransparency can 
be managed if a solution is developed that replicates the circularity of the problem. The constitution 
is mutualistic, but as I explained above the participants are not face to face and so mutual 
observation is not achievable. In such a situation there must be a symbolic structure which can be 
trusted by each participant.332 
The resolution can take a plethora of forms as long as it acknowledges the circularity between the 
two participants alongside their intractably self-referential positions. For example: (i) I do not allow 
myself to be determined by you, if you do not allow yourself to be determined by me; (ii) I allow 
myself to be controlled by you, if and only if you allow yourself to be controlled by me; (iii) I will not 
do what you want if you do not do what I want (Luhmann, 1995: 117 ff., 389). What is the symbolic 
resolution available to law? To retrieve an answer, we need to consider further restrictions on 
symbolic media.  
Symbolically generalized media hold together motivations and selections. When a selected piece of 
information is provided the motivation to accept this communicated form is made more probable. 
Not all contexts give rise to the need for attribution and decision. To explain when this is the case we 
need to establish the reference problem and attribution constellation for legal validity (Luhmann, 
2013: 202).333 The reference problem is encountered by a rapidly developing society concerned with 
managing opacity and contingency on a grander scale than that demanded in personal interaction. 
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 For an erudite analysis of double contingency that contextualizes the problematic sociologically and 
philosophically, consider Chapter 3 of Luhmann (1995).  
333
 One does not need to rely on the validity symbol, exclusively: in court one can convince through the 
demonstration of evidence, rhetoric, personal magnetism, etc.; however this complaisant context tends to 
operate via personal interaction. 
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For example, the symbolic medium for truth, associated with the sub-system of science, hinges upon 
a reference problem in terms of the incorporation of as yet undiscovered knowledge. The scientific 
revolution presupposes the discovery of ignorance. Only with the French and Italian Renaissances 
did new knowledge begin to be considered as worthy of curiosity. The mentality of the times 
allowed for further understanding and therefore further communication on these topics. Such 
unheard of knowledge would have been dismissed as deviant and otherwise irrelevant in the 
European Middle Ages because it departed from divine providence (Luhmann, 2012: 203-204). The 
symbolic medium of truth provides a platform from which extant knowledge can be observed. The 
question of truth becomes reflexive: how do we know that it is true? Resources for constructing 
methods, theories, and proofs are then provided to supplement this enquiry. 
What is the reference problem unto which legal validity offers a resolution? Validity must adhere to 
a framework that admits the mutualistic constitution of communication while also confirming the 
self-referential constitution of each participant. Hints at a resolution have been touched upon by 
Hart in his abstract historical sketch (1994: 91-99). He argues that the key distinction between a pre-
legal and a legal system proper is the maintenance of a core union between primary and secondary 
rules. Secondary rules address issues which have contributed to the transition from a simpler to a 
more complex society. On their own primary rules of obligation managed communal existence in a 
world of close proximity, where the authoritative regime is likely to be unofficial and unstated. In the 
evolution of Hart’s society a number of contingencies arise to threaten the social order. Uncertainty 
is generated as communal ties are loosened (e.g. traditional familial structures disintegrate and an 
allowance is made for social mobility) and the capacity to monitor participants' behaviour is 
stretched by the geographical spread of the group. In response to this emergent uncertainty a rule 
of recognition offers consolidation. It circulates as a validator of other rules that is a 'conclusive 
affirmative indication that ... [the rule in question] is a rule of the group' (Hart, 1994: 94). Thus a 
more symbolic dimension is attained that can transform this uncertainty into certainty.   
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The static quality of the social structure is revealed to be a problem when changing circumstances 
can no longer be incorporated by it. Changing circumstances not only in terms of a rapidly expanding 
world of knowledge but also, in a key movement emblematic of modernity, in the fact a person can 
now change their status by performance and are no longer exclusively defined by their birth station. 
The idea of individual subjectivity gains traction from the confessions of St. Augustine to its 
culmination in the European Enlightenment and the fall of the ancien regime.334 Secondary rules of 
change are developed in the shape of legislatures and in the power-conferring rules available to 
legal persons. The performance of these secondary rules changes the legal status of a person, such 
as when citizenship is gained or employment is secured. Lastly, the inefficiency of monitoring 
compliance is scrutinized. It becomes an issue that participants cannot be observed except through 
extraordinary expenditures of effort and time. Rules of adjudication are thus formalized. 
Organizational roles are created. From a more centralized platform, official participants are able to 
adjudicate upon public standards of behaviour.  
It is difficult to encapsulate these insights in a terser form. Nevertheless, they conform to the 
requirements of a resolution outlined above by their combination of circularity and self-reference. 
For example, the changing circumstances for the individual and society are neutralized by the 
provision of a stable state which can limit the possibilities of change. In terms of a power-conferring 
rule this would form the conditional proposition: I will accept that you can attain this legal position 
(employee, citizen, party to a contract, tortfeasor) if your actions meet x, y, and z conditions. The 
validity of your legal position can then make acceptance more probable such that you can anticipate 
that I will take your valid action as a premise for my actions.  
Alternatively, the duopoly of private compliance is managed by a monopoly of official, public 
standardization. In this instance the duopoly refers to the fact that the self-referential aspect of 
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participants has come into focus through the difficulties of monitoring and anticipating their actions. 
They have become opaque and akin to a black box. This situation is resolved by organizing the rules 
of adjudication. There is ample room for further analysis, but even in this abbreviated explanation, 
the possibilities of systems theory's insights are clear. Let us now move onto the second condition 
which legal validity must meet in order to circulate as a symbolic medium. 
The attributive constellation is that special arrangement which classifies the Ego - (Alter-)Ego 
relationship in terms of action and experience. This is of particular interest because it indicates a 
fault-line registered by both systems theory and analytical jurisprudence. Legal validity has been out-
differentiated as a symbolic medium from that of power. Simply put, validity is recursively 
constructed with an attributive constellation that links actions of Alter-Ego to actions of Ego. By 
placing law in this constellation we are able to see how it operates in a comparable but 
distinguishable fashion to power, love, truth, property, art, and value. By limiting validity to this 
constellation the basal structure of valid decisions is severely confined. This will be discussed and 
developed in relation to the jurisprudence of Raz and Hart below.  
Finally, I will explain the symbolic aspect of validity and its relationship to insights gathered by 
jurisprudence. The specificities and the universality of the legal system are held together by the 
symbolization of legal validity - this is an iteration on the symbolic level of the circularity and self-
reference explained above. The symbol stands in place of each side, making the self-description of 
the legal system amenable to communication (Luhmann, 2013: 191 ff.). Typologies and modes of 
classification can be communicated as a topic. This would suggest that the various branches of law 
can be communicated through reliance on this symbol of validity. This composition can be calibrated 
in many different ways. Legal history makes this multiplicity evident. One need only glance at Roman 




A symbol operates such that participants can presuppose a prior ordering.335 In the case of law this 
would be a prior chain of actions and decisions. The circulating symbol of validity operates in a 
similar fashion to Kelsen's Grundnorm and Hart's Rule of Recognition because it provides a pivot 
which connects the whole system to each particular component; and like both concepts, it would 
lose its functionality if a participant refused to rely upon the prior ordering indicated, but not 
explicated, by the symbol: the grundnorm must be presupposed as a transcendental assumption 
that conditions the normative system; the rule of recognition is a generalized practice even if it can 
be understood as series of rules .336 
This special quality of symbolization is evident in other media. In times past the gold standard 
guaranteed the money supply, but a person need not attempt to redeem the value of bank note in 
gold for the medium of money to be a successful mode of exchange. In fact, if such a redemption 
was demanded then the advantage gained by the symbolic media would be lost. Similarly, the 
abstract notions of friendship and solidarity do not need to be uncovered to be effective at bringing 
forward agreement as long as their extended formulations are available for use (Luhmann, 2012: 
206-209; Luhmann, 1986: 18-34): I can accept a request out of friendship without weighing whether 
we are really friends and what this actually means. 
Symbolization provides a pivot that ties together the unity of the legal system with its disparate 
parts. Thus, a symbolization makes the topics of unity and diversity within the system amenable to 
communication by presupposing that complex negotiations and opportunities for understanding 
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 The symbolic mode corresponds with the need for law to offer a systematic quality establishing a horizon 
for the self-direction of actors. Postema (2008: 54) recognizes this aspect when he suggests that positivist 
jurisprudence, such as that offered by Bentham, fails to explain the existence of an individual legal norm 
because in reality law exists as a web of interrelated norms. Law provides an 'infrastructure or context for 
meaningful interaction' that mediates between the actors and their reasons for action. Further this 
assumption of systematicity enables alienated participants to take an in sensu diviso position to legal norms 
(Postema, 2008: 56, 63). Raz (1995: 231 ff.) also highlights the significance of this mediatory function in his 
service conception of law. 
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 Note how Hart (1994: 101) suggests the symbolic form in the following: 'the rule of recognition is not a 
state, but its existence is shown in the way in which particular rules are identified, either by courts or other 
officials or private person or their advisers.' 
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have taken place. This is a type of situation in which there is little if any indulgence in close 
questioning and counter-argument. We simply accept such communications by virtue of such 
symbols even though the request may be inconvenient. As they say, money talks and love speaks for 
itself. This specific communication problem re-arranges unity and difference such that: whoever can 
pay gets what they want; whoever cannot pay does not. Whoever can rely on legal validity gets what 
they will; and whoever cannot rely on legal validity does not. Below we will see how closely these 
propositions relate to Raz's focus on the authority of law. 
The above paragraphs have sought to explain the generalized symbolic media of validity.  This 
symbolic form is tied to a decision communication therefore an explanation is required as to how a 
decision communication imbricates validity and action. We shall turn now to this topic. The 
jurisprudence of Raz and Hart will be used as a foil to fine-tune the intricacies and implications of the 
argument presented above. 
DECISION COMMUNICATIONS AND THE SYMBOL OF VALIDITY 
 
As noted in the opening quote to this chapter, the symbol of validity circulates via the mysterious 
form of decision-making. The concept of a legal decision is certainly a thoroughly mined vein of 
jurisprudence. Luhmann, however, provides a theorization of a decision in terms of communication. 
This expands the context in which a decision can be observed to areas external to adjudication 
proper. The advantages of this approach are several: analytically, the form of decision-making is 
extracted from the exclusive control of formal organizations; decisions are made sufficiently abstract 
as to afford the possibility of a comparison between legal decisions and decisions made in other 
social contexts (economic, scientific, etc.); and finally, isolating a decision as a communication 
further explains Luhmann's unique contribution to jurisprudence, providing a platform upon which a 
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decision made by a court can relate to a decision made by an employer, business, and other actor 
significant to the communication of discrimination. 
A decision is made when an action is communicated along with an expectation. By communicating 
each element at once an opportunity arises for considering  whether the action conforms or deviates 
in respect of the expectation.337 This can be phrased in many different ways because our analysis is 
conducted at a high level of generality.338 For example: the person acts appropriately, the action is 
unexpected, the action is constrained by an expectation, or an expected action takes place. What is 
distinctive about this analysis, however, is the fact that an action can be associated with an 
expectation in the form of an obligation or an act of obedience - the action occurs because of the 
expectation.339 A decision crystallizes through an acceptance or rejection of such a formulation as 
valid or invalid; this acceptance or rejection then communicates itself as a valid decision. Within such 
an analysis the legal validity of a judicial decision can be considered alongside the legal validity of an 
employer's decision or an individual's decision to act. The significance of this re-composition is that 
Hart's distinction between obligation and obedience, rule and habit can be visualized within the 
context of both official decisions and the more mundane actions executed in everyday life. The 
combination of an action and an expectation gives rise to a decision because it provides the 
conditions for a constitution of a choice from amongst alternatives. The decision chooses by 
highlighting its acceptance or rejection of the action-expectation form. 
Naturally, expectations can vary in their orientation. They might be cognitive: a dark cloud can 
provide an expectation of rain and so when I go on my walk (action) this provides conditions for a 
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 Recently, there has been a surge of research on a Luhmannian approach to decisions and organizations. See 
for example: Seidl & Becker (2005); however, these insights have not been applied in detail to the court as a 
decision-maker. A feat mildly attempted here. 
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 For instance, scientific truth circulates as a symbolic medium by tying together experience to experience. 
Nature reveals itself as shared experience; nature does not perform actions. The presence of actions (bias, 
mere opinion, non-repeatability of experimentation) short-circuits the performance of the medium. Since 
actions do not form part of the medium neither do decisions. Karl Popper (2002) provides, perhaps still, the 
most influential description of scientific epistemology. 
339
 The different dimensions of meaning afford a range of options for 'seeing' this formulation, see Chapter 10. 
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decision to be made; if connections are available then these can provide grounds for decisions to be 
communicated as choices, such as to carry or not carry an umbrella. A selection from amongst other 
options is communicated if a decision communication takes place. I may have chosen other options 
such as not to carry an umbrella, or to remain inside instead. Expectations may also be normative, 
for example, many would consider it proper for a person to iron their shirt before a job interview; 
however, perhaps that person is running late. Then the grounds for a decision can emerge such that 
the person becomes the subject of a decision in which they choose not to iron their shirt. This 
decision can then contribute to the premises, alongside other possible decisions, for a future 
decision as to whether they should get the job. Another instance is when a conflict arises between 
opposing parties to a claim. Legal decisions are made by 'seeing' that there are many parties to the 
case (various selections) upon which a decision can then be made from amongst the alternatives. 
To be a decision the 'choice is treated as contingent and the actions connected with it are motivated 
by this contingency' (Luhmann, 1995: 296). A decision must be communicated on the basis that a 
choice has been extracted from amongst alternative selections. To choose means to select, but the 
selection must acknowledge the contingency of its choice by showing the other possible selections 
which could have been made. The execution of a decision works upon this form of 
action/expectation; it observes the form as communicating an acceptance or rejection in respect of 
the relationship between the action and the expectation. An important aspect that needs emphasis 
is that a decision is being made by observing the formation of a prior decision.340  
Decision communications are recursively constructed such that the basal element of the system can 
only connect to other basal elements of the same type. These recursive limitations are similar to 
those apparent within coded communications constructed by reference to the legal code (Luhmann, 
2013: 145, 254). The system differentiation of decisions allows a connection between judicial 
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This requirement of connectivity has implications for Raz’s service conception of law which will be 
considered in greater detail below. 
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decisions and legislative decisions, and judicial decisions and business decisions. Rather than a code 
(legal/illegal, government/opposition, paid/not paid) establishing the system-boundary, it is the 
basal constitution of a decision.  
In a legal context a decision can connect to another decision in a number of different ways with each 
connection taking the form as a selection amongst alternative selections: the interpretation of a 
text, inference from evidence, an investment decision based on current demand, an assessment as 
to an employee’s suitability for a role, consideration of the facts. Each of these examples involves 
the extraction of a selection from amongst other possible selections. The completion of the decision 
comes about when it is recursively connected to another decision: a decision to produce a new 
product is connected to a decision in the marketing department to advertise this new product; a 
decision to allow an appeal is connected to a decision to find against a party.  
Decisions are precarious however, because they are uniquely compact communications that 
communicate their own contingency. To operate, a decision must communicate both the selection 
of some information and the range of options which were not selected. The greater the emphasis 
placed on the choice component of the decision then the less it will seem to be justified as the 
contingent component of the choice has been diminished. On the other hand, the greater emphasis 
that is placed on the contingent aspect of the decision the more that other alternatives will appear 
to be possible and so the less it appears that a decision has been made. This paradoxical situation 
comes about because of the combination of necessity and contingency within the compact form of 
the decision. In the field of psychiatry this has been touched upon by Ruesch and Bateson (1951). 
For these authors, the paradox was unfolded by inserting a distinction between on the one hand, the 
reporting of a communication as a selection from amongst alternatives, and on the other hand, the 
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commanding aura of the communication which increases the probability that a decision will be 
accepted as decisive by other communications.341   
How do legal decisions deal with this paradox in which the decision may appear either to be 
excessively decisive, or excessively contingent? A plausible, but perhaps extreme, example will help 
to make this clear: what if a court considered a legislative enactment as too decisive a decision, if 
parliamentarians had been intimidated into passing the Bill? In such a situation, the court may 
unfold such a paradox by inserting a distinction on the basis of constitutionality, or by suggesting 
that parliamentary sovereignty was premised on a number of presumptions. Alternatively, they may 
adopt a more formalistic interpretation and suggest that contingency lies in the future in which a 
forthcoming parliament could choose to vary the decision by repeal or amendment at a later date.    
Decision premises are the preconditions produced by other decisions. These premises can be 
organized into several groupings - programmes, communication channels, and personnel.342 In 
contrast to programmes that supplement the legal code, programmes that premise decisions can be 
both conditional or purposive in their structure. Personnel premises concern terms of membership, 
recruitment, and organization. These relate to the decision because they change the expectations of 
the ‘actor’ involved in the decision. For example, a senior member of the company has different 
expectations from those of an intern. Lastly, communication channels are decision premises that 
relate to the organization of an organization. These channels concern hierarchical formations. The 
effects of a decision (the conditions for connection) executed at one level are unevenly distributed 
to other levels. For example, a decision by a lower tribunal will have a different effect on the 
Supreme Court than a decision made at another level of the court system. 
                                                                
341
 In effect, Ruesch and Bateson attempt to avoid the paradox by separating the decisional form from the 
symbolic medium of validity (i.e. a command, a directive, etc.). This separation may be available at an 
analytical level; but at the level of the actual operation of law, the legal decision co-constitutes (and vice versa) 
the symbolic medium of validity in the form of valid decisions. For a brief explanation of decisions as they 
occur within the court setting, consider Luhmann (2004: 282 ff.)  
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 For further explanation of the decision paradox and decision premises, see Seidl & Becker (2005). 
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This section has provided a brief overview of Luhmann’s theorization of a decision communication. 
In the next section, we will place this alongside the symbol of legal validity in order to shed light 
upon the recursivity of valid decisions. The limitations of decision communications will be set out by 
focusing on the dual requirements for decisions to be premised on actions, and for decisions to 
avoid their paradoxical constitution if they wish to be valid and authoritative. 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE COMMUNICATION OF VALID DECISIONS VIA RAZ’S NOTION OF 
AUTHORITY 
 
In the following section we will consider how Luhmann's concepts of validity and decision can align 
with one of the most influential contributions to jurisprudence in the 20th century, namely that of 
Joseph Raz. By pursuing this analysis I hope to situate Luhmann's account of law alongside important 
concepts in analytical jurisprudence. This will lay the groundwork for understanding the limitations 
on legal decisions and the application of Luhmann's account to discrimination law. 
Joseph Raz (1995: 210-238, 1980: 209-237, 1979) has long asserted that authority must hold a prime 
position if we wish to understand the existence and identity of law. By emphasizing practical 
authority, reasons for action, and the executive function of law his jurisprudence offers a number of 
insights that complement a Luhmannian theorization of legal validity. Let us outline the essential 
components of Raz's legal philosophy so that we might consider how it aligns with Luhmann’s 
conception of a valid decision. 
Raz defends a positivistic view of law which he places under the heading of a 'sources thesis'. In its 
finality, all law is source-based. Law's existence and content can be identified by reference to social 
facts alone. He argues against viewing law as either connected to morality by entailment (for 
example, law can only exist if it meets a moral objective such as the maintenance of order), or that 
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law is a combination of legal sources and the soundest moral justifications for such sources.343 These 
approaches are respectively labeled by Raz as the 'incorporation thesis' and the 'coherence thesis'.344 
The latter is generally considered to reflect Dworkin's view on law - or at least Raz's interpretation of 
Dworkin's view. In Raz’s sources thesis it is his twin emphasis on 'social facts' and the separation of 
law from morality that brings his approach closest to Luhmann's description of law as a self-
referential, autopoietic system.345 Moreover, Raz's dismissal of the incorporation and coherence 
thesis for law coincides with a major tenet of this thesis: commentators fail to understand the actual 
operation of discrimination law if they rely on either the identification of moral principles 
incorporated into this branch of law, or if they seek to uncover the politico-moral justifications that 
best lend the law coherence and unity.346  
According to Raz, only by observing the social and factual activity of law can we elucidate the 
mechanics of law's existence and its individuation; on this basis, Raz reaches the conclusion that the 
common sources of law - the judiciary, the legislature, and custom - are pivotal to the legal system 
because they provide a crux upon which decisions and actions can be organized so as to carry an 
'authoritative mark' (Hart, 1994: 93). Raz is a hard positivist and claims that law consists only of 
'authoritative positivist considerations’ and these aforementioned sources provide a finality that is 
absolutely characteristic of law. Persons deliberate and consider on what is the correct behaviour, or 
the right course of action for any given situation. This deliberative stage involves a person 
considering ‘the merits of alternative courses of action’ and when ‘an intention is formed 
deliberation is terminated’ (Raz, 1995: 206).  Once an intention and choice has crystallized then the 
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 Notwithstanding this position Raz does not consider law to be an autonomous organization. Law is 
delimited by a political system (variously suggested as comprising such entities as the state, church, nomadic 
tribe).The identity of the legal system depends upon the continuity of the political system. For further details 
see, Raz (1979: 97-103) and Raz (1980:210). 
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 A succinct version of Raz's thesis is presented in Chapter 10 of Ethics in the Public Domain (Raz, 1995). 
Chapter 10 is a re-print of the widely read article in the Monist, Raz (1985a). 
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 Unfortunately, Raz is as unconcerned with sociological research as Hart apparently was. One can assume 
however that the sociology of organizations would complement Raz’s philosophy well. 
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 As sketched out in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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executive stage of action comes to the fore. 'The sources thesis assigns the law to the executive 
stage of social decision-making' (Raz, 1980: 213) such that law, properly so-called, is a web of 
executive, positive, reasons for action. Legal decisions communicate reasons for action by exhibiting 
a quality of finality such that our prior discussions come to an end through the executive 
performance of law. Consequently, it makes sense for Raz to stress the standard sources of law as 
projecting this function. In the vast bulk of situations, where our deliberations do not result in the 
initiation of legal proceedings, we invariably turn to statutes or judicial decisions to provide guidance 
for our behaviour.347  
Raz states that a ‘judicial decision expresses a judgment on the legal consequences of the behaviour 
of the litigants. It is presented as a judgment on the way the parties, and others in the same 
circumstances, ought to behave’ (Raz, 1995: 221). In the same vein, legislative enactments purport 
to express themselves as a judgment of what subjects ought to do in certain situations, and custom 
reflects the judgment of the bulk of the population on how people ought to act in a given situation. 
So far, we may find it plausible to see that Luhmann's conception of valid decisions correlates with 
Raz's jurisprudence, however in what sense can custom as a source of law be understood as a 
decision or an action. Where is the decision-maker?  
Firstly, a source of law should not be considered as a singular flare, but rather a prism through which 
a collection of texts and a 'whole range of facts of a variety of kinds' can be located (Raz, 1979: 48). 
Legislation and adjudication are not uncomplicated in their genetic structure. Statutory enactments 
and landmark cases may operate by providing a singular, authoritative reason for action, but their 
constitution is interwoven with other laws and norms - as Bentham discovered to his dismay, the 
meaning of a legal norm cannot be adequately separated from its interrelations with other legal 
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 Dworkin offers a divergent emphasis by following what Raz (1995: 199) calls the lawyer's perspective. 
Dworkin's jurisprudence focuses upon on how courts adjudicate in hard cases as revealing a salient evaluative 
dimension to the legal system. Dworkin’s perspective far more closely follows the recursivity of legal 
argumentation examined in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis. 
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norms. Even a constitutional statute cannot project an authoritative guide for our behaviour without 
a consideration of its surrounding context.348 In addition, we must stress that the idea of meaning 
within systems theory relies on an epistemology often at odds with that assumed by analytical 
jurisprudence. Legislation does not present a singular decision, norm, or rule, but rather a channel 
by which a plethora of decisions can be connected and synthesized. Meaning is concerned with 
connectivity, not intentionality (Luhmann, 1995: 59-103). There is a more obvious point as well - the 
legislature is a fictionalized decision-maker, and, in many cases, adjudication is reached also through 
a synthesis (a majority) of those sitting on the bench. Custom as a source of law can be constructed 
through examining the generalized motivations for accepting a premise as legally valid. We accept 
the rule as valid and binding because others customarily behave in a similar way.349 The social 
dimension of meaning allows such connections to be made. Customary norms are explicitly 
recognized as an authority in public international law and arbitration procedures. It is not the 
categorization of the source which matters, but whether it can be observed as propagating a legal 
norm non-accidently as a premise for behaviour or a future decision. After all many perfectly 
effective and authoritative legal systems have relied on animistic spirits and deities as sources of 
authority. We can begin to see how Raz’s jurisprudence overlaps with Luhmann’s decision 
communications.  
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 The executive quality of legislative communications might be attributed to their temporality. The 
crystallization of selection (the announcement of a decision) stems from the establishment of a line between 
before and after. The point of inception can be observed. On the other hand, custom, by its very nature, is 
difficult to conceptualize in such terms because of its emergence through collective actions. Nevertheless, that 
does not rule out the possibility of customs becoming authoritative through utilizing the factual or social 
dimensions of meaning. The customary practice of a legislature provides the premise for the communication of 
a decision, for example constitutional conventions; or indeed, when greater influence is attached to a judicial 
statement if the author is a well-known expert in a particular branch of law. In reality, these meaning 
dimensions can hardly be separated. Being a well-known expert involves both a social influence (she has a 
reputation in which others acknowledge her expertise) and a temporal influence (she has been influential in 
past instances). 
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 This thesis agrees with Raz's (1979: 149) position that the notions of legal validity and legally binding are 
interchangeable. For Raz, a legally valid rule is one which has the normative effects to which it claims. In 
essence, both notions signify the connectivity of legal communications.  
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The inter-relationships between norms, highlighted above, points towards a systematic quality of 
law. This systematicity, however, is not produced through the ordering of logical postulates, or by 
the conditioning of a priori intuitions and presumptions (Kelsen's Grundnorm, for example). This 
systematic quality is alluded to in Raz's jurisprudential project, in terms of his dependency thesis and 
the exclusionary force of authoritative reasons. These will be set out below. Each of these 
components form part of Raz's service concept of law which affords authority a place of prime 
importance. I have stressed that decision communications offer a sociologically and 
epistemologically superior explanation of this phenomena; however, the importance of action and 
behaviour for the communication of valid decisions, foci so important to the jurisprudential projects 
of Raz, have not been fully explored. Action is a key component within the symbolic medium of 
validity. By drawing out the consequences of action we can expose limitations on how decisions are 
communicated, and consequently limitations on how discrimination law can be analyzed. 
Raz stresses that legal authority is a practical authority because law offers reasons which are 
convincingly independent of whether they are incorrect in terms of experience or by 
miscalculation.350 These reasons do not simply add to the reasons for action already under 
deliberation so as to tip the scales in the law's favour. Law's reasons for action exclude reasons 
under deliberation. Authority is transmitted as an executed decision, not as a ground for 
deliberation.351 Raz (1995: 210-238) outlines several properties that an authoritative legal system 
needs to maintain in order to ensure its legitimacy and, ultimately, its efficacy. The level of authority 
of an actual legal system depends upon the extent to which legal directives approximate to these 
ideals. In explicating these properties, the resemblance with Luhmann's thesis will be clarified. 
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 The law that requires the wearing of a seat-belt is authoritative despite the fact that the decision-premises 
and the deliberation that underpinned the statute may be incorrect. Legal authority is not (directly) affected 
by an incorrect scientific assessment on road safety, or a miscalculation as to the economic or policy benefits 
of such a law.  
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 Although there are certainly points of nuance, I have deployed the following terms as roughly 
interchangeable, with each presenting a specific angle on the same phenomenon: reasons for action; premises 
for a decision; and motivations for compliance, conformity, or agreement. 
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Firstly, a legal directive should be exclusionary such that the offered reasons for action replace the 
reasons for action under consideration by the individual.352  The subject of authority accepts the 
reasons provided as a substitution for the reasons generated in their own deliberative process. 
Secondly, the reasons offered by the legal directive must communicate that the replaced reasons 
have been considered and reflected in the authoritative reasons now on offer. Reflection may not 
have in fact taken place. It is simply sufficient that the authority communicates as if it does reflect 
and as if it is dependent on the deliberations of the subject. These two facets contribute to what has 
been called Raz's 'service conception' of authority.  
This reflection of other reasons, demanded by Raz, aligns with Luhmann’s perspective that a decision 
must be both decisive and contingent such that a selection has been made from amongst alternate 
selections. The replaced reasons are retained by the reference to the alternate selections that 
condition the determined selection. The dependency on alternate selections (read: reasons for 
action) may also refer to the connectivity guaranteed by the chain of validity, but this node can be 
interpreted imaginatively - a present duty connects to a prior duty, a norm is recognized because a 
higher court recognizes this norm, a right or liberty can be recognized because other social actors 
recognize this conception, a norm is valid because it is effective, a norm is valid because it is similar 
to another valid norm.  
Lastly, as referenced already within footnotes, the authority of the legal directive does not emanate 
from the substance of the directive. It emanates from the 'source' of the directive, namely the 
decision-maker or adjudicator. Authority is independent from the content of the directive (Raz, 
1985b), and so the author and the authoritative instruction must be distinguishable from one 
another. This also entails that the directive must be identifiable without recourse to the purported 
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 There is a structural similarity here with how a legally valid decision motivates its own acceptance and 




reasons upon which it adjudicates or legislates.353 In spite of the reference to a decision-maker, this 
'source' is compiled within the communicative medium and does not rely upon the intentionality of 
an actor. For individuals are only 'semantic artefacts' within a society composed by communication 
(Teubner, 1989: 741).  
 
THE ATTRIBUTIVE CONSTELLATION: ACTION TO ACTION, DECISION TO DECISION 
 
Raz's concentration on practical authority and action offers a bridge between his project and 
Luhmann's sociology. A number of features in Luhmann's framework of legal validity correlate with 
Raz's conception of authority.354 In a previous section, we outlined a provisional framework for a 
symbolically generalized media that is exclusive to the legal system. We will now deepen the 
exploration of this framework. 
Luhmann (2012: 213) considers the circulating symbol of legal validity as a modern extension and 
secondary coding for the power medium. Such a secondary coding was co-emergent with the 
functional differentiation of the legal system and the modern theorization of the rule of law. This 
thesis, however, makes the argument that there is a symbolic medium of validity that now works 
exclusively on behalf of the legal system, no longer epiphenomenal on the medium of power. By 
outlining the operation of the power medium the structure of legal validity can be illuminated. One 
key point to reinforce is how much such an argument parallels jurisprudential developments made 
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 This observation seems to reflects a point made by Luhmann: a decision must be distinguishable from the 
premises upon which it was made. This coincides with Raz's claim that the executive stage must be 
distinguishable from the deliberative stage.  
354
 Alternative accounts of legal authority have pursued themes more congruent with sociological concerns, 
such as deference, trust, respect, and even gratitude. Dan-Cohen (1994: 39) has defended a theory of 
authority in which deference is the motivating factor for compliance. He notes that authority operates as a 




by Hart (1994) as he launched his own concept of law by identifying the shortcomings of Austin, 
Bentham, and Kelsen. It is Hart's panoply of key distinctions - rule and habit, obligation and obliged, 
primary rules and secondary rules, internal and external statements of the law - that points towards 
the out-differentiation of the symbolic medium of validity and detachment from the power medium. 
Hart’s comprehension of a rule, obligation, and internal statement accords with the circulation of 
legal validity.  
Communication requires an infrastructure that is attendant to the problems of double contingency 
in the co-ordination of autonomous participants. How do black boxes speak and understand one 
another? Luhmann’s proposal is an attributive constellation which classifies this relationship along 
the lines of whether meaning is reliant on external attributions (experience) or internal attributions 
(action) for the participants in question.  The attributive constellation of power concerns: 'the action 
of alter consists in a decision about the action of ego that is required to be obeyed' (Luhmann, 2012: 
212). Accept the directive or else suffer the alternative. The power symbol attempts to secure 
acceptance from the subject by soliciting the communication of conformity or compliance. If the 
media fails to convince then a sanction can be applied; however, over-application of the sanction 
will diminish the influence of the power medium to secure compliance.355 This tension is salient too 
for the validity medium in which – and this depends on the precise construction of the ‘or else’ 
component that motivates compliance for law – the excessive application of a consequence for 
deviation must be used sparingly. This thesis goes further, however. The application of a sanction is 
broadened to encompass the forms of communication that are recursively constructed by reference 
to an exposed contradiction, deviation, non-compliance, and non-congruence of perspectives held 
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 This is not an esoteric point. We know that excessive use of a sanction provokes a response – often in kind – 
that diminishes the effectiveness of that threat. Excess exposes the power-holder to a possible contest over 
who should exercise such power. Comparatively speaking, this problem was addressed by Cardinal Richelieu in 
his efforts to enhance the royal authority of the Sun King, Louis XIV, through the intense ritualization of the 
twofold relationship between the monarch and his subjects: always watching (through a hanging portrait, and 
the extension of the state apparatus), but never approachable. Foucault (1977) famously theorized how power 
was able to resolve this issue as a step-change from sovereign, hierarchical power to a more diffuse, horizontal 
type of power which focused on technology, discipline, and surveillance.     
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by participants. How a violation can be seen will be considered with recourse to Wittgenstein’s 
comments on the nature of rule-following.  
The symbol of legal validity does not secure compliance by recourse to physical sanctions alone. The 
many cogent criticisms levelled by Hart against Kelsen and Austin certainly suggest that this 
possibility does not reflect modern law. How can a sanction, particularly as an action that manifests 
itself by force and violence, explicate either commitment to the law, or the vast majority of legal 
arrangements which create rights and grant powers? Clearly it cannot. The transmission of legal 
validity must rely on a different device to motivate acceptance. Hart offers a suggestion which seems 
to point in the correct direction. He observes that a rule has an internal aspect. The participant 
acknowledges that they have an obligation to follow the standard of behavior set by the rule and the 
consequences for deviation are to suffer disapproval. Accordingly, rules are able to provide a guide 
‘to the conduct of social life, as the basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment’ 
(Hart, 1994: 90). Participant’s with the internal perspective ‘accept and voluntarily co-operate in 
maintaining the rules, and so see their own and other persons’ behaviour in terms of rules’. For the 
successful functioning of a legal system, official participants must maintain an internal perspective 
such that they should sustain a ‘critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a 
common standard' (Hart, 1994: 91, 57). Hart’s analysis suggests that the internal aspect of rules is 
generated through an interaction between rules (as a decision communication) and a specific 
component of consciousness – as a type of commitment brought about through the volitional, 
cognitive, and reflective capacities of the participant. The motivation for the acceptance of a rule is 
enabled by this relationship and the deviation from a rule (the ‘or else’) is delivered by a threat of 
‘disapprobation’ (MacCormick, 2008: 70-71).   
These arguments are edging towards a formulation within the optics of systems theory. This 
autopoietic model of legal validity, however, differs from that proposed by Hart, Raz, and Kelsen by 
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virtue of the radical recursivity of the medium. Consequently, the imputation of validity is not 
assigned by reliance on a singular source or a locus of authority, such as Kelsen’s presupposition of 
the Grundnorm, or Raz’s notion of legitimate authority. Recursivity signals that validity is re-
generated with each present decision and its connections to other decisions. The efficacy of norms 
can therefore become a factor in the assignment of validity. 
Gerald Postema (2008) observes that positivists such as Hart and Raz have shown little concern with 
analyzing how the efficacy of legal norms, and the collective divergence between internal and 
external perspectives, may destabilize the existence of legal systems. Hart’s jurisprudence is 
generated in line with the actions of legal officials. The rule of recognition divides valid rules from 
invalid rules through dependence upon a self-constructed generalization of official behaviour. The 
classes of behaviour under law’s jurisdiction are determined by the rule of recognition which in turn 
is generated through the actions of the centralized and official institutions of law. A presumption 
appears in Hart’s work, namely that the circumstances for the motivated acceptance of a rule - the 
lynchpin connecting legal communication to consciousness - is prioritized in favour of formal 
institutions instead of social consequences. In a similar manner, Raz unequivocally states that de 
facto authority presupposes legitimate authority because actual control is only possible if a prior 
acceptance has been elicited (Raz, 1979:28-30). This ignores a significant issue. Any kind of control 
presupposes the communication of acceptance on its own level. The threat of explicit violence can 
only motivate action (i.e. exercise control) if acceptance is communicated in a language equivalent 
to the decision implying such a threat. Such an acceptance need not be in the form of consent, but 
for control to occur there must be a communication of acceptance. The forced action must take the 
other controlling action as a premise for its decided action. This may take the form of genuflection or 
as the lack of effective opposition to such power. Control requires the seeing of acceptance such 
that explicit acceptance (in the form of verbalized assent, for example) is not necessary and is in 
reality often avoided. Logic only dictates de facto authority as presupposing legitimate authority if 
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the circulation of validity makes use of such logical postulates to recursively organize its transitions 
from state to state.356 
Postema (2008), on the other hand, asserts that law is dependent upon social practice and that there 
must be a certain degree of congruence between legal norms and standard social conventions for a 
legal system to exist. Of particular note is Postema’s argument that this is necessary in order to 
overcome the alienation and distance between institutional authorities and the general population. 
Postema suggests that law provides constitutive guidance shaping the horizons for deliberation by 
ensuring that 'norms must be publicly accessible, both synchronically and diachronically' (Postema, 
2008:57). Although, Luhmann and this thesis would not go so far as to agree that there must exist 
substantive congruence between legal norms and social conventions located within an 
‘informational commons’ (Postema, 2008: 59), Postema’s instincts touch upon certain key features 
which must be incorporated into any adequate theorization of legal validity. A cogent  formulation of 
the attributive constellation must include a semantics of commitment and a recognition of the 
difficulty in motivating acceptance at a distance. The dependencies outlined above - Hart’s rule of 
recognition, Raz’s service conception of authority, and Postema’s insistence on the convergence 
between norms and practice - reflect the manifold generalizations in which the connectivity of valid 
decisions can be motivated. 
Enabling such generalizations of the validity medium is an attributive constellation that connects 
action to action. Postema (2008: 58) alights on a plausible conceptualization of this constellation 
when he frames the relationship between participants as: ‘what makes sense for parties on one side 
to do depends on what they expect parties on the other side to do, while, at the same time, what it 
makes sense for the latter to do depends on what they expect their counterparts to do.' Postema 
further asserts that legal directives have public, practical significance only if subjects can be 
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confident that the significance attached to them by their fellows generally meshes with their own. 
The attributive constellation binds participants into a co-dependent relationship; however, this 
convergence cannot be over-specified through substantive normative alignment between legal 
insiders and legal outsiders, or through explicit articulation. This is so because, firstly, if acceptance 
was to be explicitly motivated through negotiation then this would undercut the possibility of trust 
in the symbolic expression of the legal system. The more explicit the agreement, the greater scope 
there is for disagreement. Secondly, there are structural reasons why co-dependence must be 
under-specified.    
All symbolic media have a symbiotic component that allows a continuously generated platform for 
communication to comprehend its participants (Luhmann: 227-230). This component is required 
because the medium is attempting to procure a motivational response from its participants and it 
must maintain receptivity to the changing states in their consciousnesses. This arrangement is 
theorized as the interpenetration between social systems and conscious systems (Luhmann, 1995: 
210 ff.). The symbiotic component differs for each symbolic media: perception for truth, need for 
money, sexuality for love, violence for power. For law I have proposed that it must be located in a 
notion of commitment and engagement that is constructed around the volitional and cognitive 
capacities of consciousness. Under-specification of this component allows for interpenetration 
between communication and consciousness to be continued over time and over a vast array of 
topics. If the component is over-specified then this can lead to positive feedback such that both 
communication and consciousness become increasingly estranged and self-concerned, which leads 
to undermining the motivation for acceptance of communication. The capacity of legal validity to 
secure compliance is diminished if we insist upon (i) a substantive congruence between official 
norms and social conventions, and (ii) an exacting level of commitment from participants. There 
must be a mutual restriction by both communications and consciousness (interpenetration), and 
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from participant to participate (double contingency of communication) such that each side restricts 
itself in accordance with the system expected in its environment.  
This line of argument has already been highlighted in jurisprudential scholarship. When Hart 
distinguishes between rules of law and rules of etiquette he suggests that one distinction is that 
rules of law require some sacrifice of interest or preference on behalf of each participant (Hart, 
1994: 87). This is part of Hart's acknowledgement that certain social facts are necessary for the 
efficacy and existence of the legal system, and it corresponds to a systems theory analysis of a 
symbolic medium: the motivation for acceptance of a valid rule – communicated as a decision to act 
– must involve a denial of self-concern by the participant.357 Raz, unknowingly, provides a 
supplementary addition in terms of a triple negation. Legal rules are 'exclusionary reasons for dis-
regarding reasons for non-conformity' (Raz, 1979: 30). This proposition needs to be unpacked. For 
Raz, legal rules are exclusionary because they mediate between alternate reasons for action that 
have been offered by parties, or which have been considered in the deliberative processes of 
participants. I have argued that this exclusionary force is structurally akin to the execution of a 
decision communication. The operation of this executive stage has a further effect. It serves to 
restrict the basis upon which interpenetration can take place. It affects motivation by prohibiting 
selections based on non-conformity. This is a negative formulation of the interdiction against self-
interested motivation.   
In the previous paragraphs I have attempted to explain how the medium of legal validity can 
motivate acceptance between autonomous participants. The reason that this seems so complex is 
                                                                
357
 We might conjecture that the over-extension of communication has occurred in relation to certain scientific 
topics. The medium of truth relies on perception as its organic referent to consciousness; however, there is a 
restriction on its use such that perception develops dependent on interpenetration with communication and 
not through a reliance on other perceptual data. Consequently, intuition and instinct are not celebrated as an 
appropriate irritation site for the interpenetration between consciousness and communication. A common 
refrain amongst climate-change deniers is the reliance on 'common sense'. This might have been encouraged 
by an overextension of the communicative medium of truth; perhaps through the efforts made to keep the 
public informed and abreast of scientific developments. A similar restriction is imposed on the medium of love 
in terms of interdictions against onanism and self-love (Luhmann, 2012: 199-236).  
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because it brings two discrete cycles into an orthogonal relationship: (i) the interpenetration 
between legal communication and consciousness, and (ii) the establishment of mutually dependent 
expectations between participants. Let us summarize this relationship.358 
A valid rule is likely to be accepted if we are able to anticipate that it will conform to certain pre-
conditions; and in turn, a valid rule can increase the probability of its acceptance if it conforms to 
these anticipated pre-conditions. Through this circular relationship the motivation to accept a rule is 
dependent upon the pre-conditions for the rule, and in turn the pre-conditions for the rule are 
dependent upon the motivation for acceptance. A feedback loop is thus instantiated that manages to 
both pose and then dissolve a problem of co-ordination through a reliance on the symbolic 
expression of validity.359 As alluded to above, these pre-conditions need not be specified (in fact, 
they must not be) for this feedback loop to take off. Symbolic media have the advantage of 
participants assuming that agreement and conformity has already been secured. Consequently, 
consensus is presumed and need not actually be substantively formed. This agrees with Wittgenstein 
(1958): to understand that a rule is being followed involves each side assuming that the other side 
‘sees’ the rule in the same way.  
This feedback loop relies on a symbiotic component that establishes a bridge between legal 
communication and consciousness. I have made efforts to explain that this is best understood as the 
concretion of the volitional and cognitive capacities of consciousness in the shape of non-specific 
commitment and engagement: if you do not adjust and anticipate my will then I will not adjust and 
anticipate your will. As time passes, the issue of double contingency is resolved through such a 
concretion. Commitment signifies an alignment of wills over time so, in a sense, it is open-ended. In 
MacCormick’s (2008: Chapters 4) examination of Hart he alludes to this requirement. MacCormick 
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 Teubner (2001) refers to an orthogonal relationship between law and its environment through the term 
'production regimes'. 
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 Luhmann (2012: 193) sets out this theoretical structure, but he does not go as far as to apply it to the legal 
concerns of validity and authority. 
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(2008: 45-49) makes the point that the volitional component of a rule must not be one of principle. 
Support for law cannot be because it coincides with our vegetarianism, for example. Commitment 
must be towards an end or common value. It is a conscious commitment that is directed towards 
communication. 
This idea of commitment corresponds to a specialized function of law highlighted by Luhmann (2004: 
145ff.) – the capacity of law to bind time. This is a conception of time that exists prior to meaning, 
because it provides the foundations for communication.360 This binding of time concerns the 
irreversibility of events and the reversibility of structures; it is not the same idea as that which I have 
previously discussed under the banner of the temporal dimension of meaning.361 Law solves a 
specific problem for communication concerned with learning and non-learning. Norms address the 
problem of under what circumstances we should expect our expectations to change? The normative 
expectations provided by law do not change (i.e. learn) in the face of cognitive disappointments. The 
very functionality of the legal system and its differentiation in modern society is at stake when the 
relationship between binding time and mutual commitment is threatened. It is therefore managed 
with special care. The threat of dis-engagement and dis-commitment operates so as to taper the 
range of possible selections in a similar manner to the operation of Hart’s threat of disapprobation; 
however, in contrast to Hart, this position does not require the presumption of a social group or 
community upon which this threat can be conditioned.  
Like the thermostat: how do legal actor’s control by being controlled? Let us recall that the 
attributive constellation is aimed at resolving the problem of double contingency. Symbolically 
generalized media offer a solution to this problem of co-ordination, and it is an answer that is 
precisely adapted to the exigencies of modern society. On each side of the equation there is both an 
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awareness of contingency and an attempt to manage it. A observes B and sees that B is also an 
observing entity. A observes that B knows that they are under observation from A. Furthermore, A is 
also aware that B is adapting their observations in line with A’s observations. ‘In line’ does not signify 
rational consensus: once a distinction is established between the two minds it cannot be effaced.362 
This primordial distinction with its attendant impasse can only be avoided if the issue is shifted out 
of view by adroit (!) manipulation of the temporal, social, and factual dimensions of meaning.  
In an analogous move to the nominal reflection required by Raz’s dependency thesis explained 
earlier in this chapter, Luhmann’s co-dependency in the medium of legal validity need not be 
substantive. Indeed, it must not be. Symbolic generalization overcomes not only the problem of 
double contingency between actors face-to-face, but additionally the symbolic form conquers the 
great exigencies endemic in the modern world, specifically: delayed and protracted communication 
between participants, spatial distribution, factual complexity, and the social individuality of 
motivations for actions (Luhmann, 2012: 190 ff.).363 As a consequence, there are severe limitations 
on the capacity of the legislator to monitor the reception of any valid legal action. In contrast to the 
close proximity that is likely to exist between a parent and child, a legal action that attempts to 
secure acceptance by recourse to the symbol of validity is not able to assess whether the legislator’s 
decided action forms the premises for the recipient’s decided action.364 The complication can be 
posed in several different ways depending upon the issuing authority in question. Is the law being 
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 Being in line signifies a highly formal interaction between participants that has sidelined the problem of 
double contingency. It signifies an assumption of mutual commitment and a meshing of perspectives between 
such participants. It also references Wittgenstein’s (1958:201a) rule paradox.  
363
 I would emphasize again that this sociological insight is a valuable complication to the topic articulated 
within analytical jurisprudence. The symbolic generalization of valid law differentiates law’s performance from 
that which takes place when the authority of a parent is exercised over a child, or the rule-bound behaviour in 
a chess game. 
364
 For the parent-child example this proximity need not be simply physical (a conversation in the kitchen the 
same room, living in the same household, etc.). Proximity is also guaranteed by a limitation on the possible 
actions such that, on a factual level, there is a limited context for parental authority to be exercised or 
rejected. There is also a restriction on the possible moves that can be made on a chessboard. Not in the sense 
of a valid move, but in the fact that there are only a certain number of squares on the board and there are a 
limited number of chess pieces. 
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followed? Will the court accept our contractual arrangement and the accompanying actions as valid? 
Will the beneficiary accept our execution of the trust? Will they make mischief? Has compliance 
really taken place?365 The actualization of the validity symbol ensures that these anxieties can be 
avoided. Trust is placed in the symbol and such concerns are off-loaded to a site in which this level of 
variability and complexity can be managed, namely: legal argumentation. The symbol would fail on 
its own terms if a person had to enquire as to whether these pre-conditions were actually met by 
such actions. Symbols stand in place of such enquiries, such that we can successfully form 
expectations of others expectations without encountering the knotty problem of finding out (a) 
what these expectations and pre-conditions in fact are, and (b) whether these pre-conditions are in 
reality met by the corresponding actions. It is the circularity of validity which is of importance: the 
anticipation of conformity to pre-conditions and the conformity to anticipated pre-conditions.366 
This section has sought to explain how the attributive constellation interacts with communication. 
From the perspective of the constellation, symbolic validity circulates as a decided action connecting 
to a decided action. I have highlighted the number of dependencies recognized by Hart, Raz, and 
Postema. The reason for doing so is to highlight the radically heterarchical nature of connections 
between valid decisions.  
We will now move on to consider the distribution of validity as connectivity. The import of this 
analysis for discrimination law will be revealed by showing how experiences are registered as invalid 
positions.  
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 Doctrines of statutory interpretation recognize the difficulty in assessing the acceptance of a rule. What 
would constitute acceptance of a rule? Does one judge the rule on the basis of its purpose, on its literal 
meaning, or on the mischief it seeks to correct? Crucially, I am suggesting that such ambivalences can be 
generalized outside the official environs of the law to consider legal actors in a more universal and complete 
sense.  
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 As referenced above in this chapter, a symbolic media cannot be specific. Notions of friendship and 
solidarity connect the elements of the love medium to other elements, but for love to be an effective medium 
the particulars of these relationships do not need to be uncovered as long as their extended forms are 
available for use. A thorough analysis of a friendship, or the 'reality' of a marriage, often destabilizes the bond 
between persons. We need to be very careful in offering proofs of our love and our friendship lest we damage 
the relationship itself. Best leave these risks to events that can be organized beforehand, so that expectations 




CONNECTIVITY AND CONTINGENCY: HOW IS VALIDITY AND INVALIDITY, RULE-
FOLLOWING AND RULE DEVIATION SEEN? 
 
The positive value 'symbolizes the connectivity of medium-specific operations, whereas the negative 
value symbolizes only the contingency of conditions for connectivity' (Luhmann, 2012: 218). 
 
Actions follow actions. A pedestrian may cross the street quickly in order to avoid an oncoming car, 
or a customer eats what they have been served. Jurisprudence has often taken refuge in such 
hypotheticals as a way of explicating the nature of rules. Often enough these can be framed as a 
chain of actions. For example: (i) on the chessboard one move follows another move; (ii) A orders B 
to hand over his money and threatens to shoot him if he does not comply; (iii) party A requests that 
party B pay his taxes or be prosecuted. These latter instances of the highwayman and tax-collector 
are deployed by Hart to illustrate the difference between 'having an obligation' and 'being obliged' 
(Hart, 1994: 82). Positivists, in various degrees, hold that the existence of beliefs and psychological 
experiences, such as compulsion, are neither necessary nor sufficient for appreciating the existence 
of binding rules.  
We might interpret Hart’s legal outsiders as understanding phenomena through the lens of 
experience. A person makes a decision to stop at the red light because in their experience this is the 
safest course; or even, a person stops at the red light out of an unconscious habit. The action of 
stopping is brought about by an experience of a certain regularity. In contrast, the legal insider will 
understand such phenomena as action following action. The person driving the car stops before the 
red light because the traffic light signals an expected standard of behavior with an accompanying 
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obligation to comply with the standard (Hart, 1994: 90).367 The regulation has been enacted through 
an action and it demands an action (or forbearance) by the driver in response.  
For systems theory, how can the actions of the highwayman be categorized? The action is viewed as 
an example of an invalid decision brought about through a signal of dis-engagement. As I have 
explained above, the symbolic media of validity relies on an organic referent of engagement to 
motivate acceptance from each participant. The continuum of the validity medium hinges upon 
mutual commitment as a solution to the problem of double contingency. The possibility of 
disruption to this infrastructure is used as a way to procure acceptance of a rule. It is this recognition 
of invalidity and experience by the decisional-chain which can indicate the limitations on how 
discrimination can be understood by such decisions. Let us consider these topics more closely. 
This thesis suggests that the meaningfulness of valid decisions qua actions are generalized through 
reference to Luhmann’s tripartite dimensions of meaning - factual, temporal, and social. 
Connectivity and contingency in the validity continuum are achieved through the performance and 
interconnections between these generalizations. The concatenation of valid decisions is not secured 
to unchanging sources of authority because the recursive structures of communication change from 
event to event. Generalizations are certainly retained as programmatic clusters, but these are not 
set in stone; they are continuously re-written and may be severely up-ended from time to time. 
These generalizations are sufficiently abstract as to allow normative terminology to be set alongside 
factual similarity, opportunities and constraints offered by time, and the demarcation of social 
competences. Analytically we can separate these generalizations, but in reality they interlock and 
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 Hart (1994) holds that the majority of the population carry the insider perspective. Tentatively he admits 
that this is a necessary fact for the functioning of the legal system. A systems theory approach, however, sees 
the problem differently. It holds that the admittance of the external perspective must be closely controlled 
because it signifies invalidity within the system. Statements of illegality and declarations of invalidity are 
allowed sparingly, but only as a reflexive value to allow a managed reconfiguration of validity.   
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modulate one another.368 Holfeld’s normative correlatives can be upended by the application of a 
legal proposition and the logical postulates that are deduced from it. Factual generalizations from 
past cases and similar instances can be upended by a higher court, or a legislature. 
The system re-constructs itself in each event. Each operation re-establishes its own meaningful 
horizons. Motives for action are ascribed ex post facto and deliberations for a decision are 
established by the decision itself: a judge re-constructs the history of a case around the context of 
their decision. This means also that consequences can be conditions for a decision.369 In terms of 
invalidity and experience: past disengagement can trigger a legal reaction, but equally anticipation of 
future dis-engagement can trigger a reaction. A party may feel obliged rather than obligated to 
follow the order of the highwayman, but this non-normative decision to follow the highwayman can 
still connect with further decisions. The highwayman’s order can be construed as an invalid decision 
by a valid decision. Invalid decisions are not binding, but they can offer themselves as a reflective 
pedestal for the communication of a valid decision. From the perspective of the continuum of valid 
decisions, the invalid aspect of the highwayman’s decision provides a scope for reflection that 
supports the validity continuum. This is achieved because the invalid decision of the highwayman 
serves as a motivation for the acceptance of a valid decision. Not in terms of a sanction or a display 
of group disapproval, but in terms of a threat of dis-engagement. 
The future threat of disengagement posed by the highwayman – whether by that person continuing 
to act as such, or because the threat diminishes the future commitment of the population to the law 
– should be avoided. The threat of dis-engagement is, in many respects  the motivation or the real 
sanction of modern law. It works within the symbolic medium of validity as the organic referent 
acting to pressure the making of a valid decision that can connect to other valid decisions. The 
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 It is oft-stated, incorrectly as it turns out, that the Chinese character for crisis also indicates opportunity. 
But there is value in perceiving this connection. A crisis in terms of social legitimacy offers an opportunity to 
reduce factual costs. The pressure of time may cause a person to see the situation in a new light.  
369
 A strange loop in which the future conditions the past. 
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actions of the ‘outlaw’ contribute to the formation of legality because they contribute to the 
invalidity of law to be generalized as a violation of a norm, deviation from a rule, and contravention 
of a statute. From this position, the threat of dis-engagement shadows the connectivity of valid 
decisions ranging from the layman and employer to the court.370 
Hart and Raz may diverge from such a conclusion because the philosophical bases of their 
theorizations do not stem from a theory of distinctions and therefore refuse to admit fully the 
paradoxes associated with self-reference.371 Drawing a distinction opens up the possibility of self-
observation such that a re-entry may occur. Neil MacCormick’s analysis of the hermeneutic position 
in which an outsider can observe an insider without losing their initial external position points in this 
direction. Taken further, a fourth position materializes in which an insider observes an outsider 
without losing their initial internal position. This is a fairly unremarkable encounter - a judge 
observes the actions of a person alienated and uncommitted to the law. Luhmann's theoretical 
enterprise allows for a distinction to have a positive and negative component such that both valid 
and invalid positions are realized within the legal system. 
This connectivity can also be found in Raz’s philosophy of law. Raz has made the claim that each 
decision must depend on the deliberations which it seeks to displace. This service model of authority 
seems to be tenable in terms of a judicial decision since it would be a rare occasion indeed in which 
a judge would suggest that they had not taken the arguments of the parties into consideration at 
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 Nobles and Schiff (2002) recognize a comparable position by noting that a superior court must establish a 
workable relationship with a lower court by supporting the validity of the lower court’s decision (showing 
deference to its ascertainment of the facts and reports of evidence) which in turn bolsters the superior court’s 
validity because it has been reached through an appeal process; and further, a lower court defends the finality 
of its decision by managing the threat of future dis-engagement from the decision of a superior court. This is 
done by following precedent and presenting the decision as consistent with other valid decisions.  
 
371
 For a deconstruction of the rule of recognition through a revealing of its foundational circularity, see 
Kramer (1988). Unlike analytical jurisprudence, systems theory has no issues with paradoxes. Such 
constructions are not considered a logical error, nor do we need to develop a hierarchy of types to avoid them. 
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all.372 This may be one reason why a court is reluctant to rule on an issue which is not pertinent to 
the case at hand. Equally, the legislature may justify its decision to enact a new law by reference to a 
political mandate or a public expectation. It is only in extremis that the risk is taken in which a 
connection to a further valid decision is not sought such as in the granting of emergency powers.373  
The instigation of action by action is integral to the connection of valid decisions to further valid 
decisions. In the previous sections I have sought to deepen this analysis by stressing the numerous 
dependencies recoverable in the scholarship of Hart, Raz, and Postema. The aim has to been to 
transliterate their theses on dependency, authority, validity, and efficacy into a systems theoretical 
framework. From this exercise the recursivity and connectivity of valid decision communications are 
exhibited as limitations on the law. 
A legal decision motivates acceptance through validity because it communicates a commitment to 
be controlled i.e. it is already committed as a resolution of double contingency. With the availability 
of various meaning dimensions a valid decision has a variety of connections from which it can 
construct its premises, but with this being the case even the highest authorities seem to depend on 
bodies which are lower down the ladder. So who is in control? 
By itself the attributive constellation does not indicate which side of the action-to-action equation 
has priority. Each ‘actor’ performs the role of both Alter and Ego, and therefore each actor has the 
capacity to bind the other. The distribution of priority is dependent upon the manner in which 
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 In a further sense, Raz's dependency thesis may correlate with Robert Alexy's (2002) argument that law 
makes a 'claim to correctness' such that law avoids self-contradiction. Therefore, any failure to reflect the 
excluded reasons - i.e. the dependent reasons - would amount to a self-contradiction which would undermine 
the validity of a legal decision.  
373
 One further point to note is that these singular legal decisions communicate on the basis of their rarity. Not 
every judicial decision, even in the highest court of the land, can be a landmark decision. This may be a further 
example of an applied sanction proper to modern law. Application of sanctions must be rare because it risks 
destabilizing the delicate interplay of interpenetration between communication and consciousness. We might 
consider this as a sanction in the sense that its validity is predicated on dis-engagement. There is a 
communicated shift in which the recursive structures connected to decisions are abandoned in favour of new 
structures. If performed too often then the dialogical commitment that underpins legal validity may be 
disrupted. We can see this is in the manner that the overuse of emergency powers dilutes commitment to the 
law, or how the excessive production of landmark decisions may destabilize trust in the law.  
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meaning is allocated in the factual, social, and temporal dimensions. A hierarchical allocation 
mobilized through the social dimension is the most familiar formula. The doctrine of stare decisis 
operates as a scheme in this regard. The legal system produces a range of feedback loops in which 
observers mutually observe each other. An actor observes another, making predictions and 
decisions in respect of the other actor’s behaviour, while presuming that they are under observation 
themselves. This proposition is not only well-founded for the relations that a court maintains with 
other courts and legal personae. It can be extended also to suggest that binding can occur in which 
the formal sources of law – for Raz, the legislature, judiciary, and custom – are capable of being 
bound by legal persons. Strange loops do occur.374  
The symmetry of these loops is dislocated by the insertion of a distinction. In the social dimension, 
this would be an acceptance of an action made by Alter because other Ego’s also accept action’s 
made by Alter. Broadly, this can be understood as leadership (Luhmann, 1979: 156-160), but it also 
conforms to Raz’s social thesis in which the legislature, judiciary, and custom are sources of valid law 
by virtue of convention. Alternatively, the temporal dimension might be the mode which is 
generalized. In this situation, the action which binds another action is given by finding that the 
present action follows a past action. An example would be the operation of precedent and tradition. 
A more controversial example, however, would be the fact that a claimant has found that their legal 
arrangements have persuaded the court to take an action which is premised by their actions. The 
court communicates acceptance of their actions by declaring such arrangements to be legally valid. 




                                                                
374




When does a decision appear to be invalid? Raz (1995: 213) suggests that authority is lost when a 
decision fails to be content-independent, exclusionary, and dependent, and he also suggests that 
authority is lost when an 'arbitrator was bribed, was drunk while considering the case, or if new 
evidence of great importance unexpectedly turns up'. I have associated Raz's theses with the 
connectivity brought within the validity continuum. This, however, does not fully explain how 
invalidity is registered by the medium. This is especially important for this thesis because 
discrimination law, for a large part, seeks to identify and remedy violations of the law. Unlike other 
branches of law, discrimination law mainly operates so as to create obligations for employers to 
conduct their actions in a particular way. It is not especially constitutive of legal relations in which 
individuals manage their affairs in reliance on its precepts. Rights are granted but they emerge in the 
shadow of a violation. Consequently, understanding how invalid decisions are connected to valid 
decisions is important for this thesis. 
How can we know whether a rule has been followed or not followed? Since we hold that a rule can 
be encapsulated by the form of a valid decision the question then becomes: once a valid decision 
has been received has it been accepted or rejected by the receiving decision? Acceptance and 
rejection are communicated in response by the action of the participant that is expressed as a 
decision communication. Acceptance is communicated if the valid decision has been taken as a 
premise for the receiving decision; rejection is communicated when the valid decision is not taken as 
a premise for the receiving decision. I have argued above that rejection concerns dis-engagement. 
The Philosophical Investigations of Wittgenstein (1958: 201a) indicates the theoretical difficulty of 
discovering whether a rule has been followed. How can we know that each participant understands 
the rule in the same way? We can provide a more detailed version of the rule so that any 
misunderstanding can be avoided, but this provides further terms which can then form the basis for 
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a divergence of opinion. Greater explication invites greater possibilities for dissension. Alternatively, 
we can assemble all the past applications of the rule and use these instances as a direction for the 
appropriate application of the rule; however, the grouping of similarities between past cases is not 
guaranteed. Past cases can be collated and generalized using a variety of different metrics. And yet 
for the most part this quandary is avoided. Wittgenstein offers a prophetic explanation of how this 
works that fits with the sensibilities of this thesis. He suggests that to understand a rule is to know 
how to act. It is an issue of being able to 'see' and 'go on in the same way'. The following action goes 
on in the same way as the ruling action. Bert van Roemund (2013) explains this in terms of a 
'rehearsal' and a response in kind. Explaining the meaning of a rule corresponds to providing a recipe 
for a meal. Following the rule involves cooking the recipe. Rules operate as icons such that to 
execute a rule (follow, apply) is a response in kind. Wittgenstein (1958, para. 241) proposes that 
agreement between human beings is not concerned with opinions, but as a 'form of life'. A game 
proceeds not by expressing consensus or through explicit rule-agreement, but by a 'joyfully tuning 
into each other’s actions'.375 Agreement comes about as a presupposed mutual understanding. It 
coincides with the manner in which motivation to accept becomes entwined with selective co-
ordination. Validity manages to make the conditioning of selection into a motivating factor. 
Acceptance of a communication can be more likely if we know that the proffered information is 
organized around certain conditions and limitations. In turn, a valid rule is more likely to be accepted 
the more it restricts its conditioning.   
Systems theory, in contrast to the theory of Raz, holds that valid rules and invalid rules are contained 
within the legal system. Illegality, invalidity, and exceptionality exert themselves as limitative 
principles on the circulation of legal validity: an exception proves the rule. In its broadest terms, 
invalidity provides the jurisdictional limit on the formation of legal validity as conceived from the 
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 Van Roemund (2013: 556-7) quoting Wittgenstein. This conclusion is not overly esoteric. It works in the 
same manner as when we say that the only real way to engage with a painting is via another painting.   
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perspective of an attributive constellation.376 The threat of dis-engagement establishes the boundary 
for the circulation of validity and the threat is processed as a topic of communication through the 
recording of invalid and illegal positions. 
Robert Alexy (2002: 35-39) comes close to this thesis when he asserts that a ‘claim to correctness’ is 
a necessary element of law such that a performative contradiction will arise if a judge decides in 
favour of a defendant whilst stating that this decision is incorrect. Implicitly or explicitly law makes a 
claim to consistency and non-contradiction. When a contradiction emerges: ‘Legal character is 
forfeited when norms or systems of norms cross a certain threshold of injustice' (Alexy, 2002: 28). 
Alexy’s concept of injustice replays the manner in which invalidity forms the boundary of validity. 
Validity communicates with consistency and invalidity communicates with inconsistency. This can be 
formalized with reference to the lexicon of systems theory. Such a step is important because the 
claims which systems theory makes with reference to justice and validity are not reliant on 
substantive ideals. 
Consistency is a matter of ‘seeing’ the connections available to a communication. Inconsistency and 
contradiction is concerned with ‘seeing’ the contingency of such connections available to 
communication. This can be summarized in the legal maxim that justice demands like cases to be 
treated alike and dissimilar cases to be treated differently (Luhmann, 2004: Chapter 5). The question 
left open is what is meant by a ‘case’ and how is consistency/inconsistent communicated? I have 
already made the argument above that the notion of a source or case or even a text should be 
understood as a complex manifold, rather than  singular point of analysis. Hence, justice as a formula 
for contingency provides an angle for the interpretation of the validity continuum as it is bounded by 
a horizon of invalidity.  Logic and social convention, however, do not provide an exact determination 
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 The threat of physical coercion works as a horizon for the application of power. It is the 'inescapable 
borderline case of an avoidance alternative which forms power' (Luhmann, 1979: 149). 
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as to how consistency or inconsistency may arise. This is a matter for communication and the 
manipulation of temporal/social/factual dimensions of meaning. We will now consider this point. 
To observe the violation of a norm or the compliance of a norm can only come about when we 
realize that such insights are co-produced. The norm represents the connectivity of operations and 
the violation represents the contingency of such connections. The exception delimits the norm 
causing a consequent re-formulation of what the norm means. Furthermore, a rule has a very 
different effect dependent on the context. A rule indicates the decisive element of a decision, but for 
argumentation it is a 'symbol of redundancy' (Luhmann, 2004: 323). The invalidity of a norm is 
produced by visualizing a contradiction - an action rejects an expectation, for example.   
The manipulation of meaning conditions the assumption of consistency and the visualization of 
contradiction. Time multiples contradictions, but can also dissolve them: extending the boundaries 
of a situation allows further actors and intentions to come into contention, but an extension also 
allows the possibility of smoothing out the contradictions as a sequence (Luhmann, 1995: 378): 
chronology, narrative, epochs, or steps from a series of actions required to accomplish a goal. 
The dissolution of the contradiction, however, arrives with the modulation of meaning dimensions. A 
sequencing of events is achieved by reliance on a factual assessment such as the calculation of costs. 
Once the costs have been assessed then negative aspects of the action can be sorted into acceptable 
and unacceptable. Actions can then be taken which pursue the most advantageous and acceptable 
decision. Of course, this finding can then be modulated again, to be contradictory as a social 
dimension. Once acceptable costs are calculated and followed by actions then an opportunity arises 
in the social dimension of meaning. Those that find their interests to fall into being unacceptable 
costs are then engaged in a competition with others to secure their interest. 
Invalidity is visualized, therefore, through delimiting the connectivity of valid decisions qua actions. It 
involves seeing that something is an experience, rather than an action, that communicates the 
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absence of a valid decision which can be followed, or the absence of a decisional-premise for a 
decision. Both of these are disconnections in the attributive constellation underlying the 
communication of valid decisions with (i) involving action leading to experience, and (ii) involving 
experience leading to action. 
 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, in this chapter we have produced a Luhmannian conception of legally valid decisions 
through a reflection upon the jurisprudence of Raz and Hart. With this complete, a platform has 
been produced for understanding how the continuum of valid decisions is delimited by its 














CHAPTER 10 - APPLICATION OF DECISION ANALYSIS TO DISCRIMINATION LAW 
 
'Lawyers interpret the equality principle not as a prohibition of inequality, but as a prohibition of 
arbitrariness. This points to organization as a tool for regulatory specification. In other words, the 
equality principle is not a conditional program but a limitative principle.'  
(Luhmann, 2013: 152) 
 
This chapter illustrates how legal decisions work against the assumptions articulated in anti-
discrimination law scholarship and analyzed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. This analysis will uncover an 
unavoidable limit in the constitution of anti-discrimination law that contributes to providing a more 
complete description, which I have consistently described as a re-description, of this field. This is 
accomplished by placing the theory of a valid legal decision made out in Chapter 9 alongside the 
limitative principle of equality. In contrast to common assumptions in anti-discrimination law 
scholarship, equality is not a substantive or formal norm, but a constitutive and inviolate level within 
the recursion of legally decisive communications. Under the influence of this limitative principle, key 
terms within anti-discrimination law are meaningfully communicated through decisions by finding 
inconsistencies that can be explained in terms of experience. This involves understanding terms by 
considering the point of contact for further communications as an external cause, rather than 
locating the point of contact as an internal cause.377 Firstly, I will explain how the limitative principle 
of equality relates to the attributive constellation of action and the symbolic medium of valid 
decisions. Secondly, I will apply this analysis to argue that the meaning of key terms in anti-
discrimination cases (on racial grounds, on the grounds of sex) can only be understood through 
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 The difference between attributions of action (internal cause) and experience (external cause) has been 
explained in Chapter 9 of this thesis. 
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exposing and excluding arbitrariness as opposed to defining such terms in a positive manner. These 
registrations of arbitrariness are recognized as instances of prioritization, displacement, and 
inconsistency within the factual, social, and temporal dimensions of meaning.     
The principle of equality is a hallmark of a modern legal system in which social status is no longer 
determinative of legal relationships; each individual can avail themselves of rights and duties, 
powers and immunities, etc., by presupposing a reference to the universal legal category of the 
person. Exceptions to this principle of course exist, especially for those below the age of legal 
responsibility, or for those deemed incapable of making legal decisions. The history of discrimination 
law in the UK over the last six decades has aimed to provide a more substantive articulation of 
equality. In some respects, this goal aligns with the regulatory incursions into private law that have 
taken place over the last century. The abstract principle of equality has been supplemented with 
concrete protections for disadvantaged parties in legal relationships. Efforts to re-set imbalances of 
power have been pursued in a wide range of areas - labour and employment law, consumer law, 
landlord and tenant legislation, and so on. Public immunities and protections granted by human 
rights may also adhere to this trend.  
Luhmann’s principle of equality, however, is activated through the relationship between law as a 
communication system and the attributive constellation intimate to the symbolic media of validity. 
The principle operates as an unavoidable restriction on the concatenation of legal decisions. It does 
not arise through the particulars of a judicial decision nor through legislative enactment; accordingly, 
it cannot be repealed or directly effected through alterations emanating from this level of analysis. 
In the previous chapter I explained that Raz’s conception of authority declares the authority of a 
decision, as distinct from the content of a decision. If the decision is factually incorrect or 
disappointing in its outcome, then this does not diminish its authority as a decision. Here there is a 
structural resemblance to Luhmann’s equality principle. Both the equality principle and Raz’s notion 
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of authority point towards the limitations constricting legal decisions from extending beyond their 
underlying attributive constellation. This has salient consequences for the jurisprudence of 
discrimination law which I will develop below. 
The equality principle limits the recursive connection of decision to decision by prohibiting 
arbitrariness. When we are concerned with excluding the arbitrary, or that which is comprehended 
through chance and probability, there is a shorthand reference to the exclusion of experience. The 
equality principle functions so as to privilege a certain distribution of meaning by distinguishing 
between action and experience; thereby the system clarifies whether the point of contact for further 
operations is an internal or external cause (Luhmann, 1995: 83-84). If the connection for further 
communications is not confirmed as arbitrary and external, then it is instead explicable by internal 
attribution. By definition decisions are not made arbitrarily, but as determined selections from 
amongst alternatives.378 When decisions do appear arbitrary then they run the risk of undermining 
their constitution.  
In its broadest sense, this equality principle delimits the jurisdiction of law.379 The legal system 
maintains a number of practices that implement the equality principle.  When legal decision-makers 
condense and review relevant cases – stating the facts along with the salient legal issue, and 
articulating general legal propositions – the experiential aspect of the decision is identified and 
excluded. Each case under review is presented as distinguishable from each other case. They are 
presented as distinguishable items (exempla, scenarios, and scenes) as the premises from which a 
choice is to be made. This is a common feature of judicial decision-making. In the recent 
discrimination case of Walker v. Innospec Limited, Lord Kerr undertook just such a review of relevant 
cases when deciding on the extent to which the retrospectivity of judgments affects the liability of 
occupational pension schemes. A range of comparable instances were considered in order to 
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 This has been explained in Chapter 9 of this thesis. 
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 Martin Stone (1995: 65, ft. 50) also makes this connection by reference to his Wittgensteinian concept of 
interpretation as a 'rule of jurisdiction'. 
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provide a ruling on the time at which rights and duties become available for non-heterosexual 
spouses.380 Once such examples are distinguishable, then further points of contact for each case can 
only come from within each case as an internal implication. How far does this conclusion go? I am 
not suggesting that the cases surveyed by Lord Kerr are not available for further reasoning. In future 
decisions they can legitimately be subsumed within another case or a more general concept; 
however, if this takes place during the execution of a legal decision then these cases will be 
manipulated in order to distinguish a further array of examples from which a decision can be 
selected.381  
This review of rules and rulings is a way for a decision to eliminate arbitrariness. An illuminating 
antithetical structure is evident in scientific research.  Science deploys a number of limitative 
principles to find the truth and universality in each result. It is not a question of finding niches in 
which a result can be explained on its own terms, but instead each result must contribute, and 
hence be explicable, with reference to a shared world of experience. The veracity of each discovery 
is determined through its relationship to an external cause beyond itself whereby experimental 
procedures aim to ensure that each result is independently reproducible. Indications of an internal 
motivation are eliminated by the scientific limitative principles associated with falsifiability and 
testability.382 Science has an attributive constellation that chains experience to experience with an 
associated limitative principle that prohibits uniqueness and singularities. Mere opinions, biases, and 
idiosyncrasies are rooted out by explicit limitations within scientific methodology. Legal rulings are 
the opposite. Interrogation of rulings seeks to preserve the particularity of each decision by 
gradually smoothing out their arbitrariness, allowing the ruling to stand out amongst other 
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 [2017] UKSC 47, 30-44. The cases highlighted by Lord Kerr were - Defrenne v Sabena [1981] 1 All ER 122; 
Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607; Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group 
[1991] 1 QB 344, etc.  
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 The method in which cases are formally distinguished would be an illustration of this procedure. 
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 Luhmann (2012: 203-207) sketches this out with reliance on Karl Popper's (2002) famous work on The Logic 
of Scientific Discovery. 
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alternatives as a communication of a decision which can premise further decision 
communications.383  
If a court observes that a prior ruling has misunderstood a key issue, then that prior ruling is rejected 
as a premise for the decision at hand. This means that this aspect of the prior ruling is erroneous and 
is deemed unpersuasive. In the language of law's symbolic media, it is seen as invalid and adjudged 
to be dissimilar from the decision at hand. Invalidity provides an opportunity for reflection upon the 
contingency of valid rules. We are familiar with how exceptional cases trigger reconfigurations in the 
understanding of a rule by shedding light on the nature of the rule: the exception proves the rule. 
The decision-maker must observe the rule to be construed as invalid, but this is not given by logical 
deduction.  
So how can invalidity be observed? As Wittgenstein (1958) has explained, the observation of rule-
following involves acting and 'going on in the same way'. The analysis presented in the preceding 
chapter asserted that validity circulates presumptively and in essence you either see it or you do not. 
Invalidity, however, involves the recognition that the observed rule fails to cohere with one’s 
understanding of the rule. In a sense, utilizing Wittgenstein’s metaphor, we see the invalidity out of 
the corner of our eye with the rail on which we stand running disconnected to this other rail. On a 
practical level this phenomenon manifests itself in a variety of guises. A prominent manner in which 
the arbitrariness of a case is exposed is to adjudge that it is either an over-extension of a more 
general case, or that it fails to present itself as distinguishable from other cases. To understand such 
instances, we must seek communicative meaning from causes external to the case, and therefore 
information which is experiential in its bearing. 
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In the Walker v. Innospec Limited case Lord Kerr finds the decisions issued by the Court of Appeal 
and Employment Appeal Tribunal unpersuasive on this basis. He notes that these previous decisions 
failed to assert a crucial distinction between legislative retrospectivity and judicial retrospectivity.384 
Noting that in each instance they failed to see this fundamental issue is tantamount to exclaiming 
that they can be understood in respect of a point external to them. They fail to distinguish 
themselves because they fail to see the matter in the same way as Lord Kerr. The analysis pursued 
above may seem overly technical but it has already been considered by those inspired by 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations who follow his conclusions to assert: (i) the meaning of a 
rule cannot be extracted from its context, (ii) a rule is self-directed, and (iii) accordingly legal rules 
are a 'self-declared domain' determining their own 'limits, so to speak, of what can be said' (Stone, 
1995: 70, 71). 
What are the implications of this analysis? On a jurisprudential level, this limitation reflects the 
contention that Hart makes in differentiating between a habit and a rule. Rules indicate a normative 
state of obligation through the presence of an internal commitment; having a habit suggests that a 
person is obliged by the pressure of an external factor.385 The phenomena falling under a habit fails 
to stand-out on their own terms as self-attributive selections. Dimensions of meaning are utilized to 
establish a priority from which the habit is understood as an extension. Temporally speaking this can 
be understood in terms of how present habits come about as an extension of former actions. A 
person follows their former actions. Socially, habitual behavior can be observed as an extension of 
another’s behaviour. A person out of deference or social pressure follows the actions of another. 
The factual dimension is helpfully highlighted by Martin Stone (1995). It is a question of this 
following that such that a ruling is conceived as an extension of another rule; and we should recall 
that Luhmann’s (1995: 76) definition of factuality involves distinguishing this from something else. To 
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be clear: it is the presence of extensionality or displacement which signifies that the observed 
phenomenon is an experiential attribution because the communication connects to a point of 
contact external to itself.386 Stone (1995: 70 ff.) presents a convincing argument that the notion of 
reasonableness often works in this manner. Reasonableness is the factual prioritization from which 
various procedures and sub-rules extend.387 He considers the well-known Spartan Steel case as an 
example (Stone, 1995:72-74). In this judgment, Lord Denning considers whether the plaintiff can 
recover for economic loss arising from negligent damage to an electrical cable caused by a 
contractor. The issues argued would normally concern the traditional tort concepts of duty, 
remoteness, and the directness of damage caused. Instead of this approach Lord Denning feels that 
the authorities cited offer little guidance for deciding on this difficult issue. Therefore, he turns to 
the public policy considerations for extending liability for economic loss. Should it be spread to the 
whole community or be placed on a single pair of shoulders? This is a hard case and the uncertainty 
encountered by the court is managed by limiting tortious liability through reference to policy 
considerations. Martin Stone contends that Spartan Steel illustrates that the meaning of tortious 
concepts (duty of care, reasonableness) are consolidated by focusing on the external considerations 
of policy.388 Tortious concepts of duty and remoteness are not settled by investigating them in their 
particularity - perhaps through sub-dividing duties into separate headings and Benthamite 
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 I have used the following terms to attempt a description of this movement - extension, displacement, 
prioritization. Descriptors such as a reduction or constriction might also be suitable terminology because they 
are meaningful as a movement from a state that is out of sight (non-constricted) to a state that is in focus 
(constricted) i.e. the state in focus is explicable by reference to an external cause.  
387
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argumentative topoi; however, these are not explored in-depth in this thesis. 
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tabulations. Instead, the generality of tortious rules is preserved by a limitative principle that 
delimits these rules by exposing topics such as policy that can be understood only by considering 
information external to itself. Policy is meaningfully communicated by how it contributes towards a 
goal external to itself; it is explicable and dependent upon an external prioritization, for example: 
how far or near it is to an aim, or whether it is the appropriate method for achieving a goal. Similarly 
for anti-discrimination law, the fact that key terms - such as 'on racial grounds' - are self-directed 
and outlined by exposing inconsistencies will be examined below.  
Clearly the references to interpretation in the preceding paragraphs differ from its normal utilization 
in jurisprudence. This type of interpretation concerns the manner in which decisions respond to 
decisions. It is a type of communicative understanding concerned with how something can be 
explained by something else, or how an expression can be usefully substituted for another 
expression.389 Literary theory scrutinizes this phenomenon under the topics of metonym and 
metaphor. The Equality Act 2010 is the codifying statute for anti-discrimination law for the UK. Like 
many statutes there are a number of terms presented that operate as substituted expressions for 
each other. Section 4 explains that the protected characteristics can be understood to indicate: age, 
disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, 
religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation. Section 9 of the Act explains further that race can be 
understood as including ‘colour, nationality, and ethnic or national origins’. Section 13 sets out a 
definition of direct discrimination as when a person directly discriminates against another if, because 
of a protected characteristic, that person treats the other less favourably than they treat or would 
treat others. Section 13(5) stipulates that less favourable treatment according to race includes 
segregating that person from others. Section 19 outlines a claim for indirect discrimination as when 
a person applies to another a 'provision, criterion, or practice' which is discriminatory in relation to a 
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relevant protected characteristic. The detailing of 'provision, criterion, or practice' can be 
understood as various expressions which indicate something else.  
 The criticism that one may raise in response to the preceding proposition concerning interpretation 
is that each term simply presents a more specific form of the most general term. Is there not a 
general meaning of direct discrimination which is further specified by forms that explain each term 
by reference to further terms? Can we not clarify direct discrimination by reference to a test in the 
form if x, y, z are established then a legal consequence follows? So, for example, we have the 
general term ‘protected characteristics’ which is a key component to each form of discrimination 
and this determines a class of further terms: race, gender, sexual orientation, and so on? I would 
suggest not. Even the most general terms are explained and understood by reference to other terms. 
The recursivity of meaning demands it. This does not invoke an infinite regress because meanings 
cluster into sub-complexes and programmatic streams; moreover, communication would never get 
off the ground if such paradoxes were frequently encountered. This will be illustrated in the sections 
below. 
In terms of decisions communications a legal rule is not fashioned to achieve an aim beyond or 
outside itself. A concept is clipped through ironing out arbitrariness. The consequence of this 
approach is that the rules and concepts that compose direct discrimination are not constructed so as 
to achieve a particular aim outside of themselves. These rules are not aimed at finding whether 
there is liability or a wrong committed by the employer, nor are the rules constructed with a view to 
upholding a principle such as equality or dignity. Understanding direct discrimination and indirect 
discrimination as formulae or a collection of steps to ascertain a particular result fails to grasp how 




ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE LIMITATIVE PRINCIPLE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES 
The determination of a decision communication is not executed through the interpretation of a 
legislative provision. A decision is executed by following a rule. And yet, by taking into account 
Wittgenstein’s rule paradox, we cannot observe whether a rule is followed in a substantial or 
positive manner. The limitative principle of equality ensures that valid decisions follow other valid 
decisions by an ex negativo route in which arbitrariness and inconsistency are identified within the 
dimensions of meaningful communication. This is accomplished by observing relationships of priority 
and extension in the factual and temporal dimensions, or through the presence of experiential 
attributions in the social dimension. As a consequence, decisions in the field of discrimination law 
are executed without positive reliance on key legislative provisions, or through precise articulation 
of substantive norms. This finding contradicts how most anti-discrimination scholars have presented 
the law (examined in Chapter 2 of this thesis). 
The facts of James v Eastleigh Borough Council390 related to a leisure centre that provided a 
discounted rate for all pensioners who wished to use the swimming pool. The issue was whether the 
provision of this discount for pensioners violated section 1 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 that 
prohibited direct discrimination on the ground of sex. At the time, the pensionable age differed 
between men and women. As such it was alleged that this discount amounted to less favourable 
treatment ‘on the ground of’ sex contrary to the Act. The issue on appeal concerned the proper 
meaning of this statutory provision. Does ‘on the ground of’ require a discriminator to intentionally 
treat a person less favourably such that gender was a motivation or a substantial reason for the 
treatment? Controversially, a majority at the House of Lords found that the provision was essentially 
causative in nature in which one should ask whether ‘but for’ the sex of the victim the treatment 
would have been different. The way each Law Lord justified their decision exhibits how a decision 
communication is executed through exposing and avoiding of arbitrariness. Lord Bridge, in the 
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majority finds two inconsistencies to support his decision. Firstly, he relies on the social dimension of 
meaning by stating  that to decide otherwise would be to contradict a decision already made by 
other courts: 
‘But to construe the phrase, 'on the ground of her sex' as referring to the alleged discriminator's 
reason in this sense is directly contrary to a long line of authority confirmed by your Lordships' House 
in R v Birmingham City Council, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1989] IRLR 173.’ (para. 9) 
Secondly, he discerns an inconsistency in the adoption of the term ‘pensionable age’ as a discount 
rate because this referred to a statutory definition which was already discriminatory such that the 
actions of the leisure centre are an extension of a previous decision or another decision-maker. As I 
have explained earlier in this Chapter, seeing a matter as an extension of a further issue is suggesting 
that the matter is meaningful by reference to what is external to itself i.e. as an experiential 
attribution that is highlighted and eliminated by the limitative principle of equality. Policy, in general, 
also has this quality when visualized by a legal decision.  Alternatively, the term pensionable age can 
be understood as a factual inconsistency in which the meaning of a term is contracted - as a 
shorthand, or synecdoche -  into a further expression: 
 ‘The expression 'pensionable age' is no more than a convenient shorthand expression which refers to 
the age of 60 in a woman and to the age of 65 in a man.’ (para 8.) 
On the other hand, Lord Lowry dismissed the appeal. He framed his decision by reference to a choice 
between divergent opinions given by the other Lordships to the case. This observation of an 
inconsistency between these opinions provides premises for Lord Lowry's decision:  
‘I can discern in your Lordships' speeches, which I have had the advantage of reading in draft, two 
logical and persuasive trains of thought which lead to opposite conclusions, and the question is how 
to choose between them.’ (para. 41) 
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He then provides further examples of arbitrariness, that are reliant upon the factual dimension of 
meaning in which a phrase signifies this rather than that, to support his decision.  Through statutory 
construction he gives meaning to his selective interpretation (i.e. decision) by seeing an 
inconsistency between the natural, grammatical, and dictionary meaning of a term and the 
causation definition provided by Lord Bridge. Seeing an inconsistency involves finding an externally 
caused attribution such that the 'causation definition' in focus is determined through its 
inconsistency relationship to the 'natural meaning' that is out of focus: causation<natural meaning. 
 ‘Counsel argued that the subjective construction 'artificially confines the meaning of “ground”. I 
must disagree: the subjective construction uses 'ground' in its natural meaning, whereas the 
causative construction suppresses the natural meaning. The phrase 'on the ground of' does not mean 
'by reason of'; moreover, 'ground' must certainly not be confused with 'intention'.’ (para. 50) 
If the term is defined through an extension from a prior source or as a state inconsistent in respect 
of another state (something else), then this signifies that its meaningful communication is located 
externally to itself i.e. as an attribution of experience. Such indicia are sought out and eliminated by 
the limitative principle of equality. 
The JFS case provides a further illustration of this thesis.391 The case concerned the admissions policy 
of a Jewish school which gave preference, in the event of over-subscription, to those children 
regarded as Jewish by the standard Orthodox test of matrilineal descent. The question for the court 
was whether this policy was discrimination contrary to section 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976. The 
court was split 5:4 with the majority deciding that the policy was implemented on the grounds of 
race and therefore in breach of the Act. Lord Philips, for the majority, premised his decision by 
‘seeing’ inconsistencies in the manner of preference given, as articulated above. He notes that 
section 3 of the Act defines racial grounds as involving ‘colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national 
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origins’. The issue is whether JFS's reliance on matrilineal descent falls within this section. Lord 
Philips frames his reasoning in contradistinction to the arguments of counsel made by Lord Pannick 
who asserted that matrilineal descent is not necessarily racial in character because it also includes 
converts to the Jewish faith. Lord Pannick asserted further that the policy essentially involved a 
religious test, rather than one grounded on race. In the prior case of Mandla v Dowell Lee, Lord 
Fraser had provided a detailed examination of the section in considering whether Sikhs could be 
considered as an ethnic group for the purposes of the 1976 Act.392 
‘Initially I found Lord Pannick's argument persuasive, but on reflection I have concluded that it is 
fallacious. The fallacy lies in treating current membership of a Mandla ethnic group as the exclusive 
ground of racial discrimination. It ignores the fact that the definition of "racial grounds" in section 3 
of the 1976 Act includes "ethnic or national origins". Origins require one to focus on descent. Lord 
Pannick is correct to submit that descent simpliciter is not a ground of racial discrimination. It will 
only be such a ground if the descent in question is one which traces racial or ethnic origin.’ (para. 33) 
Lord Philips perceives an inconsistency between the criteria laid down by Lord Fraser in the Mandla 
case and the statute itself. The Mandla group is not the 'exclusive ground of discrimination' 
envisioned by the Act. Lord Philips' interpretation of the Mandla group involves seeing it as a 
reductive and incomplete version of that which was provided for under the Act: Mandla group < Act. 
Thus, Lord Philips' interpretation of Mandla conceptualizes it as a movement from the meaning 
provided by the Act i.e. as meaningful in reference to a cause external to itself. Following this 
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conclusion, how does Lord Philips deal with this observed inconsistency? He does so through a 
schema of extension and prioritization in which the provision of evidence and authoritative religious 
statements provide a definition that extends to section 3 of the Act and the present case. He relies 
on the statements by the Chief Rabbi on the nature of conversion to the Jewish faith, and also on 
submissions made by the head of the movement for Reform Judaism (para. 39-40). The words of the 
Act are envisioned as an extension from the (prioritized) statements of the Chief Rabbi and other 
authoritative religious statements. Lord Philips premises his decision through exposing such 
schemata. It is the limitative principle of equality which guarantees the excavation of his decision.   
Baroness Hale, also in the majority, in her opinion set out the principles and context of anti-
discrimination law. And yet, two of the major propositions which support her decision are also 
conceivable in terms of a contradiction. In a sense, she invokes a purposive interpretation of the 
legislation by noting that no parliament would fail to extend protection to the Jewish people from 
racial discrimination; the history of the 20th century contradicts such a proposition. In the below 
passage, parliamentary intention is invoked ex negativo – what it denies and prohibits. 
‘There is no doubt that the Jewish people are an ethnic group within the meaning of the Race 
Relations Act 1976. No Parliament, passing legislation to protect against racial discrimination in the 
second half of the twentieth century, could possibly have failed to protect the Jewish people, who had 
suffered so unspeakably before, during and after the Holocaust’ (para. 67) 
In the same passage Baroness Hale also noted another negative proposition which supports her 
decision by explaining what the Act does not do and what it does not mean. 
‘Parliament might have adopted a model of substantive equality, allowing distinctions which brought 
historically disadvantaged groups up to the level of historically advantaged groups. But it did not do 
so. It adopted a model of formal equality, which allows only carefully defined distinctions and 
otherwise expects symmetry.’ (para. 67) 
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If we turn to the decisions in the minority then we see the self-same pattern in which the restrictive 
influence of the limitative principle of equality recursively forecloses the premises for each decision 
communication. Both Lord Hope and Lord Rogers founded a part of their decision on the issue of 
consequences.  Lord hope suggests that the decision of the majority 'leads to extraordinary results' 
(para. 188) - a sentiment seconded by Lord Rodgers:  
'The decision of the majority means that there can in future be no Jewish faith schools which give 
preference to children because they are Jewish according to Jewish religious law and belief.'  (para. 
225).  
After this recognition, Lord Hope suggested: 'The phrase "racial grounds" in section 1(1)(a) of the 
1976 Act requires us to consider what those words really mean--whether the grounds that are 
revealed by the facts of this case can properly be described as "racial".' (para. 199).  Three 
inconsistencies are registered. First, highlighting the consequences of the decision relies on showing 
that the present decision leads to a future state which is at odds with aim of the Act, or the 
intentions of Parliament. Second, the majority verdict contradicts the provision of Jewish faith 
schools in toto. Third, this leads Lord Hope to visualize a contradiction between the 'what the words 
really mean' and the meaning proposed by the majority.  
In conclusion, if a concept of equality or definition of a key term impacts upon decisions then it only 
manages to do so in terms of the limitative principle: arbitrariness is highlighted and excluded in the 
concatenation of valid decisions. The exposure and exclusion of inconsistencies provides a series of 







In respect of the literary review in Chapter 2 the preceding analysis in this chapter suggests the 
following. If each statutory term and central concept of discrimination law is self-directed and 
delimited by inconsistencies, then the ability to explain the forms of discrimination as a test is 
doubtful. Each concept does not constitute a step within a formula such as - if x, y, z then 
consequence A. Much scholarship has been directed towards distinguishing the forms of 
discrimination (direct, indirect, harassment, positive action, disability) in accordance with how they 
can be understood morally and with reference to justice. Various formulae and schemes have been 
generated to comprehend such discrimination claims. The recursivity of decision communications in 
this area suggest that this approach of generating simplified schemes does not reflect the operation 
of the law. For decision communications in anti-discrimination law the following concepts are 
defined by exposing information which is externally constructed: protected characteristics, 
causation, a justification for indirect discrimination as the ‘proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim’, etc. Inconsistencies are found through manipulating the factual, social, and temporal 
dimensions of meaning of such terms. As a consequence these key terms are only understood 
through delimitation; they are not defined positively. This would mean that a valid decision by the 
court to find direct discrimination, for example, does not involve identifying an action and intention 
on behalf of the employer. Instead, these concepts are delimited by finding inconsistencies that can 
be explained in terms of experience i.e. the point of contact for further communications is an 
external cause.  
In this chapter, we have presented a further re-description of anti-discrimination law. The manner in 
which legal decisions are recursively connected occurs in a far different manner than is generally 
supposed. The principle of equality is a limitative principle operating as an 'inviolate level' for the 
execution of decisions; it is not a substantive norm or a formal concept that rationalizes or brings 
coherence to anti-discrimination law. Both Chapters 10 and 11 complement the theorizations and 
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proposed limitations on anti-discrimination law that has been highlighted in the literature. This 
analysis contributes towards providing a re-description of the limits of anti-discrimination law 



















CHAPTER 11 - THESIS CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to address the following questions. (1) What is the social basis for discrimination 
from a systems theory informed perspective? (2) How does this perspective add to the incomplete 
view on offer in anti-discrimination scholarship? (3) What are the unacknowledged limitations on a 
discrimination claim when we focus upon the recursive limitations of legal argumentation? (4) What 
are the unacknowledged limitations on a legal decision when we focus upon how valid decisions are 
recursively constructed as legal communications? The overall aim has been to re-describe the social 
problem of discrimination and the legal understanding of anti-discrimination law from a perspective 
that is attuned to the discontinuity of these positions, and which can further elaborate upon the 
ethereal and intensive modality of discrimination itself.  
One key contribution of this thesis has been to find a way towards identifying a social basis for 
discrimination that presumes (i) that this phenomenon is inherently complex, and (ii) that there is no 
central or essential conception of it. This has been accomplished by considering the diachronic 
development of systems-references and social structures in addition to a synchronic consideration of 
racism. The route taken has identified certain of Luhmann’s concepts as significant for this analysis 
(society/interaction, society/world, self-description, and functional differentiation), then 
supplemented their Luhmannian analysis by combining methodologies from Foucault and Deleuze to 
explicate how race operates visibly in a public scene to channel irritability and intensities between 
social systems, especially through repetition in time itself. A more orthodox approach to systems 
theory is found wanting because one is left with either racism as operative at the societal level 
interlinked with functional differentiation, or racism as a system-specific history available in 
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differentiated models - functional sub-system, organization, interaction. These perspectives provide 
incomplete descriptions of discrimination.393  
The title of this thesis echoes the title of a collection of essays by Niklas Luhmann (2002): Theories of 
Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity. In those essays Luhmann suggests that the 
pre-conditions under which the problematic of modernity has arisen can be re-described with the 
aid of systems theory. The problematic of modernity encompasses the problems to which it has 
given form and the proposed solutions that have been created in response. A defining issue of 
modernity is a loss of faith in the continuum of reason to link the human with the rationally ordered 
universe.394 The social developments and technological advances of modernity have damaged our 
capacity to comprehend the whole of the world alongside its many antagonistic parts. Since at least 
the 18th century philosophy has sought to provide a resolution to this problem. In these essays 
Luhmann, however, does not propose a new solution, but offers instead a major epistemological 
shift such that the pre-conditions of the problematic are re-described.  
Luhmann's systems theory relies on an epistemology of second-order observation to consider the 
pre-conditions that underpin what an observer can see and not see, acknowledge and not 
acknowledge, remember and forget. The motifs picked up by Luhmann explore the radically 
ungrounded nature of observation - its partiality, self-reference, and paradox - in the fields of 
science, logic, philosophy, and social theory.  Luhmann takes the hallmark of modernity, along with 
its tensions and paradoxes, and uses it  productively to create a theory of society that accords it a 
prominent role. In no small part, this thesis has sought to re-describe anti-discrimination law in line 
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with these motifs. Where partiality, self-reference, and paradox have been found, then these have 
not been discounted as observational errors, but as indicative of the constitution of the phenomena 
under observation. 
The limitations of anti-discrimination law established by the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 
have served as points of focus to produce a re-description that takes racism as the archetypical form 
of discrimination. The difficulty of holding together a picture of the world and its constituent parts is 
reflected within discrimination scholarship in the tensions between: distributive justice and 
corrective justice, social groups and the individual, equality of outcome and equality of opportunity. 
This hallmark of modernity is also found in the difficulty in locating a core definition of 
discrimination, or a central moral tenet that matches the empirical reality of discrimination. There 
has been much recourse to concepts of autonomy, rationality, and immutability, as these can be 
seen as justifying action that is beyond partiality and prejudice. Consequently, discrimination has 
been identified as the obverse of such phenomena where, for example, the autonomy of the 
individual is violated or given insufficient regard. Via the optics of systems theory this thesis has 
attempted to reposition this approach. 
Anti-discrimination scholarship has defined its problems and offered its solutions by assuming a 
continuum that avoids the anxieties of modernity. There is an appeal to nature, universal human 
rights, historical and transcendental ideas of freedom, autonomy, and equality. But this vision 
dissipates as soon as we acknowledge that different rationalities are at work in the production of 
discrimination. The moral understanding of discrimination need not match the legal understanding; 
and the legal meaning of discrimination can be further split into sub-divisions surveying the 
justifications for finding discrimination in terms of legal argument, and the definitional concepts of 
discrimination in terms of legal decisions.  
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Modernity struggles to provide a description of society that is both universal in its scope, but which 
can also account for the singularities of life, system-specific references, and lived experience. In the 
same fashion, the identities protected by anti-discrimination law, such as those of race, gender, 
sexuality, age, religion, and disability pivot around this juncture, which allows them to bring together 
both a collective and abstract idea, and the individual and specific reality of experience. It is here 
that the methodologies adopted in this thesis can operate. The communication of discrimination is 
taken as an attempt by modern society to square both the universal and the singular in a way 
different from that of pre-modern-society; pre-modern society had provided a different self-
description that could support rather different historical analogues of discrimination. 
 
THEMES AND CONCLUSIONS – HOW HAVE THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS BEEN 
ADDRESSED? 
 
This thesis set out to address a series of questions pertinent to anti-discrimination law scholarship; 
however, it also had ambitions to extend the scope of such questions to engage with a wider set of 
implications not normally addressed by such work. The notion of limits was chosen as a crux upon 
which relevant questions could be refined, and as a point of focus amenable to a systems theory 
informed methodology. This was accomplished by firstly suggesting in Chapter 2 that discrimination 
operates in such a manner that is not easily grasped by existing approaches, because there is an 
assumption in such approaches that moral philosophical frameworks and legal categorizations can 
adequately, or already do in fact, reflect key facets of discrimination as an actual phenomenon. 
Legally informed approaches are especially guilty of assuming that the solutions proposed to 
counteract discrimination reflect the structures of the problem that, it is thought, need to be 
addressed. Distinctions between direct and indirect discrimination may be able to operate as 
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suitable statutory formulae, but this does not mean that they reflect the social basis for 
discrimination, or indeed the doctrinal development of relevant decisions and argumentation.  
Chapters 4 – 6 sought to identify a social basis for discrimination by revealing the complex history of 
discrimination, and finding limitations in terms of its communicative meaning. This was attained by 
proposing that the associated phenomena comprised at least three different strands of meaning 
that could not be collapsed into a central definition - mass mediated communications, moral 
communications, and artistic communications. The limitations of discrimination were then re-
described by considering historical comparators to discrimination which were more closely aligned 
with the allocation of esteem. Furthermore, the social basis of discrimination was positively linked 
with the societal structures of each epoch. This supports our initial assertion that discrimination is 
not a historic constant, but a factor in how society describes itself. The implication is that to 
understand discrimination properly we must see its historical contingency and the conditions which 
give rise to its reproduction in modern society. Finally, the malleability and intensity of 
discrimination was described by reference to the way in which modern society allows racism to 
make itself felt through a complex series of repetitions. This was exposed and expressed by reliance 
on the notion of Labour and Work in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Chapters 7-10 re-described the limits of how law understands discrimination by reference to discrete 
sections of the legal sub-system. Luhmann's autopoietic theory was used to produce and apply both 
a theory of legal argument and one of legal decision. One of the main aims of this analysis was to 
show that the legal categorizations of discrimination codified in statute do not reflect how the legal 
system reproduces its own understanding of discrimination. Firstly, in terms of legal argument, it 
was suggested that an approach in which moral justifications provide a suitable explanation for how 
doctrine develops or coheres fails to accord with reality. Argumentation, even in a field with heavy 
moral interest, is not directly affected by moral justifications and, consequently, any classification of 
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discriminatory headings in terms of justice will fail if it assumes that it is. Argumentation recursively 
connects in its own special way, operating and drawing out its own limits. Secondly, Luhmann's 
theory of decision was developed through productive opposition to Raz's jurisprudence. The aim of 
Chapters 9 and 10 was to articulate a contribution to how law constructs its decision and then to 
apply the identified limits to discrimination cases.  
 
EVALUATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
One of the aims of this thesis has been to provide a preliminary proposal for the social basis of 
discrimination from a systems theory perspective. For reasons of economy, racism was chosen as 
the archetype best placed to explicate this social basis. However, reliance on such an expansive 
series of system references in the mass media, morality, and art, anticipates a framework which is 
equally applicable to other characteristics protected under anti-discrimination law. A few, key 
illustrations were given as to how racial communications can be understood through this framework. 
A more in-depth socio-historical study that considers the development of certain trends in each of a 
number of the sub-systems of modern society may pay dividends in further highlighting this complex 
and elusive object of study. 
A route for further enquiry might consider a thicker description of law’s relationship to 
discrimination. The thesis sought to develop innovative insights into the necessary limits on the 
communication of legal decisions and of legal argumentation as they appear in discrimination cases. 
Other possible lines of enquiry, and exploration of legal limits are certainly available. One such route, 
already mentioned by the socio-genetic development of manners and courtesy in Chapter 4, would 
be to re-describe Anti-Discrimination Law as coupled with different branches of law which tackle 
comparable problems. Indeed, it was suggested from the historical excursus of Chapter 4, that Anti-
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Discrimination Law is a modern emanation of a certain type of social regulation concerned with 
delimiting the boundaries of esteem and respect by reference to the structural limitations of society. 
This reorientation would move the discipline away from the internal legal picture that associates the 
field with employment law, or the broader impetus that strives to place it within the purview of 
constitutional law and human rights. Anti-Discrimination Law could be moved closer to its historical 
antecedents and thus could gain a more coherent, sociological explanation for the law, which has 
the advantage of aligning with the social basis for discrimination identified in this thesis. Anti-
Discrimination law would thus be aligned with the long tradition in which a person's reputation and 
social status are protected by law by reference to the limitations of communication. For example, 
Nicola Lacey (2008) has argued that English criminal law in the 19th century was acutely focused on 
identifying bad character and protecting reputation. With the provision of functional comparators 
comes functionally comparable issues faced by the law and, more importantly, functionally 
comparable solutions. 
One of the objectives for isolating the aesthetic component of discrimination was to bring our 
understanding of the phenomenon much closer to its older counterpart, in which discrimination 
corresponded to ideas of taste and expertise associated with the distribution of respectful, 
esteemable social status. In so doing, however, the argument was made in Chapters 5 and 6, that 
the aesthetic component played a key role in  allowing discrimination’s meaning to be terribly 
elusive. Art permits racism to return because it shifts the active intensity of race into different 
contexts through a type of metempsychosis: (i) a communicated judgment which combines to that 
which was known before about an employee (one's impressions, achievements, comportment) with 
the unknown (the difference between declarations and their actual achievements, their contribution 
to the company, their fit into the workplace culture); (ii) the jolt of race combines recognition with 
astonishment. A working relationship is completely re-patterned when the race of the person is 
revealed. Is this relevant or irrelevant? And in respect of which variables at work - task, 
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presentational ability, working ethic, etc.? This argument was predicated upon Deleuze's re-
interpretation of Nietzsche's law of Eternal Return, such that only that which remained different, 
and not the same, could return again and again. Artistic communication posits a caesura between 
the before and after that punctuates the career of an employee and the history of a work-place. Are 
there categories or instances of discrimination which cannot re-emerge because they fail the test of 
Eternal Return?  
The return of racism can only come about through the capacity of supporting distinctions remaining 
available, thereby allowing a certain level of inner difference and complexity to be maintained. As 
noted in Chapters 5 and 6, this holding pattern between communicatively discrete systems can only 
be maintained through reliance on structural couplings and special restrictions on communication – 
the interdiction of moral self-exemption (finding and rejecting hypocrisy) and a restriction on artistic 
external-reference (finding and rejecting derivative qualities to protect the originality of the artistic 
work).395 If we are to find that certain types of discrimination lose their intensity and fail the test of 
Eternal Return, then this may be a profitable avenue on which to make further enquiries. For the 
emergence of the artistic object to take place, its originality and inner dimensions are imagined 
through identifying and discounting external causes. The object of art must in some way emerge and 
detach itself from its conditions of construction. It must have an inner complexity. On this basis, 
some artistic objects may be criticized for a lack of originality.396  
In the history of art, there is a long tradition of distributing both esteem and originality. This can be 
considered to be similar in approach to the way in which the essential characteristics protected 
under Anti-Discrimination Law are given meaning. For example: craft, gastronomy (until recently), 
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 But, some not, which is why Shakespeare's Hamlet is hailed as such a significant artistic achievement. For 
example, the leading character seems to have an inner complexity capable of supporting many different 
interpretations. Hamlet can be re-imagined anew for each new generation and can say something of import on 




embroidery, flower-arranging, and fashion were excluded from the pantheon of high art because of 
their instrumental, decorative, and everyday qualities.397 The intensity which allowed this 
derivative/original distribution was gender. Fan-art and zines are denigrated as vain and poor 
reproductions of original art-works, and video-games are proclaimed as derivative based on framing 
the interactive input of the user as an external contribution to video-games. Here the intensity is 
age. Non-Western art is described as immature and rustic. The intensity involved could be race, 
ethnicity, or nationality. The fact that artistic works produced in art therapy or during incarceration 
are dismissed as overly instrumental or naive could be explained by reference to disability as an 
intensive process.  
Could this trend provide a further insight into the social basis on which discrimination discriminates? 
Possibly so. It may suggest that in order for the aesthetic experience to enable a transformation and 
re-emergence of racism depends on what amounts to the constitutive restriction of art. This limit 
will not be satisfied if the type of discrimination refuses by definition to depend on an inner / outer 
attribution or a derivative / original construction. The most obvious form of discrimination which 
defines itself purely as an externality without reference to an internal aspect is tattoos.398 These are 
decorative etches across a surface that, for the most part, do not signify or at least depend upon an 
inner reference for their meaning. They are presentational indications. The fact that tattoos in public 
have become far more frequent and acceptable may support this speculation. Another form of 
discrimination which may not last into the future is sexuality. For institutional reasons, sexuality has 
not served as a differentiating force for the inner and outer attribution of the artistic object; and yet, 
its increasingly accepted performative nature may place it that position, defined precisely as unable 
to differentiate between inner and outer attributions necessary for the formation of an artistic 
object. If these considerations can gain in cogency then it might suggest that future anti-
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discrimination strategies could revolve around, paradoxically, de-essentializing and 'trashing' that 
which we currently wish to protect. 
In summation: this thesis has re-described the limits of anti-discrimination (and, thereby, anti-
discrimination law) in respect of its social basis, and its legal articulation as argument on the one 
hand, and decision on the other. The insights of systems theory in particular, and of some writings of 
both Foucault and Deleuze, have been deployed to provide a series of innovative responses to 
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